Voices from the Distance:
Radio Martí and the (Pen)Insular Construction of Cuban Identity
by Diana Saco
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The Schmidt College of Arts and Humanities
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master
of Arts in Communications
Florida Atlantic University (Boca Raton, Florida)
August 1992
Thesis Advisor: Fred Fejes, Ph.D.
© 1992 Diana Saco. Permission to reproduce, distribute,
and/or quote from this work for non-profit, educational purposes is freely
granted, always provided that proper reference to the author be included
and that this notice accompany copies of a section or more of text. Reproduction
and/or citation for profit and/or non-educational purposes is expressly
forbidden without prior consent from the author.
Abstract: In May, 1985, the United States government inaugurated
Radio Martí, a broadcast-to-Cuba project with the avowed
intent of providing the Cuban people with objective news. In this study
I argue that an important though tacit political aim of this project is
the reconstruction of Cuban identity. I take a cultural-studies approach
in my "situated interpretation" of Radio Martí transmissions, foregrounding
the mutual, discursive constitution of meaning and self-understanding.
Situating my own voice within the multiple discourses on Cubanness, I note
how the transmissions construct the voice of the Cuban exile in Miami and
evoke an image of a separated Cuban community. I argue that Radio Martí
invites listeners in Cuba to see themselves as belonging to this separated
community and to translate the exile sense of loss into political agency
directed against Castro and the Cuban government.
Table of Contents
Preface
The work which follows was as much a personal exploration as it was
a scholarly one. In the process of writing this study on Radio Martí,
I had to confront my long-held discomfort with reading about and writing
anything which touched on Cuba and on the tensions between Cuban exiles
and Cuban revolutionaries. This discomfort emerged out of my own experiences
as the daughter of Cuban parents who had left Cuba in 1960, a year after
the revolution. I was born and raised in the United States but reared,
as well, in an "exile" context. Growing up within this context meant being
exposed, early on, to the image of a shadowy figure named "Castro." Unable
to understand his political significance, I grasped only that he was "a
bad man." So while other children heard stories about a nameless bogeyman
who stalked them, I grew up understanding simply that my family had lost
its home because of a bogeyman named "Castro." And while other children
engaged in heroic fantasies about confronting their bogeyman, my fantasies
included a row boat and a secret mission to Cuba to try to talk some sense
into this seemingly more real bogeyman and, thereby, free Cuba from his
clutches. (What a strangely political fantasy for a child of about eight
to have.)
Those early fantasies soon gave way to a more practical and theoretical
understanding of the political-economic tensions which resulted in the
Cuban revolution. Having cut my academic teeth on critical studies which
adopted a Marxist (and/or a feminist) perspective, I developed sympathies
for what I regarded (and still regard) as the structurally oppressed--sympathies
which can be variously described as "dangerously radical" and "naive" or,
alternatively, as "concerned" and "politically aware." At the same time,
living in South Florida--in the midst of one of the most anti-Castro, exiled
Cuban communities in the United States, and in the midst of family members
and older friends who shared these anti-Castro sentiments--I felt constrained
in voicing ideas about the structural oppression of the working class or
anything else that smacked, even remotely, of a communist perspective.
It was only after leaving this context, and the subtle pressures it created
to "think like an exile," that I was finally able to reflect on the assumptions
which had patterned so much of my early thinking on Cuba.
In this respect, the study which follows is dependent on a distancing
from that "exiled" context. As I make clear in Chapter III, however, this
distancing is still very much situated within the multiple communities
which have contributed to my (albeit, fractured and contradictory) sense
of self. My sense of belonging to an exile Cuban community--though mediated,
over time, by other senses of belonging--still exercises its own subtle
pressures on my thinking. To give an example, I solicited support for this
project from various quarters and found myself confronted, on the one hand,
by family members who enthusiastically inundated me with newspaper clippings
on Radio Martí and personal recollections and opinions about Cuba
and Cuban politics; and, on the other hand, by academic colleagues and
friends who had their own critical views to share on Cuban politics and
on the history of U.S. interventions in Cuba. As a consequence of these
contradictory pulls, the position I stake out for myself vis-à-vis
the Cuban revolution is one of ambivalence.
With respect to U.S. interventions in Cuba, however--including projects
like Radio Martí--my position is less ambivalent. Until recently,
U.S. policy towards Cuba had been conditioned, at least in part, by "national
security" assumptions about the bi-polar nature of the international system.
Given the recent demise of the Soviet bloc and the much touted "end of
the Cold War," the United States could certainly now afford to assume a
more conciliatory posture towards Cuba. It could, at a minimum, relax its
economic embargo against Cuba (an embargo which has been in effect since
1961). Instead, the United States has continued its policy of isolating
Cuba, both politically and economically. Furthermore, it has stepped up
its broadcast-to-Cuba campaign, continuing its Radio Martí program
and launching the TV Martí project in 1990. Insofar as the
program content on Radio Martí covers recent changes in the Soviet
Union and the Eastern bloc countries, the aim of these transmissions seems
to be to modify the political identity of Cubans on the island and to spur
the end of Communism in Cuba, patterning these changes after those in Europe.
In the meantime, the common wisdom in the United States has it that Cuban
Communism is not long for this world. One recent episode of MacNeil/Lehrer
included a segment on Cuba entitled "Focus--Numbered Days?" (1992). And
a recent episode of Frontline was devoted to an analysis of "Castro:
The Last Communist" (1992). In the context of the United States' self-described
role as "defender of the Free World" and its ideological antagonism towards
"Communist regimes," American commercial and government programs of this
type take the subtle form of a threat. From their standpoint, of course,
they are simply providing objective coverage of international and Cuban
"realities," foregrounding the economic hardships faced by the Cuban people
and indicating that these hardships have resulted from Castro's intransigence.
Not surprisingly, however, no mention is made of how the U.S. embargo may
contribute to the economic hardships on the island.
My analysis aims at an understanding of how Radio Martí tries
to effect changes in Cuban "realities"--that is, how it operates discursively.
In this respect, the following study may be read as a treatise on what
is required to make broadcast campaigns of this type better: a reading
which would imply that I am in sympathy with Radio Martí's project.
As I hope will become clear, however, I disassociate myself from those
who would view the project as "objective"--that is, as concerned primarily
with the "free flow of information"--and therefore as normatively defensible
on universal grounds (for example, that every human being has the right
to "information"). Radio Martí is a fundamentally political
project. As such, even its normative underpinnings are open to debate.
Once the political nature of the project is understood, one can begin to
raise questions about whether the United States government should be engaged
in projects of this type, or whether, alternatively, it should seek some
other (perhaps, more diplomatic) policy towards Cuba. I have written this
work in the spirit of seeking such alternatives.
I conducted this study as a concurrent graduate student in the Department
of Communication of Florida Atlantic University and in the Department of
Political Science of the University of Minnesota. Consequently, I have
been assisted by two academic support networks. This study benefitted from
the financial support I received from the University of Minnesota's Harold
Leonard Memorial Film Study Fellowship, which I held during completion
of this project (1991-92). I would also like to acknowledge the constructive
criticisms and friendship of the following people with whom I have been
associated at both of these universities: Clay Steinman, Fred Fejes, Mike
Budd, Jennifer Milliken, Mark Laffey, Jutta Weldes, Eric Selbin, Rhona
Leibel, Paula Tuchman, and members of the International Relations Colloquium
of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota.
In addition, I would like to thank my mother and sister, Bertha and
Nikki Saco, for their unconditional love and their constant prompting to
"get the thing done"; and also those members of my family who provided
the "exile" opinions (and the anxieties) which inform this project. Finally,
I dedicate this study to the memory of my father, Ernesto Antonio Saco,
who--more than anyone else--imbued me with a sense of loss for a homeland
I never knew.
I. Introduction
This study is about voices: the insertion of my voice into a chorus
of distant voices, voices from the past and from abroad, which attempt
to articulate what it is to be Cuban. More often strident than harmonious,
this chorus has included voices as diverse as those of anti-Castro exiles
and pro-socialist revolutionaries, each claiming to speak for the Cuban
people, in part, by invoking the name of Cuban national hero José
Martí.
Martí (1853-1895) was a nineteenth-century writer and revolutionary
who died in an early military expedition of Cuba's Second War for Independence
(1895-1898). Exiled from Cuba when he was eighteen for writing a seditious
letter (Foner 1975), he studied and worked as a journalist in Spain and
in several countries in Latin America, finally settling in the United States
in 1881. Owing perhaps to the appeal of his romantic vision of Cuba and
to his own martyrdom in Cuba's struggle for independence from Spain, Martí
has become a symbolic figure of lo cubano (Cubanness) for both islanders
and exiles, revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. In effect, what
Martí helped to summon into existence was a sense of national belonging
to Cuba as patria.
Patria is a concept which defies translation. Given its etymology,
it is often translated as fatherland. However, in her analysis of
a burgeoning sense of Cuban national identity in the nineteenth-century
literature of exiled writers like Martí, Méndez Rodenas points
out that the metaphorical imagery of nature and origin which these early
writers used to signify "Cuba" as patria is decidedly feminine (1986,
74). In Spanish grammar, moreover, the term is feminine gendered: viz.,
la patria. For these reasons, motherland seems a closer approximation
to what is meant by patria. But even motherland does not
adequately capture the sentimental attachment that patria invokes.
While I will, nevertheless, use the term motherland throughout this
study to convey patria, the term should be understood not simply
as a place of origin, but as a place of belonging: and in the case of exiles
like Martí, as a place where one longs to be.
Notwithstanding the symbolic significance which Martí's work
has invoked for virtually all Cubans, substantively, his writings have
lent themselves to multiple interpretations and hence to divergent ideological
appropriations. As one Cuban literary historian has noted:
[T]he ambiguous, literary, and therefore open character of
Martí's prose is what explains, at least in part, why his works,
like the Bible, often become all things to all Cubans. Martí's ideology
continues to be used both to praise and to condemn the United States, both
to justify and to deny the present Cuban government, and to inspire both
exiles and islanders alike. (Santí 1986, 140-41).
This study concerns one such appropriation. On May 20, 1985, the United
States government inaugurated a Cuba-broadcasting program entitled Radio
Martí: a self-described "service program for Cuba, from the
Voice of the United States of America" [12]. (1)
The radio program was conceived by the Reagan administration and members
of the exiled Cuban community as a medium through which to disseminate
objective news to the people of Cuba: ostensibly to counter propaganda
by Fidel Castro and his government. (2)
Opponents of the project, however, did not seem satisfied that it had
only benign intentions. To those members of Congress who attempted to block
passage of the Broadcast to Cuba Act via filibustering tactics, the project
signalled a return to the impassioned Cold-War politics of the '50s: one
legislator proposed renaming the project the "John Foster Dulles Cold War
Mentality Memorial Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act" (cited in Frederick
1986, 29). On this view, Radio Martí's mission is no less propagandistic
than the "information monopoly" (US/Report 1989, 28) of the Cuban
government which it seeks to break.
The fact that Radio Martí is a government-controlled broadcast
puts it squarely in the realm of propaganda. That is, we can assume, pretty
much without qualification, that the broadcast has a specific political
intent. But what does this assertion mean for the way Radio Martí
has been and should be approached as an object of analysis? Most of the
academic work on broadcast campaigns by the United States government has
been confined to the field of international communications (see, for example,
Fejes 1986; Frederick 1986). Within this framework, writers have tended
to draw from mass communication theories to argue that Radio Martí's
overtly propagandistic objectives are destined to fail. This assumption
of failure follows from the ways in which some media scholars have characterized
the various "phases" marked by research developments in the history of
media study.
Early Media Research
According to one media scholar (McQuail 1984, 176), the "first phase"
of media study, dating from about the 1900s to the 1930s, was marked by
a common suspicion that the media exercise extraordinary power over mass
society. In a similar vein, Lowery and DeFleur (1983, 10) maintain that
the concept of mass society--understood as a "distinctive pattern
of social organization" emerging from the processes of industrialization,
urbanization, and modernization--facilitated this view of media power.
To understand why this is so, we should bear in mind that early social
theorists tended to view mass society as a modern ill which had displaced
the traditional communities of the pre-modern era and the integrative functions
which these communities had served. Hence, in contrast to pockets of socially
integrated communities adhering to traditional norms and values, mass society
was viewed as an agglomeration of individuals of different class, ethnic,
and racial statuses migrating to urban-industrial centers and clashing
with each other (Lowery and DeFleur 1983, 10-11). Given this view of society,
it is not surprising that early social theorists were skeptical about the
possibilities of "open and easy" (face-to-face) communication:
Open and easy communication as a basis of social solidarity
between people becomes more difficult [in mass society] because
of social differentiation, impersonality and distrust due to psychological
alienation, the breakdown of meaningful social ties, and increasing anomie
among the members. (Lowery and DeFleur 1983, 11; their emphasis).
What this essentially atomistic view of modern society meant for early
notions about the power of the media was that given the dearth of traditional
social ties, the media confronted and overwhelmed separate and lonely individuals
who lacked a sense of place in the world. This theory of media power has
been dubbed the magic bullet theory or, alternatively, the hypodermic
theory of the media--labels which well convey the penetrative power
attributed to the media by early adherents of this theory. Lowery and DeFleur
summarize this theory as follows:
-
The media present messages to the members of the mass society who perceive
them more or less uniformly.
-
Such messages are stimuli that influence the individual's emotions and
sentiments strongly.
-
The stimuli lead individuals to respond in a somewhat uniform manner, creating
changes in thought and action that are like those changes in other persons.
-
Because individuals are not held back by strong social controls from others,
such as shared customs and traditions, the effects of mass communications
are powerful, uniform and direct. (1983, 23).
Of this early view of mass society, let me note two features to which I
will return later. First, early social theorists maintained a distinction
between community and society. At a minimum, community was understood as
a face-to-face mode of interaction; consequently, a community was regarded
as a local and interpersonal phenomenon. Second, and relatedly, modernity
was regarded as an irreversible development which signalled the breakdown
of traditional, face-to-face communities and the emergence of mass society.
As I view it, what McQuail terms the "second phase" of media research
(1984, 176) accepted many of these assumptions about mass society. I will
explain shortly why I think this is so. For the moment, let me note that
media researchers of this second phase were not initially concerned with
disavowing the claims of earlier scholars; they were concerned, rather,
with offering more systematic evidence about the effects of the media.
As McQuail notes, the early suspicion about media power was based more
on the observed popularity of the media than on scientific investigation
of their effects (1984, 176). Efforts to approach media research in a more
systematic fashion were inaugurated in the early '30s with the Payne Fund
Studies, a series of research projects concerned with analyzing the influence
of motion pictures on children in the United States (McQuail 1984, 176;
Lowery and DeFleur 1983, 31-57).
McQuail argues that this second phase of media research (roughly, from
the 1930s to the 1960s) was marked by "a new statement of conventional
wisdom which assigned a more modest role to media in causing any of their
chosen or unintended effects" (1984, 177). As a statement about, at the
very least, the Payne Fund Studies, this gloss seems incorrect, for in
point of fact most of these studies concluded that motions pictures do
exercise a good deal of influence over the attitudes and behaviors of children
(Lowery and DeFleur 1983, 54). Consequently, it may be more accurate to
say that what marked the Payne Fund projects as a new phase of media research
was that they introduced the use of statistics as a tool for quantifying
and measuring media effects and that they made a more explicit attempt
to incorporate the insights that had been gleaned from studies in behavioral
psychology, employing variations of the stimulus-response (S-R) model in
their analyses of media effects.
One of the most famous expressions of this effort to make media research
more systematic via adoption of the S-R model was provided by Harold D.
Lasswell in 1948. Lasswell offered the following concise formula for understanding
the media communication process:
A convenient way to describe an act of communication is to
answer the following questions:
-
Who
-
Says What
-
In Which Channel
-
To Whom
-
With What Effect (cited in McQuail and Windahl 1981, 10).
From this standpoint, media communication was viewed as an essentially
linear process whereby a communicator (who) sends a message (what) through
a medium (channel) to a receiver (whom) with an effect. The link between
this model and the S-R model is evident if we think of the message as the
stimulus and the effect as the response. It should also be noted that the
model assumed that the media always have an effect of some sort. In this
respect, then, Lasswell's model accepted first-phase assumptions about
the power of the media.
For better or for worse, the Lasswellian model established the terms
in which much of the subsequent media research of this second phase was
set. My point is not that research during the rest of this phase was stilted;
I mean only that where advances in media research were sought, they were
generally modifications (sometimes, quite elaborate modifications) of this
basic model. One of the ironic consequences of second-phase attempts to
make media research more systematic was that several studies conducted
in this period and employing scientific techniques actually resulted in
negative or inconclusive evidence about the power of the media. No doubt,
this is why McQuail, after all, characterizes this phase of media research
as the "no-effect" phase (1984, 177). The overwhelming conclusion of media
studies conducted during this period, as McQuail notes (1984, 177), was
drawn by Joseph Klapper in his famous summary of the then-current state
of knowledge about The Effects of Mass Communication (1960). More
than a literature survey of the field-to-date, Klapper argued in favor
of the new "phenomenistic" approach to media research, which called for
situating the media amid other social and cultural influences which might
mitigate against or otherwise soften media effects:
[The phenomenistic approach] is in essence a shift away
from the tendency to regard mass communication as a necessary and sufficient
cause of audience effects, toward a view of the media as influences, working
amid other influences, in a total situation. . . . In short, attempts to
assess a stimulus which was presumed to work alone have given way to an
assessment of the role of that stimulus in a total observed phenomenon.
(Klapper 1960, 5; his emphasis).
Note that, according to Klapper's description, the new approach only attempted
to "situate" the earlier S-R framework; it did not attempt the more radical
move of displacing the S-R model. Consequently, the phenomenistic approach
still adopted some of the assumptions of the earlier framework. To understand
what was apparently new about this approach, consider one of the exemplars
which Klapper (1960, 5) mentions: viz., the "Decatur studies" (Katz and
Lazarsfeld, 1955).
The Decatur Studies drew from an earlier analysis by Lazarsfeld, Berelson
and Gaudet (1944) in which the authors had hypothesized that the effects
of the media are filtered through a number of other influences and are
therefore, at best, indirect. More specifically, the authors of this first
study had suggested that communication flows from the media to opinion
leaders and from the latter to informal groups of followers. In Decatur,
Illinois, Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) proceeded to investigate this two-step
flow theory of communication, locating informal groups, identifying
the opinion leaders within these groups, and interviewing group members
about their views on specific issues covered in the media. This study,
according to Lowery and DeFleur, "represented the first clear and intensive
focus on social relationships and their role in the mass communication
process" (1983, 201). In sharp contrast to traditional communication theories
based on atomistic notions about mass society, the two-step flow studies
re-emphasized the mediating role played by informal groups. In short, these
studies marked the "rediscovery of the primary group" as a site of socialization,
which patterned, among other things, people's interpretations of media
messages (Lowery and DeFleur 1983, 180-81).
The studies and commentaries summarized above all attempt to set into
high relief the characteristics of "second-phase" media research as a new,
systematic, and contextually-situated approach to communication: descriptive
terms intended to mark this phase as one distinct from earlier studies
of mass communication. Despite this characterization, it is clear
from my summary that not all the studies and models which emerged during
this second phase contradicted the conventional wisdom of the first phase.
As I noted earlier, the Payne Fund Studies argued that motion pictures
do influence children. And as McQuail and Windahl comment, the Lasswell
formula "assumed that messages always have effects" (1981, 11). Does it,
therefore, make more sense to talk about two significant sub-phases
within this second-phase development of media research: one (characterized
by the Payne Fund Studies and the Lasswell formula) which is more scientific
than earlier studies while still accepting the direct-effects assumption,
and the second (characterized, in particular, by the Decatur Studies) which
is both more scientific and more critical of the first phase of media research?
While this way of putting things would be handy for noting some differences
within
second-phase approaches to media research, I think it would tend to exaggerate
the distinctions. Furthermore, even the distinction between so-called
"first-phase" and "second-phase" media research may be overdrawn.
To be sure, I am not asserting that there were no differences between
first-phase mass-society theorists and second-phase media researchers like
Katz and Lazarsfeld. Clearly, the latter rejected (a) the view that modern
society is atomistic, (b) that the flow of information from the media to
their audiences is unmediated, and hence (c) that the media have direct
effects on their audiences. Note, however, what was not rejected in this
view. The Decatur Study school of thought did not deny that societies have
become more differentiated and impersonal--in a word, more modernized.
It did not reject the view that modernity has signalled the breakdown of
traditional, face-to-face communities. Both schools of thought agreed that
where interpersonal networks existed, these pre-existing affiliations would
mediate the impact of the media on persons who identified with (or, more
concretely, saw themselves as belonging to) these groups. The key difference
between the two was that mass-society theorists argued that interpersonal
networks (defined narrowly as traditional, face-to-face communities) no
longer existed. Katz and Lazarsfeld, however, defined interpersonal networks
more broadly to encompass modern forms of primary group affiliations. They
posited, moreover, that these primary groups pre-existed the communication
process and were no less capable of influencing in-group perceptions of
the media message than traditional communities might have been.
Although Katz and Lazarsfeld never speak specifically in terms of pre-existing
primary groups, I use this term only to convey their sense that these primary
groups have their sources in the broader social and cultural context. That
is, they pre-exist the media communication process insofar as they are
not constructed by the media. The crucial issue this raises is whether
or not the media can be viewed in their own right as sources of identity
formation--here understood as a process by which a person develops a sense
of belonging to a particular group or community. This issue was not considered
by Katz and Lazarsfeld. They assumed instead that groups and group identity
were the product of face-to-face social encounters. They argued, moreover,
that these groups, in turn, helped to pattern their members' perceptions
of things: hence the nexus between the small group and the development
of meaning which Katz and Lazarsfeld emphasized in their study.(3)
Stated somewhat differently, these second-phase researchers maintained
that primary groups provided their members with particular interpretive
frames for understanding the world and their place in it.
What I have been suggesting is that this view is not very different
from mass-society assumptions about traditional communities and the meaning-constitutive
function which they were taken to serve. Both schools of thought essentially
viewed the media as sources of information (the message), while they tended
to regard face-to-face social networks as the definitive sites for the
formation of identity and the constitution of meaning. In this respect,
both accepted the view that the interpersonal (the face-to-face relationship)
is more powerful than the impersonal (exposure to the media) for the patterning
of human perception. In short, both regarded pre-existing groups or communities
as interpretive communities which could, in principle, modify the
effects of the media. As a summary of the assumptions made by first-phase
theorists, these points are somewhat more difficult to grasp precisely
because they accepted the mass-society argument that traditional communities
no longer existed; but these assumptions are implicit in their pessimistic
diagnosis that it was the very absence of traditional communities as mediating
factors which made modern individuals more vulnerable to the media's power.
In summary, early social theorists maintained a distinction between
community and society, and they argued that modernity signalled the demise
of the former. If communities are understood as traditional, face-to-face
networks of relationships, and societies as impersonal networks of relationships
structured by broader social practices, than second-phase media researchers
like Katz and Lazarsfeld accepted this distinction. In contrast to first-phase
media researchers, however, they posited the existence of primary groups
as sites of socialization which fit, analytically, somewhere between the
concepts of the cohesive traditional community and the conflictual mass
society.
My arguments about the assumptions shared by first-phase and second-phase
media researchers have not been intended to minimize the contributions
of the latter. We may still accept the view, offered by commentators like
McQuail, Lowery, DeFleur, and of course Klapper, that the rediscovery of
the primary group as a mediating factor provided an important corrective
to the earlier conventional wisdom about the power of the media. Summarizing
the impact of second-phase studies, McQuail notes:
It was not that media had been shown to be, under all conditions,
without effects but that they operated within a pre-existing structure
of social relationships and in a given social and cultural context. These
social and cultural factors have a primary role in shaping choice, attention
and response by audiences. This new sobriety of assessment was slow to
modify opinion outside the social-scientific community. It was particularly
hard to accept for those who made a living out of advertising and propaganda
and for those in the media who valued the myth of their own great potency.
(1984, 177).
Of course, this narrative about developments in media research which I,
with McQuail's help, have just recited only brings us up to about the 1960s.
As McQuail notes, however,
hardly had the "no effect" conclusion been disseminated by
social scientists than it was subject to a re-examination by those who
doubted that the whole story had been written and who were reluctant to
dismiss the possibility that media might indeed have important social effects.
(1984, 177).
This point ushers in the "third phase" of media research, which, according
to McQuail, "is still with us" (1984, 177). The definitive feature of this
current phase of media research is the continued search for the possible
effects which the media might have, but a search buttressed by a more complex
sense of the interrelationships between our experience of the media and
our seemingly more immediate experience of social reality. Rather than
review current insights now, I have reserved this discussion for the next
chapter, in which I outline a theoretical framework for understanding these
complex relationships. Drawing from recent work in the area of cultural
studies and, more particularly, from work on the emergence of the nation
as an object of cultural significance, I will suggest how these works offer
a truly new approach to media research: that is, an approach which constitutes
a more radical break from first- and second-phase assumptions about the
necessary pre-existence of interpretive communities. In the meantime, I
want to return the discussion to Radio Martí to show how one recent
scholar approaches his topic still very much within the terms of first-
and second-phase media research.
Radio Martí as Propaganda
In his commentary on Radio Martí, John Spicer Nichols argues
that proponents need to adopt a "communication perspective" to gain a more
realistic assessment of Radio Martí's likelihood of success (1984,
35). Given his tenor, Nichols is clearly in agreement with McQuail's observation
about propagandists outside the social-scientific community: namely that
they have more-often-than-not resisted the "new sobriety of assessment"
about media power characteristic of second-phase media research (McQuail
1984, 177).
Having adopted a more sober communication perspective, Nichols proceeds
to argue that Radio Martí is destined to fail. However, since his
commentary was written a year before the radio station began operation,
Nichols' argument is not based on analysis of Radio Martí transmissions.
Instead, he draws his conclusion from a summary of earlier media research
on propaganda campaigns ("How International Propaganda Works," 36-7). In
the following quotation, note Nichols' assumption that Radio Martí
is based on the first-phase theory about the power of the media, and note
also how he relies on second-phase research findings to dispel "this simplistic
theory":
The Radio Martí plan is predicated on the outmoded "bullet"
theory of communication which treats members of the audience like ducks
sitting on a pond. All the communicator needs is a rifle, the proper ammunition,
and good aim in order to achieve a communication effect. Virtually all
of the propaganda activity during the two world wars was based on this
simplistic theory. We now know that the processes by which bullets and
words achieve their effects are very different, and that most of this wartime
propaganda was either ineffective or had an effect other than intended.
With the development of more sophisticated research since World War
II, communication researchers began to realize what probably should have
been obvious all along--that in order for communication to take place a
message must not only be created and transmitted, it also must be received,
accepted, and internalized. The major conclusion of multitudes of studies
is that members of the audience are not passive recipients of messages
designed by a master propagandist to persuade or inform. Rather the audience
actively selects or rejects available messages based on complex psychological
processes and social relationships. (1984, 36).
The argument Nichols offers his readers can be restated roughly in the
following syllogistic manner:
Major Premise: Radio Martí is predicated on the
bullet theory of communication.
Minor Premise: The bullet theory is outmoded--that is, researchers
since World War II have shown that communication simply does not work this
way.
Conclusion: Therefore, Radio Martí will be ineffective.
If Radio Martí is, indeed, predicated on the bullet theory of communication,
then I actually find this argument persuasive. But why accept the major
premise?
The bullet theory was an hypothesis about how the media work their magic.
It was ultimately relinquished by subsequent media researchers who argued
that their predecessors had not taken adequate stock of the audience. According
to second-phase critics, first-phase researchers had ignored the interpretive
strategies which audiences might employ. They had assumed that traditional
communities (which, on their view, had been the definitive sites for learning
interpretive frameworks) no longer existed. Consequently, they had postulated
the character of the audience, conceiving the latter as an amalgam of socially
disparate individuals with essentially the same psychological make up:
no more than passive recipients vulnerable to the media's messages.
Why assume that Radio Martí, like the early bullet-theory proponents,
has not taken stock of its listeners? Why assume that it has not considered
what might best pull their strings? In offering this assumption as fact,
Nichols makes the opposite error of not taking adequate stock of the communicator.
Consequently, rather than analyzing Radio Martí's transmissions
in terms of how they address the issues of reception, acceptance and internalization,
Nichols writes as though Radio Martí proponents have simply ignored
these issues.
Nichols is correct, of course, to mention that something as fundamental
as whether or not listeners in Cuba can receive and will listen to Radio
Martí is a necessary precondition of its effectiveness as a propaganda
campaign. My claim, here, is simply that Radio Martí programmers
are not unaware of this. Radio Martí transmits on short-wave and
on non-commercial medium-wave (AM) frequencies. Furthermore, at regular
intervals throughout the broadcast day, it changes the short-wave frequencies
on which it transmits to avoid atmospheric interference. This channel diversity
suggests an attempt on the part of operators to reach the widest possible
audience.
Of course, the radio program has always been vulnerable to jamming by
the Cuban government. In fact, in 1990, when the Voice of America (VOA)
stepped up its Cuba-broadcasting campaign by inaugurating TV Martí,
the Cuban government responded by jamming both the TV broadcasts and also
Radio Martí's AM broadcasts. Consequently, Radio Martí's
reception in Cuba is even more limited now than it was initially. The relative
success of the Cuban government's jamming operations has itself become
a hotly debated topic. Cuban newspapers argue that the jamming of the broadcasts
is highly successful, while the Spanish-language newspapers published in
South Florida for the exiled Cuban community argue that some of the broadcasts
still manage to get through. To show that transmissions are getting through,
Radio Martí cites correspondence apparently written by listeners
in Cuba who attest to both its receptivity and its popularity among islanders.(4)
Given these responses, it should be clear that Radio Martí proponents
have not ignored the issue of receptivity.
Even assuming that the transmissions can be heard, however, Nichols
doubts whether they will be heard in the way they are intended: he cites
a number of studies on selective perception which indicate that
listeners tend to hear only those messages which confirm their already
held views, while disavowing or reinterpreting those messages which conflict
with their views. Following this, Nichols implies that the effectiveness
of Radio Martí depends on whether Cuban audiences are willing to
listen to "the voice of a hostile nation" (1984, 37). Unfortunately, since
he does not analyze Radio Martí's content, Nichols ignores the myriad
ways in which the transmissions are coded as friendly and even familial.
As a consequence, he rules out the very possibility that they might be
interpreted in any way other than hostile.
How Radio Martí codes its transmissions--how it identifies the
voices which speak through it--lies at the heart of its efforts to gain,
in Nichols' terms, audience "acceptance" and "internalization" of its message.
At issue, then, are the discursive strategies which Radio Martí
employs in projecting an image--or, more appropriately, in voicing an identity.
Insofar as Radio Martí presents itself as a friendly voice, insofar
as it addresses and seeks to undermine local constructions of, for example,
the United States as a hostile voice, Radio Martí operators are
aware of the interpretive framework which their listeners might be employing.
And this awareness, moreover, informs the discursive strategies which the
radio program uses. These strategies are missed by scholars like Nichols
who insist on dismissing the project as naive propaganda.
Granted, Radio Martí is a propaganda campaign if by this we mean
a government-operated project with some (perhaps, nefarious) political
intent. We are mistaken, however, when we assume that such campaigns must
of necessity rely on a defrocked mass media theory for designing their
strategies. Analyzing Radio Martí as propaganda poses problems
for researchers interested in understanding the more complex mechanisms
by which it operates. This is so because propaganda has a history which
seems relentlessly tied up with simplistic notions about the malleability
of people. That is, given popular and scholarly understandings of the term
propaganda, this word unfortunately connotes the sense that what
we are dealing with is not only intentionally misleading and biased, but
also wrong-headed in its assumption that people can be so easily duped.
As contemporary scholars who have accepted some of the "sobriety" of second-phase
media research, therefore, we are more likely to treat what we take to
be overtly propagandist as naive. Easily, then, any attempt by a campaign
of this type to present itself as a viable project seems to us a chimera.
Radio Martí as Discourse
Sobriety in making conclusions about the power of the media is, generally
speaking, a good thing, but not when it forecloses avenues of investigation.
From my standpoint, Radio Martí cannot be dismissed as mere propaganda
when this is understood as false, ideological rhetoric. Nor, on the other
hand, should it be accepted on its own terms as counter-propaganda, for
this, too, preempts analysis by suggesting that what is being transmitted
is simply true, objective information. Both moves unreflectively assume
that what gets to count as propaganda or as truth is self-evident:
ignored are the interpretive practices by which even these apparently self-evident
objects are brought into being. At a minimum, the existence of propaganda
and of truth presupposes a concrete, historical community: a we
who constructs its truths (its
world) and its communal sense of
self (its identity) vis-à-vis those truths. Consequently,
media research on the effectiveness of so-called propaganda necessarily
entails some understanding of the particular interpretive communities which
comprise its audience. On the face of it, this view seems to support arguments
about selective perception. Selective perception theory, however, is severely
limited in one important respect: it cannot account for change. It tends
to assume that shared beliefs are pre-given and affect the impact of media
messages, rather than being affected by them.
To reiterate a point I made earlier, the problem with this view lies
in the assumed pre-existence of community: that is, in the view
that the making of a community is a process which occurs prior to or independent
of the media communication process. Of course, scholars who have adhered
to this understanding of community do not deny that communication is perhaps
the most important mode of human interaction by which communities are created
and sustained. For them, however, the relevant form of communication here
is always interpersonal. They believe, in effect, that we know who we are--what
communities we belong to--because of the personal experiences we have in
our day-to-day interactions with other people. But what sorts of face-to-face
encounters make it possible for us to see ourselves as, for example, Americans--or,
in my case, as a Cuban-American? Clearly, there are a number of
people whom we regard as belonging to our national communities who nonetheless
remain personally anonymous to us. In fact, we will never meet and personally
interact with the majority of these other members.
Not all senses of belonging--not all communities--are dependent on interpersonal
forms of communication. In fact, as one contemporary scholar (Anderson
1983) has argued, the community which is the nation can only be
"imagined" into existence since it cannot be the product of one's personal
encounter with millions of others. It follows from this that impersonal
forms of communication, such as print and telecommunication media, are
central to the way in which some communities are created and sustained.
Radio Martí presents itself as a service program for the Cuban
people. Therefore, to be "effective"--in the sense of, as Nichols puts
it, gaining "acceptance" and "internalization" of its political message
from this particular audience--Radio Martí must, at a minimum, address
its audience as Cubans. In this respect, then, Radio Martí
is involved in projecting an imagined community. In what follows, I argue
that the discourse by which this community is imagined has both sentimental
and critical elements which are brought together through the construct
of the Cuban exile. I indicate how the voice of the Cuban exile
on Radio Martí enacts a sentimental attachment to Cuba and to the
Cuban people as a separated community. This sentimental vision from
afar is linked to a critical sense of what has caused the separation of
the Cuban people: namely, Castro and his government. The enactment of this
exile identity on Radio Martí invites Cubans on the island to identify
themselves in a similar fashion. From a strategic standpoint, the political
intent underpinning this invitation is that as islanders come to accept
this sense of belonging to a separated community, they will come to share
the critical vision of Castro as other which imagining the Cuban
community in this way fosters.
Two theoretical understandings are central to my analysis of Radio Martí
as discourse. The first is an understanding of what is meant by the claim
that the media help to imagine national communities into existence. The
second involves the issue of discursive articulation--that is, the sense
of how a discourse works to (re)configure the popular and/or official ideological
elements which are already available in other discourses. This theoretical
framework is developed in Chapter II. Another important aspect of the theoretical
position I have discussed here and will take up again in the next chapter
is that communal identities (interpersonal or "imagined") help to provide
us with interpretive frames for understanding the things around us. Consequently,
I think it appropriate to comment on the senses of belonging that inform
or situate the interpretations I, myself, offer in this study. This
is the subject of Chapter III. The next chapter (Chapter IV) focuses specifically
on the previous discourses about Cuban national identity from which Radio
Martí draws some of its understandings. In the first part of this
chapter, I review recent scholarly work on the emergent discourse of Cuban
national identity constructed in nineteenth-century Cuban literature. In
the second part of Chapter IV, I consider how the figure of José
Martí has been incorporated into the socialist-revolutionary discourse
of the Cuban government. Having summarized these early-popular and contemporary-official
discourses on Cuban identity, I finally turn my attention, in Chapter V,
to Radio Martí and its articulation of what I call a pen(insular)
view of Cubanness.
II. Theorizing the Mediated Community
Much of the bulk of my argument against first- and second-phase media
research, in Chapter I, concerned the assumed necessary pre-existence of
communities. I accepted the view that communities can, in principle, soften
the effects of the media precisely because they provide their members with
an interpretive frame for understanding the world and their place in it.
In this sense, then, I agreed with and attempted to further the view that
communities are interpretive. In my discussion, I also insisted
on retaining the concept of the community as opposed to the primary
group. I did this precisely because I wanted to continue approaching the
issue of where meaning comes from (of how people might be encouraged to
adopt interpretive frames) by drawing on the connotative sense of community
as collective identity--that is, as something which provides people with
a sense of belonging which situates them in an otherwise chaotic world.
Where I departed from earlier assumptions was in the view that communities
must always be the product of face-to-face human interaction. In particular,
I argued that some senses of belonging (specifically, of belonging to the
national community) are imagined into existence via impersonal forms
of communication such as print and telecommunication media.
It is this last argument which I propose to develop further in this
chapter. I begin my discussion with a summary of Benedict Anderson's (1983)
reflections on the nation as an imagined community. Drawing from this and
other recent work in cultural studies, I explore the specific role of the
media in projecting representations of belonging. In this respect, I narrow
the focus to provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the construction
of mediated communities and their audience address. I then turn
my attention to the concept of discursive articulation as a way of understanding
how the media both draw from and modify a people's already held senses
of belonging. In the final section, I relate this framework to Radio Martí.
Imagining the Nation
The concept of the imagined community has been suggested by Benedict
Anderson in his study of the emergence and continued growth of nationalism
(1983). In outlining his approach, Anderson comments on how his analysis
departs from previous studies of the nation. He begins with the following
paradoxical observation: namely that, in contrast to orthodox Marxist assumptions
about the inevitable demise of the nation, "since World War II every successful
revolution has defined itself in
national terms . . . and, in so
doing, has grounded itself firmly in a territorial and social space inherited
from the prerevolutionary past" (1983, 12). Earlier studies of the nation
had sought its origins in the development of specific social and economic
forces, particularly, in capitalism and the industrial revolution: as a
consequence, theorists prophesied that the later developmental stages of
capitalism and the inevitable emergence of transnational proletarian struggles
would make the nation obsolete. In contrast to this approach, Anderson
seeks the roots of the nation in (Western) culture: specifically, in the
post-Enlightenment secularization of world views and collective identities.
From the standpoint of nationalism studies, the signal importance of this
shift is that it allows Anderson to suggest why the nation as a cultural
artefact has weathered the tides--instead of withering away--despite changes
in social and economic forces. It allows him to suggest why, in fact, the
nation continues to arouse deep emotional attachments (1983, 13-14).
My interest in Anderson's work lies in his explanation of the sense
in which the nation is an "imagined political community":
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.
(1983, 15).
He notes, moreover, that an imagined community cannot be set against some
more authentic, more real notion of community which lies behind it.
In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of
face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined. Communities
are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style
in which they are imagined. (1983, 15).
It should be clear from this description that the imagined community is
distinct from the concepts of the traditional community and the primary
group only with respect to this issue of face-to-face contact. Notwithstanding
this difference, the imagined community still functions to create in its
members a sense of belonging, but it does so via impersonal or public forms
of communication. This point is explicitly made by Anderson in his attempt
to relate the emergence of the nation as an imagined community to the concurrent
development of print-capitalism: specifically, the novel and the newspaper
as literary forms with comparatively new ways of apprehending time (1983,
30-31).
Anderson argues that the ability to imagine a nation as an object of
history depended, at least in part, on having a style of storytelling that
would allow for a sense of historical development (of a before and after).
Similarly, to imagine a community of anonymous others existing at the same
time and presumably engaging in the same kinds of activities as oneself
required a sense of simultaneity (of a meanwhile). In short, what was needed
was a narrative style by which the story of the national community could
be told. Both the novel and the newspaper provided this style of storytelling.
Relatedly, the novel and the newspaper, as written forms, could simultaneously
reach a number of people in a public forum. The single most important requirement
for reaching these people was that they all share the same language: that
is, that they comprise, at the very least, a linguistic community. In their
establishment of mass vernacular languages (as opposed to discreet local
dialects), the print media helped to displace both the earlier oral style
of storytelling and the face-to-face encounters by which the local community
had developed a sense of its past and of the continued co-existence of
its members. In a similar vein, they also displaced the sacred languages
by which religious texts, mediated through the hermeneutic practices of
an ecclesiastical literati, imagined the broader religious communities
like Christendom.
According to Anderson, the novel's projection of the two senses of time
noted above are evident in its typical structuring of events. Time frames
are logically linked together in terms of a before-and-after progression
through which the plot unfolds; but within these time frames, a number
of distinct events occur involving some characters doing one thing while,
in the meantime, other characters are doing something else. Consider the
following example of a narrative segment--one slightly more fleshed out
than the example Anderson offers (1983, 30-31):
Our story begins in the early afternoon. A husband is quarreling
with his wife. In the meantime, and unbeknownst to the husband and wife,
the husband's mistress is at her flat, making love with the wife's lover.
Later that afternoon, the husband telephones the mistress. In the meantime,
the wife is out shopping, and the wife's lover is out somewhere else playing
pool. That evening, the lover is getting drunk in a bar while the husband
and wife dine at home. Resting in her flat after her afternoon tryst with
the wife's lover, the mistress has an ominous dream.
From the standpoint of the reader, these four characters are associated
with one another. This is so despite the fact that some of the characters
are unaware of the existence of some of the others, and none of the characters
are ever aware of the actions of those others who are not immediately present
to them (that is, those characters who are elsewhere). Note that in this
narrative segment, three progressive time frames are indicated: early afternoon,
later that afternoon, and that evening. Within each of these time frames,
different characters simultaneously perform a number of different actions.
As this brief example suggests, the novel projects time in both its diachronic
(historical) and synchronic (simultaneous) dimensions. Readers draw on
these temporal cues to imaginatively associate the four characters with
one another.
Now, to understand why it is that Anderson relates the structure of
the novel to the emergence of the nation as an imagined community, consider
the following structural parody of the example just offered.
Our story begins in 1895. Creole elites, mostly sugar planters
who have been suffering from both Spanish-colonial rule and separatist
insurgencies by the underclasses in Cuba, are actively encouraging the
United States to intervene in these struggles. In the meantime, and unbeknownst
to the parties just mentioned, José Martí and a group of
other Cuban revolutionaries are getting ready to embark on a military expedition
against Spain for the sake of Cuban independence. The situation progressively
worsens over the next three years. During that time, other Cuban revolutionaries
continue the battle for independence begun by Martí's expedition,
while the United States searches for some means of ending Spanish dominion
over the island without giving it over to Cuban national rule. Then in
1898, the explosion of the American warship Maine, in Havana harbor,
is blamed on Spain and provides the United States with the pretext it needs
for intervening. Somewhere else in Cuba, African slaves continue harvesting
the island's sugar crops.
My presentation of Cuban history as narrative is undoubtedly exaggerated,
for in the telling of national histories, one is seldom given narrative
markers like "our story begins." Notwithstanding this superficial difference,
the imagining of national communities such as Cuba has clearly depended
on the literary form of the novel, one cast in vernacular languages and
capable of relating both diachronic and synchronic dimensions of time.(5)
Anderson admits that the sense in which the newspaper also serves the
imaginative functions of community is, perhaps, more difficult to grasp.
However, by pointing out the way in which the newspaper juxtaposes discreet
events whose only similarity is their having occurred on the same day,
Anderson argues that the newspaper effectively works to create a sense
of bounded spaces like "the United States" and "the world" in which a number
of anonymous actors are doing things at the same time. (Note, especially,
the sense of a place bordered by both space and time implied by the very
titles of journals like USA Today and The New York Times.)
This arbitrary inclusion and juxtaposition of otherwise disparate events,
on Anderson's view, foregrounds the sense in which the connection between
them is, at best, imagined. In addition to this, Anderson argues that the
process of reading the newspaper lends itself to our imagining countless
others (in our linguistic community) who are simultaneously engaged in
the same activity. In these ways, the newspaper, too, is involved in a
"profound fictiveness" (1983, 37).
Taken together, these two aspects of the novel and the newspaper (that
is, their narrativity and their written vernacular form) are what have
allowed the storytelling of the nation in terms of origin and destiny and
in terms of anonymous others whom we can, nonetheless, imagine are like
us: existing in the present, as simultaneous members of the national community.
Via the imaginative processes of the print media, Anderson notes, "fiction
seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating the remarkable confidence
of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations" (1983,
40).
Representations of Belonging and Textual
Address
Anderson's sense of community in anonymity (in effect, of the necessary
imagining of all communities too large to be the product of face-to-face
contact) has been taken up by John Tomlinson (1991) in his analysis of
cultural imperialism. Tomlinson points out that Anderson's concept "immediately
locates national identity at a certain level of abstraction" (1991, 80):
[A]ll cultural identities--be they national, regional, local--are,
in one way, of the same order. They are all representations (in the sense
that imagination is a representative faculty) of belonging. . . . Where
people think beyond the immediate presence of others, which is today almost
everywhere, they "imagine a community" to which they belong. (1991, 81).
Viewing modern cultural identities as imaginative representations
of belonging is suggestive for understanding the media's role in imagining
communities. Since representations are available to us from a number of
different quarters, this understanding suggests, at a minimum, that people
may draw from a number of different sources for gaining a sense of what
it means to belong to particular communities. More concretely, however,
this view of cultural identities as representations of belonging--together
with Anderson's discussion of the relationship between print media and
the emergence of the nation as an imagined community--makes clear that
the media should be properly regarded as the primary source for representations
of certain senses of belonging: specifically, those senses of belonging
which cannot be the product of our lived experiences with others.
Elsewhere in his study, Tomlinson makes this point more explicitly.
He offers a view of the media as what constitute our experience of culture
as representation in contrast to our experience of culture as
lived experience. Tomlinson's point is not, however, that culture as
"lived experience" is in any sense immediate:
[T]he "lived experience" of culture may also include the discursive
interaction of families and friends and the material-existential experience
of routine life: eating, working, being well or unwell, sexuality, the
sense of the passage of time, and so on. (1991, 61).
Hence, even some aspects of what we take to be "lived experience" are discursively
mediated.(6)
Consider the concept of the family. On one level, that notion
seems to refer to something concrete, something most people grasp in terms
of their own experiences with the people with whom they live: usually,
parents and siblings, or marriage partners and children. At the same time,
however, to be able to talk about the family--as if only one concrete
understanding of this were possible--obscures the very different ways in
which people may experience "family": could not a child, his mother, her
lesbian lover, her lover's step-mother, and the lover's adopted daughter
constitute a family? As a concept, the family points to a particular
network of meaning which may, and often does, operate as a standard against
which our own experiences of "family" are measured and reconsidered. Such
dominant discourses on the family, moreover, may effectively change the
ways in which we experience our own "families": e.g., as "unconventional,"
perhaps "aberrant," sometimes even "dysfunctional." Or if our image of
the family is drawn largely from televised situation-comedies, like The
Cosby Show, we may come to experience our own "families" simply as
"unhappy." The point to bear in mind is that one comes to experience "family"
in a particular way as a result of, in part, one's understanding
of various discursive constructions of "the family." (Tomlinson makes a
similar point with the example of "romantic love" as it is "lived" and
as it gets (re)presented in the media [1991, 62-63].)
The upshot of all this is that a personally held sense of self (whether
as the member of a family or of a national community) involves a complex
network of intermediations between media representations and our no less
discursively-mediated "lived experiences":
The undeniably high profile of the mass media in contemporary
cultural practices, set against the evidence that people bring other cultural
resources to their dealings with it, suggests that we can view the relationship
between media [read: culture as representation] and culture [read: culture
as "lived experience"] as a subtle interplay of mediations. . .
. The relationship implied in this is the constant mediation of one aspect
of cultural experience by another: what we make of a television programme
or a novel or a newspaper article is constantly influenced and shaped by
whatever else is going on in our lives. But, equally, our lives are lived
as representations to ourselves in terms of the representations
present in our culture . . . (Tomlinson 1991, 61).
Taking stock of these claims, I have argued--following Anderson and Tomlinson--that
virtually all modern cultural identities are collective identities which
are abstracted from our lived experience. This is so because they depend
on our imagining a communion with countless other people with whom we will
never have any face-to-face contact. Insofar as imagination is a representational
faculty--precisely because it involves our visualizing what is not present
before us--imagined communities are, properly speaking, representations
of belonging. I noted, as well, that because the media may be regarded
as the "dominant representational aspect of modern culture" (Tomlinson
1991, 61), they serve, arguably, as the primary source for our understandings
of modern cultural identities. Finally, we experience culture, broadly
speaking, through a complex interplay of mediations between the
two aspects of culture which Tomlinson outlines: namely, the represented
and the "lived." It follows from this that the imagined communities to
which we see ourselves belonging are better understood as mediated communities.
In a dual sense, mediated, here, nicely conveys that the media play
a role in this process, and it also attempts to foreground the sense that
our apprehension of "lived experience" is also mediated. A further advantage
of employing the phrase mediated community instead of imagined
community is that the latter unfortunately connotes the sense of something
which is fictive (Anderson's definition notwithstanding), whereas mediated
alludes to something which exists, but whose existence as such is
possible only through a process of filtering or, better, of relating other
things. As yet, however, even the concept of the mediated community does
not really tell us enough about the mechanisms by which representations
of belonging might be incorporated by people as personally held senses
of belonging. For an understanding of this, I want to begin by turning
to Tomlinson's discussion of how texts represent culture.
Tomlinson's concern is with discourses of cultural imperialism: specifically,
with investigating the assumptions and claims of various scholars and of
members of international organizations who have argued that the exportation
of artifacts from one (often, national) culture to another culture may
pose a threat for the latter. In the process of commenting on who gets
to define what constitutes a given nation's culture and what constitutes
a threat to it, Tomlinson points to two ways in which texts represent culture:
They represent in the sense of describing or depicting a state
of affairs ("French culture under threat"/"French culture struggling against
the isolationism of its political leaders") and they represent in the sense
of (often implicitly) speaking for a culture. (1991, 18).
Hence, representing a culture involves the dual sense of speaking about
a culture and
speaking for a culture.
As it stands, neither of these two senses of representation suggest
how it is that a people may come to accept what the media say about and
for (ostensibly) them. Representation in terms of speaking about
(as depiction) and speaking for (as proxy) is devoid of any sense
of how the media can speak to a people. Colloquially, the phrase
it speaks to me implies that I accept what is being said because
it adequately conveys my sense about some given phenomenon. It speaks
to me means, in effect, it rings true. Here, the connotation
is one of a match between already held understandings of something and
the media's depiction of it. Of course, the claim that we already hold
particular understandings does not preclude the possibility that these
understandings may have derived from our earlier experiences of media representations
(as well as our earlier experiences of culture as "lived experience").
In this respect, then, what I mean by already held understandings is different
from first- and second-phase assumptions about the pre-existence of communities.
The sources for our already held understandings are the discourses which
structure both media representations and culture as "lived experience."
The point to bear in mind is that our interpretations are
situated
in the interplay between these broader networks of meaning (the discourses)
by which we have understood and continue to make sense of whatever is going
on around us. This is what Tomlinson means by the claim that "our biographies
are, partly, `intertextual'" (1991, 61).
There is, however, a second sense in which media representations speak
to audiences. Media representations may explicitly address audiences
as particular kinds of subjects: "my fellow Americans," "you boys there,"
"we in the developed world," and so forth. Furthermore, these forms of
explicit address may operate as attempts to
resituate the audience,
to reposition them within the particular network of meaning which structures
a given media text. This is what Louis Althusser (1971) has meant by the
notion that structures work via address to interpellate people into
particular subject positions.
Althusser's example is the situation in which a police officer hails
a person: "Hey, you there!" He argues that this address may effectively
reposition the person hailed as a particular kind of subject (a "suspect,"
perhaps), interpellating that person within a particular structure of authority.
In a similar vein, when I use the term we in the writing of this
study, I am inviting you the reader to see yourself as a member of a particular
community of which I am suggesting you and I are both members. In this
respect, I am resituating or interpellating you within a communal discourse.
I may use
we broadly to suggest the human community. Or I may use
the term more narrowly--as I did in the first chapter, when I commented
on "we as contemporary scholars"--to convey a much smaller community. Of
course, when I invoke the term we to refer to these particular communities,
you may accept the invitation (to identify yourself as belonging to these
communities) because you already, in part, see yourself this way. Wherever
this is the case, the we rings true, and it does so because the
address seems less an attempt to resituate you than a benign recognition
of an already commonly shared situation.
In Althusser's example, however, the effective interpellation of the
person hailed is not dependent on that person's already regarding him-
or herself as "a suspect." But there is still a sense in which that interpellation
(that effective re-positioning) depends on a set of commonly shared understandings.
In this instance, it depends on shared assumptions about police officers
as accepted authority figures. That is, the person hailed accepts or steps
into the subject position of "suspect" (at least, momentarily) because
someone recognized as a figure of authority has so positioned that person.
Consequently, Althusser's example suggests that in the case of authoritative
discourses, the person hailed may be more likely to yield to the way in
which he or she is being authoritatively positioned. (For a sense of this
pre-disposition to yield to authoritative positionings, consider the guilt
which, perhaps, some of us have felt when stopped and addressed by "the
long arm of the law," even in situations when we know we have not done
anything illicit.)
Relative to Althusser's example of the authoritative discourse of policing,
communal discourses do not, in general, evoke the same kind of deference.
Part of the reason for this is that community membership is usually imagined
as a non-hierarchical relationship. This is Anderson's point when he notes
that the nation,
is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation
is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. (1983, 16; his emphasis).
What I am suggesting is that communal discourses--insofar as they are non-hierarchical--limit
speakers to addressing their audiences as equal members of the community.
This is different in kind from authoritative discourses which define subjects
as either authority figures or subordinates. As a consequence of the non-authoritative
character of communal discourses, therefore, the invitation to audiences
which the term we invokes--that is, to see themselves as members
of particular communities--may be rejected. This may happen, for example,
when I invoke the term to refer to a still smaller community from which
you the reader may see yourself excluded (such as, we Cuban-Americans)
or when I invoke the term in a way that implies an understanding of "our"
community which you do not share (such as, we peace-loving Americans).
In the first instance, you may reasonably conclude that this use of we
is not an invitation for you to step into a particular subject position.
That is,
we Cuban-Americans may be read by you less as an invitation
(a speaking to) than as a representation (a speaking for and about): specifically,
as me speaking for other Cuban-Americans and telling you something about
us. In the case of we peace-loving Americans, the we invoked
may be read as a failed attempt on my part to invite you to see yourself
and other Americans in a particular way. Here, the invocation of we
does not ring true, and may, in fact, reveal itself as a rhetorical ploy
by me to reposition you by playing on your emotional attachment to the
very concept of belonging which we conveys. Your response would,
no doubt, hinge on the adjective peace-loving. You may reject this
depiction of Americans because it does not adequately convey your
sense of what Americans are or have been. Note, of course, that you may
still see yourself as an American, but your sense of belonging will
depend on a very different understanding of what that term means.
These considerations are relevant for understanding how mediated communities
are not just represented, but made real: that is, incorporated by people
as lived collective identities. By focusing on the notion of address (of
speaking to), I am trying to point to one of the paramount discursive strategies
by which the media attempt to translate a representation of belonging
into personally held senses of belonging. As is clear from my discussion,
this strategy depends, at least in part, on already held understandings.
But if this were all it depended upon, then the media would serve only
to reinforce these already held understandings and we would have no way
of making sense of the claim that previous media representations had helped
to construct these understandings in the first place. At issue here is
how the media work to create networks of meaning. What is needed, in effect,
is a theoretical framework for understanding how the media are both parasitic
(drawing on the already held understandings made available by previous
discourses) and innovative (reconfiguring the elements drawn from these
previous discourses by situating them in a "new" network of meaning). This
framework has been suggested by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985).
Discursive Articulations
Like Anderson (1983), Laclau and Mouffe's work results from a paradoxical
observation: in this case, with Antonio Gramsci's earlier observation that,
contrary to orthodox Marxist assumptions, proletarian revolutions had not
emerged in countries with advanced-capitalist economies. Implicit in Marxist
theory was the assumption that workers' collective identity (their class
belonging) was determined by their position in the capitalist economy:
that is, by the fact that they are wage-earners rather than owners of the
means of production. According to Marx, this objective class membership
would develop into a subjective class consciousness in advanced-capitalist
economies in which, due to the growing scarcity of resources, workers would
come increasingly into conflict with the owners of the means of production.
Note that, on this view, both the increase in class conflicts and the coming
to consciousness of workers as workers is determined by economic
forces. In contrast to this, Gramscian theory argues that the hegemonic
ideologies at work in advanced-capitalist societies can preempt and, in
fact, have preempted the emergence of class consciousness among wage-earners
in these societies. By hegemony, Gramsci has meant an ideological framework
which is dominant without being coercive. In fact, on Gramsci's view, hegemonic
ideologies are dominant precisely because they depend on the tacit consensus
of subordinate classes. This consensus is secured through the constant
restructuring of hegemonic ideologies in a way which attempts to incorporate
the interests and concerns of the subordinate classes. Of course, these
interests and concerns are not understood in class terms: viz.,
as those of the subordinate classes in contrast to those of the dominant
classes. On the contrary, hegemony works by re-presenting diverse interests
and concerns as those of a people: a collective identity which occludes
class (and other) distinctions. Inasmuch as hegemonic ideologies successfully
incorporate popular interests and concerns with hegemonic ones, they present
themselves as the common sense of a people.(7)
In outlining their framework, Laclau and Mouffe begin with the Gramscian
conviction that the identities and interests conveyed by various terms
(for example,
wage-earners, working class, financiers, capitalists,
socialism, nationalism, liberalism, and so forth) have no necessary
class belonging. To be clear on this point, what this means is that persons
who are workers (from a quasi-objective standpoint: wage-earners)
may nonetheless reject or simply never consider identifying themselves
in terms of the collective identity working class. The latter depends
on the way in which identities and interests are articulated within
a discourse. As Stuart Hall has usefully explained (1986b, 53), the term
articulate has two senses in the British vernacular: it can mean
to speak and it can mean to link together, as in the phrase
an articulated lorry (or truck) in which the cab may be linked to
a trailer but need not be. Laclau and Mouffe employ the dual connotation
of the term to establish the notion that the identity or meaning of a thing
is never given except in its relation to other things within a network
of meaning, and even then, only provisionally. Stated somewhat aphoristically--we
can never be articulate about things in themselves; we can only be articulate
through the relations between them. This understanding is suggested by
Laclau and Mouffe in their definition of terms:
In the context of this discussion, we will call articulation
any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity
is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality
resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse.
The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a
discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call element
any difference that is not discursively articulated. (1985, 105).
At a minimum, it should be noted that these terms are analytic distinctions;
they are not meant as descriptions of physical-world entities. This point
is important for understanding, in particular, what Laclau and Mouffe mean
by an element. Insofar as the term is used to refer to what remains outside
of discourse, element does not describe anything identifiable, since
identity is the product of the relations established between elements as
moments within the structure of a discourse. An element is at most
a signifier: that is, something which can potentially mean. But what it
means is established only at the point at which it is transformed into
a moment within a network of meaning. As I understand it, Laclau
and Mouffe's reason for maintaining this distinction is to avoid suggesting
that we are "confronted only with moments of a closed and fully
constituted totality" (1985, 106). On their view, elements (or signifiers)
can mean different things precisely because "no discursive formation is
a sutured totality and the transformation of the elements into moments
is never complete" (1985, 106-107).
Using this terminology, let me now point out how, for Laclau and Mouffe,
class consciousness might be better understood as the product of a discursive
articulation. Consider the two terms wage-earner and working
class. As Laclau and Mouffe's lexicon suggests, these terms should
be viewed as elements: meaningless in themselves, but providing
grist for the discursive mill. Rather than assuming that the two terms
are necessarily linked because of wage-earners' shared objective, material
interests under a given social formation (such as capitalist modes of production),
Laclau and Mouffe suggest that the significance of a working class
identity for wage-earners (that is, the meaningful relationship
between these two elements) depends, at least in part, on how and whether
they are articulated as moments of a concrete, historical discourse (such
as the socialist revolutionary discourse of the Cuban government). This
meaningful articulation situates wage-earners in a network of meaning about
class identity, interests, expectations, and so forth, which may be welfare-oriented,
subsidy-oriented, and, in some cases, explicitly anti-capitalist in tenor.
In contrast to this, other discourses may work to meaningfully link
wage-earner to the ideological element taxpayer, for example.
Clearly, this meaningful articulation situates wage-earners in terms of
a very different set of interests and expectations, ones often oriented
around a concern with having to pay high taxes. Although, here too,
taxpayer
is not necessarily connected to this concern. It could, alternatively,
be meaningfully articulated with the notion of "having paid one's dues
to the state" and, hence, "reasonably expecting some return"--such as a
viable welfare program paid for with tax dollars. In the concrete, historical
discourses of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, however, taxpayer concerns
have been defined in terms of "high taxes," and the latter notion has been
linked, in turn, to the need for fiscal cuts in welfare programs and in
subsidies to various industries, signalling a return to a more "free-market"
orientation.(8) From the standpoint of leftist
political concerns, what is intriguing (and perhaps frustrating) about
this return to a "free market" orientation is that it has been popularly
supported by wage-earners, despite growing numbers of unemployed workers
coupled with cuts in welfare programs. Laclau and Mouffe seek not only
to explain this paradox, but also to devise socialist strategies for winning
over the support of wage-earners. On their view, socialists concerned with
developing strategies for combatting the hegemonic discourses of advanced-capitalist
societies must, at a minimum, engage in discursive practices aimed at disarticulating
elements from those hegemonic discourses (e.g., the wage-earner/taxpayer
nexus) and
rearticulating them within a new network of meaning (e.g.,
one in which wage-earner can be meaningfully related to working class).
But putting the matter this way, as Stuart Hall (1986b) has suggested,
seems to make the emergence of particular identities and interests simply
a matter of discourse. Of course, Hall's work, too, is informed by Gramsci's:
so his quibble is not with Laclau and Mouffe's (Gramscian inspired) rejection
of economic reductionism. On one level, then, Hall accepts the view that
one cannot speak about identities and interests as the products of economic
forces within a fully closed (or "sutured") social reality. But Hall suggests
that Laclau and Mouffe may have gone too far in the opposite direction:
"The critique of [economic] reductionism has apparently resulted in the
notion of society as a totally open discursive field" (1986b, 56;
my emphasis). The danger in this lies in failing to give due consideration
to how material practices limit the conditions of possibility for the emergence
of some discourses. As Hall himself has put it elsewhere, citing Gramsci:
It may be ruled out, [Gramsci] suggests, "that immediate
economic crises of themselves produce fundamental historical events" [Hall's
italics]. Does this mean that the economic plays no part in the development
of historical crises? Not at all. But its role is rather to "create a terrain
more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought, and certain
ways of posing and resolving questions involving the entire subsequent
development of national life." (Hall 1986a, 11).
On this view, the economic constitutes the practical context within which
only some ideological-discursive contestations are possible. What Hall
seems to be suggesting is that before something like a working class identity
can emerge, some people must, at a minimum, engage in the income-earning
practice of wage-labor in contradistinction to others whose income derives
primarily from owning the means of production (which in Marx's time generally
meant owning fixed assets like an industry, but which today is coming more
and more to mean owning liquid assets like investment capital). But what
makes it possible for us to conceive of even these apparently more basic
income-earning practices as wage-labor, on the one hand, and capital
ownership, on the other?
The distinction Hall seems to want to hold onto here is between discursive
and
non-discursive (or, more concretely, material) practices.
Laclau and Mouffe explicitly reject this distinction (1985, 107), and I
must admit that I find their argument persuasive. At the same time, Laclau
and Mouffe do analytically distinguish between discursive moments
and non-discursive elements. These considerations raise two important
issues: first, what kinds of things are non-discursive, and, second, are
these what Hall has in mind when he insists on maintaining the discursive/non-discursive
distinction? The quick and dirty response to the first question is that
only those things which are not thought about are non-discursive. This
is so because a discourse is an interpretive framework: that is, something
which helps people to make sense of or understand certain phenomena as
distinct objects of knowledge. In effect, then, to reflect on something
is to attempt to provide a gloss for it. Thinking about always involves
speaking about precisely because we employ meaningful words and
images (the "moments" of a particular network of meaning) when we engage
in these processes. The capacity to think of a wage-earner as working
class requires a discourse which makes it possible to articulate this
understanding. But it is equally true that to think about a wage-earner
as a wage-earner also requires a discourse. This is why we must
pause to consider what exactly it is that Hall wants to retain by insisting
on the discursive/non-discursive distinction.
On my view, the class of phenomena which are non-discursive (read: generally
unthought) includes instinctive practices (such as eating, sleeping,
walking, crying, and the like) and routine practices (such as working,
driving, bathing, and so forth). Of course, just because some practices
are either instinctive or routine, it does not follow from this that they
cannot be reflected upon and, hence, discursively reconstituted. Sleeping
can become "visiting the angels." Walking may be discursively reconstituted
as "doing something which is good for your health," or alternatively (and
momentously) as "one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind." And
the routine experience of working has its multitude of discursive
significations: in some contexts, it may even be discursively constructed
as not working (e.g., "No, I don't work; I'm a housewife."). The
point to bear in mind, here, is that some discursive constructions (e.g.,
working class) depend on the prior existence of certain routine practices
(e.g., the practice of working for wages). But once even a routine practice
is reflected upon, it is discursively reconstituted (even when this remaking
is couched in terms of the seemingly more immediate experience of working
for wages).
Alfred Schutz (1967), an early-twentieth-century phenomenologist, has
made a similar point. He argues that the process of thinking about an experience
always involves distancing oneself from the doing (or having done) of some
action. Actions, on his view, do not become meaningful acts
until they have been mediated through (in effect, thought through) meaning-constitutive
frames. At the moment when an instinctive or routine action becomes a meaningful
act for the actor, his or her experience has been discursively constituted.(9)
If we think of the non-discursive as commonly unreflected practices,
then Hall is right to insist on maintaining a distinction and to argue
that political change involves more than the discursive strategy of offering
up a new network of meaning. This is not a trivial point: it is important
to bear in mind that not all practices--in a particular context--are
the object of reflection, and hence "open" to discursive rearticulations.
Laclau and Mouffe are, of course, correct to point out that "new" networks
of meaning have to be partially articulated to the common sense of a people:
meaning that they have to draw from understandings which are already available
in existing hegemonic and/or popular discourses. This notion is suggested
by the concepts of disarticulation and rearticulation. At
the same time, however, all of these discourses are embedded in a wider
array of non-discursive practices; although, I have been implying that
these should be regarded, more accurately, as tacit understandings,
since their generally non-discursive existence does not preclude their
being discursively (re)constituted in some contexts. These tacit understandings
include the day-to-day practices which have become the routine of life.
Such routine practices, moreover, have been conditioned by the socio-economic
systems we are in, and are, in turn, affected by changes in those systems.
This, I think, is a better way of understanding what is meant by the Gramscian
view of the economic "as a terrain" (cited in Hall 1986a, 11).
Two (perhaps, contradictory) circumstances follow from this understanding
of discursive and non-discursive practices and the relationship between
them. First, while Laclau and Mouffe's theoretical view of the social as
a discursively open field is useful for combatting certain kinds of reductionism,
we must bear in mind, following Hall, that practically-speaking, the social
is not as "open" as this theoretical understanding might suggest. In particular,
it is the generally non-discursive, routine practices we engage in which
set certain limits on what can be discursively articulated. People must
have a tacit understanding of a certain set of practices as distinct
wage-earning practices before this understanding can be made explicit
and linked, discursively, to a
working class identity. But their
is a second implication which follows from all this: namely, that discursive
interventions are most possible at precisely those moments when routine
practices are disturbed. Unemployment, for example, foregrounds what up
to that moment has remained tacit, routine, taken-for-granted: namely,
working for wages. Practically-speaking, then, the social is open to change
when conditions have upset the normal, habitual, routine flow of life.
On my view, this condition is presently met in Cuba.
The Contemporary Cuban Context and Radio Martí
Recent changes in Cuba's international economic relations with the erstwhile
Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries may have provided an opening
for discursively rearticulating the political/ideological direction in
which Cuba should go. Let me explain why I think this is so. In the thirty-odd
years since Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba, the United States has retaliated
against his government by imposing an economic blockade on the country.(10)
Early on, then, the Cuban government was forced to secure trading agreements
with partners outside the so-called "Western
world." Over time, Cuba developed
an economic dependence on its Eastern bloc partners, particularly as a
source for oil and for a number of manufactured goods (cars, industrial
machinery, and so forth) necessary to the smooth running of its infrastructural
system. These economic ties were effectively weakened in the late '80s,
resulting in a scarcity of resources which has, doubtless, affected the
routine way of life of Cubans on the island.(11)
One practical effect of this has been that the Cuban government is undergoing
a crisis of legitimation, a crisis evident in the Cuban government's need
to modify shared understandings of "the socialist revolution in Cuba."
That is, the taken-for-granted understandings of "the socialist revolution"
have become explicit in a way which has demanded changes in how Cubans
have understood this phenomenon and their own place in it. As Gramsci reminds
us, hegemony is a process that has to be constantly (re)produced, sometimes
with modifications, in order to be maintained. Cuba's hegemonic discourse--what
I will be calling its "official socialist revolutionary discourse"--is
also undergoing modifications in this time of crisis. This is why I argue
that Cuba's deteriorating trade relations with the former Eastern bloc
countries has opened up a space for discursively rearticulating "the Cuban
revolution."
To offer one example: initially, and until recently, Cuban revolutionary
discourse represented "the Cuban revolutionary" as part of an imagined
global community of revolutionaries struggling against imperial oppression
everywhere. One of the best examples of this is still Ernesto "Ché"
Guevara's 1965 letter-to-the-editor on the subject of "Socialism and Man
in Cuba."(12) Guevara's actions in and
his eloquent defenses of the Cuban revolution put him squarely at the vanguard
of those who could speak for the Cuban revolution. At the same time, however,
it should be pointed out that Guevara was Argentinean and, hence, marked
as different from those fellow revolutionaries who were Cubans fighting
for Cuba. His nickname "Ché" points to this difference. As one brief
biographical sketch on Guevara notes, the nickname "derived from [Guevara's]
habit of punctuating his speech with the interjection ché"
(Bullock and Woodings 1983, 293). This "habit," however, was not unique
to Guevara, but is, in fact, an interjection common among Argentineans
(in much the same way that British-Canadians are popularly depicted as
interjecting their speech with the term aye). This difference is
relevant to my point here, for it effectively helps to construct Guevara
as an "international revolutionary figure" of the Cuban revolution, and,
by extension, it gives credence to his own claims about the character of
"the revolutionary" both inside and outside Cuba. As he put it,
The revolutionary, ideological motor of the Revolution within
his party, is consumed by this uninterrupted activity that has no other
end but death, unless construction be achieved on a worldwide scale.
If his revolutionary eagerness becomes dulled when the most urgent tasks
are realized on a local scale, and if he forgets about proletarian internationalism,
the revolution that he leads ceases to be a driving force and it becomes
a comfortable drowsiness which is taken advantage of by our irreconcilable
enemy, by imperialism, which gains ground. Proletarian internationalism
is a duty, but it is also a revolutionary need. This is how we educate
our people. (Guevara, in Banachea and Valdés 1969, 168; my emphasis).
As this construction suggests, the hegemonic discourse of the socialist
revolution in Cuba, which Guevara helped to articulate, has attempted to
construct "our people" in a way which obscures national distinctions
while foregrounding class differences ("proletarian internationalism")--a
construct which precisely reverses the functioning of hegemonic discourses
in advanced-capitalist societies. By way of concluding my comments on Guevara's
place in Cuban revolutionary discourse, let me note that, in 1967, Guevara
was captured and shot while leading a guerrilla campaign against the army
in Bolivia. From a Cuban revolutionary perspective, then, he died a martyr
of revolutionary movements against imperialism. Together with Martí,
Guevara has become an emblem of the international revolutionary spirit
as this is constructed, at the very least, within Cuban revolutionary discourse.
This internationalist understanding of the revolutionary, however, has
recently undergone modifications within the official discourse of the Cuban
government. As a result of changes in the international scene, Castro himself
has had to modify this representation in a way which, on my view, draws
on Cubans' insular identity to link their concerns with the island
of Cuba to a concern with safeguarding Cuba as an island of revolution:
"surrounded by capitalism, an island of revolution between the Atlantic
and the Pacific, an island of revolution in this hemisphere, an island
of revolution in the West."(13) This island
metaphor arguably reconfigures "the revolutionary" in isolationist terms,
in contrast to earlier internationalist constructions. The task is now
to insulate the revolution from the outside, rather than
constructing it "on a worldwide scale," as Ché envisioned it.
My point in mentioning this is to suggest that the crisis of legitimation
the Cuban government is presently undergoing opens up a space for Radio
Martí to effectively rearticulate Cuban concerns to a different
discursive understanding. Beyond this point, I do not explore the concrete
conditions which might make Radio Martí's discursive intervention
more effective.(14) Instead, I focus on
how Radio Martí's discourse on Cubanness articulates certain ideological
elements and, in the process,
attempts to (re)constitute its audience
as "Cubans" of a particular type. To that end, I find Laclau and Mouffe's
articulation theory, as well as Benedict Anderson's notion of the "imagined
community," analytically fruitful. Taken together, they offer a theoretical
framework which emphasizes the following issues and concepts: (1) the very
contructedness (or imaginativeness) of cultural identities and of
people's sense of themselves as belonging to a particular community,
(2) the suggestion that mediated communities may be brought into
existence via the specific strategy of address, attempting to link
the mediated community's representation of belonging to a people's
already held sense of belonging, (3) the sense that ideological
elements become
significant for particular identities insofar
as those elements and identities are
articulated in concrete discourses,
and (4) the importance of prior popular and
hegemonic discourses
in helping to form the common sense of a people.
These considerations are relevant to my analysis of Radio Martí
as a discursive intervention. By invoking the name of Martí, the
program's transmissions address (explicitly speak to) their listeners as
"Cubans," but in a way designed to disarticulate (or uncouple) "Cubanness"
from its revolutionary construction and to rearticulate (or link)
"Cubanness" to a new network of meaning. What this new network of meaning
may
signify is the subject of this study. This qualified statement ("may signify")
is necessary, for as I have suggested, texts are open to multiple interpretations
precisely because no network of meaning is fully sutured. The words and
images which are meaningfully linked together in a discourse may have other
meanings in other discourses. Furthermore, and this is a crucial point,
the discursive strategies at play in the structure of a given text are
not the only relevant strategies. Readers and listeners may employ a number
of different interpretive strategies which make a given text meaningful
to them in a particular way. But note that we learn how to read (how, in
effect, to interpret) via our prior experiences with cultural artifacts
(representations) and our prior experiences with others with whom we are
communally associated (our "lived experiences" as members of various communities,
both interpersonal and "imagined"). It should be evident from this that
interpretive strategies are also discursive. Once again, interpreting something--in
effect, making sense of something--is necessarily related to the ways in
which one can speak about something. It follows from all this that two
sets of discourses are relevant to this analysis: (1) the prior popular
and hegemonic discourses on Cubanness from which Radio Martí draws
the ideological elements it incorporates into its discourse, and (2) the
prior discourses which inform the interpretive strategies I employ in my
readings of Radio Martí. The earlier discourses from which Radio
Martí draws its elements are the subject of Chapter Four. In the
next chapter, I discuss some of the discourses which situate my subsequent
interpretations.
III. Situating
Every interpretation signifies the trace of a standpoint. It is the
mark of a subject position made available by a specific network of meaning
through which a person understands the world and her place in it. Consequently,
no interpretation can present itself as merely objective since interpreting
always depends on adopting a particular frame which allows one to see some
things but not others, and in only some ways, but not others. At the same
time, however, the interpretive frame which one adopts at a given time
is, as I have argued, the product of a decidedly social process: of one's
interactions ("lived" or "imagined") with others in our shared communities.
Consequently, no interpretation is wholly subjective, either. An interpretation
is, properly speaking, intersubjective since it bears the mark of
one's interactions with others, including one's other selves: the multiple
subject positions which situate an individual in several different (and
sometimes contradictory) discourses. These points help me to clarify the
multiple subject positions from which "I" am speaking: that is, they situate
my voice within the several discourses which situate my complex and fragmented
identity.
One position from which I speak is as a Cuban-American (and arguably
there are multiple forms of even this more specific identity). That standpoint
enables me to share with other Cubans some of the elements that comprise
our senses of Cubanness, while at the same time vitiating against
my incorporating some of the other elements which comprise their
senses of Cubanness. Clearly, then, I speak from a position in which some
elements of Cubanness ring true (or speak to me), inasmuch as they
both enable and confirm my already held sense of Cubanness. At the same
time, I speak from a position of "critical distance" vis-à-vis some
of the other elements which comprise other Cubans' Cubanness.
Two points should be stressed here about the sense in which my interpretation
is situated. First, by situating my voice, I am obviously distancing myself
from social-scientific approaches which profess to offer an "objective"
analysis. My analysis of Radio Martí transmissions does not, for
example, pretend to offer "results" which are in any way "statistically
significant." Rather, I offer an explicitly situated interpretation and
analysis of Radio Martí: situated in the sense that my identity
cannot help but inform my reading. That said, however, I would want, secondly,
to distance myself as well from those (primarily "standpoint feminist")
theorists who privilege subjective understandings because, on their view,
personal experience is the most authoritative source of knowledge we can
have about concrete practices. I am not claiming that my experiences as
a Cuban-American authorize me to speak for all Cubans--or even for
all Cuban-Americans. As I suggested in the previous chapter, experiences
may be discursively mediated and, hence, effectively reconstituted. On
this view, my "lived" experiences as a Cuban-American are mediated through
my experiences of various representations of Cubanness and also through
my "lived" experiences as a self-identified member of other interpretive
communities. Hence, the sense in which I can speak on behalf of all Cuban-Americans
must be qualified. In line with this argument, I offer one possible interpretation
of Radio Martí's discursive strategies given the way I sensed the
transmissions were trying to "work on" me: namely, by attempting to rearticulate
"my" already held understandings of Cubanness given my identity as a Cuban-American.
Furthermore, I can offer only one possible understanding of what it means
to be "Cuban-American."
A Cuban-American View
To be clear on what I mean by a Cuban-American identity, I should note
that I use this term to describe second-generation Cubans, either born
in the United States or brought here as children. I also regard this identity
as distinct from the identity of the Cuban exile in Miami and the Cuban
revolutionary in Cuba. Our identity is not in any immediate sense
an exile identity, although aspects of the latter clearly inform
who we are. Our Cubanness has been learned from our parents' sense of their
Cubanness. In this respect, then, we have arguably grown up as (inheriting)
members of an exiled Cuban community. It does not follow from this, however,
that our understandings (of Cubanness, of Castro, of socialist revolutions,
and so forth) are wholly determined by this membership. The reason for
this is that we are also members of other interpretive communities.
This is generally true of most people. Human beings may feel multiple
senses of belonging to, for example, leftist political communities, feminist
communities, gay communities, academic communities, church communities,
national communities, and so on. Which sense of belonging is most salient
at any given time depends on the pragmatic context we are in. Relatedly,
the interpretive frames we employ to understand a particular situation
largely depend on the cues we get from being in that situation. I do not
mean to suggest, however, that we conduct a rational calculation of a situation
in order to determine which interpretive frame is most appropriate for
understanding it; on the contrary, in the process of doing something--say,
having a conversation with a fellow worker--we fall into, rather-out-of-habit,
a particular interpretive frame available to us from our prior experiences
(both representational and "lived") of those typical situations. In addition
to this, I should note that any situation is open to a number of different
interpretations even by the same person. For example, in the process of
reflecting sometime later on a conversation I might have had with a fellow
worker, I might come to interpret some of what he had said as being sexually
suggestive. In this respect, I have re-constituted my earlier experience
of a conversation between workers as an experience of a come-on
between a man and a woman. For whatever reason, this particular interpretation
was not available to me during the conversation or even sometime later,
but it becomes one possible, alternative, future interpretation which I
can give that prior experience. Furthermore, this reinterpretation depends
on my knowing or assuming something about the sexual identity of my fellow
worker (for example, that he is heterosexual) and on my being familiar
with or becoming familiar with "making a pass" as a moment within a discourse
of (hetero)sexuality.
With respect to Cuban-Americans, the interpretive frames we are likely
to adopt in a given situation depend as much on our identifying ourselves
as Americans as it does on our sense of belonging to a Cuban
community. Situated as we are by both an American community and a Cuban
community, our Cuban-American identity, more often than not, evinces our
sense of belonging in the imaginary borders between these two communities--that
is, we tend to see ourselves located at the hyphen.(15)
Since we live overwhelmingly within an American context, however, our
Cuban-American identity is, I think, better understood as an ethnic
identity, in contrast to the national identity of the Cuban exile.
In making this distinction, I am drawing in part from Catherine Hall's
(1992) brief discussion of these two types of identity. Following Benedict
Anderson, Hall notes that although "imagined communities" often try to
present themselves as natural, they in fact require a great deal of ideological
and political work precisely because they are open to challenge: "For there
is no one national identity--rather competing national identities jostle
with each other in a struggle for dominance" (1992, 240). In contrast to
this, Hall notes that "ethnicities have been constructed as belonging to
`others,' not to the norm . . . " (1992, 240). My point in mentioning her
work is to emphasize that national identity is something which strives
for dominance within the spatially-bound construct we call "the nation."
In contrast to this, I am using ethnic identity to describe something which
strives for peaceful co-existence with "others" who are not members of
the ethnic community in question. In this respect, an ethnic identity is
defensive in character. It is an identity which seeks to protect itself
from extinction. Similar points may be made about national identity in
an
inter-national context; but within the bounds of a nation, a
national identity is arguably more concerned with control than with co-existence.
These points are meant to convey some understanding of the differences,
as I see them, between a Cuban-American (ethnic) identity and a Cuban exile
(national) identity.
The identity of the Cuban exile--particularly as it gets constructed
on Radio Martí--is broadly speaking anti-Castro in character. Consequently,
the major target of this identity is the Cuban revolutionary identity constructed
in the official socialist revolutionary discourse of Cuba (discussed in
the next chapter). For this reason, I treat both the exile and the revolutionary
identities constructed in these two competing discourses as national identities:
that is, as identities which jostle with each other for dominance in Cuba.
I want to make clear, however, that my primary focus is on the exile identity
of Cubans in Miami as this gets constructed on Radio Martí.
This represented exile identity may be somewhat different from the way
this identity is "lived" by Cubans in Miami.(16)
As some contemporary scholars have suggested, the "lived" identity of Cuban
exiles in Miami is changing.
Both L. Pérez (1990) and Stack and Warren (1990) suggest ways
in which, in my terms, the national identity of the "exile" in Miami's
Cuban community may be giving way to the more conciliatory (or, at least,
less "symbolically" anti-Castro) ethnic identity of second-generation
Cubans in Miami. Stack and Warren, in particular, imply that second-generation
Cubans have more invested in the United States as home, and are therefore
less likely to measure themselves as Cubans against what I would
characterize as the bi-polar standard posited by exiles: namely, anti-Castro/pro-Castro.
In contrast to this, it can be argued that second-generation Cubans are
attempting to establish a standard of measurement more akin to a political
spectrum: while the anti-Castro and pro-Castro positions may still mark
the extremes of that spectrum, a conciliatory, middle-ground position (e.g.,
"ambivalence" or "being not necessarily against the revolution") is, I
think, being made available to Cubans as Cubans. The changes in
investments (in both the United States and in the exclusively bi-polar
identificatory discourse of the exile) is marking a shift from Cubans as
political exiles outside of Cuba to Cubans as an ethnic minority
within the United States.
In the process, however, the tension between these two modes of being
is experienced by second-generation Cubans on a personal level--that is,
in our interpersonal relations with family members and older friends who
experience their identities as political exiles. Their sense of
Cubanness cannot be easily disarticulated from their anti-Castro sentiments.
Insofar as they include second-generation Cubans as members of the Cuban
community, they generally expect us (tacitly or explicitly) to also adopt
an anti-Castro position. But given that our stakes are different--that
most of us have established our lives in the United States and do not,
for the most part, consider returning to Cuba to make it our home--most
of us are, at best, ambivalent about Castro and the socialist revolution.
This seemingly less critical position is somewhat difficult to reconcile
within the discourse of the Cuban exile.
I regard this position as only seemingly less critical because, from
my standpoint, "ambivalence," too, can be a form of critical distance.
This is so because ambivalence marks an unwillingness to adopt a particular
position. Ambivalence is not, on this account, an uncritical acceptance
of multiple positions; on the contrary, it marks a denial of either/or
choices and a (perhaps inchoate) sense that some alternative position should
be available. Furthermore, neither ambivalence nor critical distance are
equivalent to "radical skepticism." With respect to the theoretical framework
I adopt here, radical skepticism cannot constitute a viable social identity.
To be skeptical about literally everything is to construct an individualist
(asocial) world-view akin to the psychotic "reality" of the schizophrenic.
This is so because once we grant that reality is a discursive and hence
social construct, we have to admit that to put oneself in the position
of always questioning others' senses of reality is to fall outside reality.
At most, what can be said is that a critical vision requires moments of
skepticism--i.e., moments in which "I" question an "other's" sense of reality.
With respect to a Cuban-American identity, ambivalence constitutes a questioning
of the exiled Cuban's take on Cuban reality.
An Academic View
In the process of reflecting on the tenor of my interpretations, I have
noticed a kind of skepticism which cannot be explained wholly in terms
of my Cuban-American identity. Rather, it has to be explained in terms
of my identity as an academic. (At least, I think I owe this skepticism
to my academic identity given the extent to which my critical thinking
has developed out of my scholarly experiences.) This other identity has
made me somewhat skeptical of discourses which represent political realities
in Manichaean fashion. For example, I shudder at liberal democratic discourses
which construct Castro and Communism(17)
as unqualified evils and "the free market" as, at least tacitly, a universal
good. Consequently, my willingness to question such stark representations
puts me at odds with some of the ways in which exiles have
constructed
Castro.
Of course, I draw back, as well, from those socialist revolutionary
discourses which, alternatively, construct the United States as "the evil
empire" against which ardent revolutionaries must "fight or die." And yet,
in my readings of Marxist and quasi-Marxist critical studies, I have found
powerful arguments about the structural inequalities that pervade domestic
and international relations. As a consequence, I find that social justice,
defined in terms of economic equality, is a compelling endeavor: as is
social justice defined more broadly in terms of gender, sexual, racial,
and other kinds of equality. What this means is that, given the way my
academic identity has evolved, some aspects of the socialist revolutionary
discourse of Cuba ring true to me.
Some readers may, of course, object to my claim that this identity is,
broadly speaking, "academic." Indeed, it might be argued that this should
be considered, more accurately, "leftist academic." I avoid this term,
however, because it too narrowly defines the sets of interests and concerns
which have structured my academic identity. To this I would have to add,
at a minimum, the interests and concerns which have been structured
by my exposure to feminist and lesbian theory, not to mention my own "lived"
experiences as a feminist and a lesbian. At this point, however, the marker
"leftist, feminist, lesbian academic" becomes simply too unwieldy. Need
I add, too, that these identifying terms do not necessarily refer to mutually
reinforcing or even mutually tolerant interests and concerns? As debates
between feminist and leftist academics suggest, some aspects of each contradict
aspects of the other. And at times I have found that my identity as a lesbian
has put me at odds with certain feminists. Which aspects of this complex
identity are prioritized at any given time depend on the context I am in.
Doubtless, the academic view I adopt hear does bear the trace of distinctive
(and, at times, competing) standpoints within the academic community. But
I prefer to convey this sense more simply by speaking in terms of an
academic view: suggesting, in effect, one of many.
In particular, the academic view I adopt denies the existence of extra-discursive
(and, hence, universally valid) truths. Any phenomenon which is presented
as truth can be presented as such only because of the truth claims
(the criteria of validity) which a particular network of meaning has made
available. However, outside a given discourse--that is, from the standpoint
of an alternative discourse--the validity of such "truths" is open to question.
In effect, then, as an academic of this stripe, I question the validity
of certain "truths" about Cuba which are constructed in both academic and
non-academic discourses.(18)
Radio Martí's version of "truth" is open to this kind of questioning.
But not because, as some propaganda scholars assume, it reflects or represents
the politically interested views of the United States or of members of
the exiled Cuban community. From my theoretical standpoint, this academic
truth about what Radio Martí is doing is also open to question.
In contrast to this, I argue that Radio Martí helps to constitute
the identities of "the United States" and "the exiled Cuban community."
I interpret and analyze these representations vis-à-vis, in part,
my own "lived experience" as a (particular type of) Cuban-American and
academic. The critical distance I am afforded--as an academic, especially--makes
it possible for me to reflect on how it is that Radio Martí's construction
of Cubanness works on my personally held sense of Cubanness. This
working on is obviously related to the issue of effectiveness, but my point
is not to argue about the changes in identity which Radio Martí
will effect in listeners on the island of Cuba. Rather, my point is to
outline the discursive mechanisms by which, on my view, this change is
attempted. Consequently, I focus on how Radio Martí enacts the identity
of "the Cuban exile" and imagines its Cuban community. How Radio Martí
enacts what I will call a (pen)insular view of Cubanness is ignored
by propaganda scholars concerned solely with measuring the effects of these
transmissions on the insular identity of their intended audience--namely,
Cubans on the island.(19)
In order for identities to come into existence (i.e., to be realized),
they must be incorporated by people; not just in the sense of being mixed
in, but literally of being in-corporated (or embodied) by
human beings. (This concept is central to my understanding of identity
formation.) Incorporation marks identities as belonging to particular human
beings. This point can be somewhat misleading, however, for I am not suggesting
that we simply look at which bodies act in particular ways in order to
discern which identities are being conveyed. A male body acting a certain
way is not, therefore, necessarily acting out a masculine identity.
If this were so, then I would be positing a necessary connection between
kinds of bodies and the kinds of identities which they must be conveying.
But this is not my point. Rather, what I am stressing by the notion of
incorporation is that identities are brought into existence in practice.
But because these practices can only be distinguished via the networks
of meaning we have at any given time, they are fundamentally discursive
practices. Consequently, identities do not involve the acting out
of preestablished social roles; rather, identities are enacted.
They are brought about in the doing.(20)
It should be clear from this that we need a way of grasping how it is
that broadcast transmissions can represent phenomena as belonging to or
being incorporated by particular identities. In other words, how is it
that Radio Martí's audio presentations operate as aural representations
of belonging? In the case of Radio Martí transmissions, a sense
of incorporation is evinced in the notion of voicing: transmissions
are coded as the voice of José Martí, the United States,
Cuban exiles, and even Cubans on the island (in, for example, "Testimonies,"
"Letters to Radio Martí," and commentaries presented as the "real
stories" of Cubans on the island). In this process of "identifying voices,"
human voices are transformed into a particular collective identity: specifically,
the separated community of the Cuban nation. Furthermore, by voicing a
sense of belongingness to this separated community ("us over here"), these
voices invite listeners on the island ("ours over there") to incorporate
this identity as well--that is, to identify themselves as members of "our
divided Cuban national community."
Identities, from this viewpoint, are far from pre-established social
roles which we merely step into or act out. Rather, identities are always
in the making. We are already in the process of bringing them into existence
at those moments when we are jointly articulating our senses
of selves. Voicing this sense of "us" implies that identities are modes
of "being-in-common" (Nancy, 1991) which are realized by us in our interactions
with ours and with others.(21)
Tomlinson's view of the interactive relationship between media representations
and "lived" experience--captured by his phrase "a subtle interplay of
mediations" (1991, 61)--is apposite. By addressing its listeners as
fellow Cubans, Radio Martí invites them to jointly constitute "the
Cuban community" as a separated community. The point of this analysis
of identity formation is to detail the ideological elements in Radio Martí's
discourse which help to construct this "separated Cuban community."
In detailing those elements, however, we may also find that some elements
are shared across communities. I am analyzing the way "the separated
Cuban community" is articulated in Radio Martí's discourse. The
point I am making here is that some of the ideological elements significant
in that discourse for the construction of that community may overlap with
those in another discourse and the community it articulates. In this chapter,
I have discussed some of the elements that comprise the discourses which
speak me: specifically, as a Cuban-American and an academic. I have argued
that these discourses situate my interpretation and make it possible for
me to reflect on Radio Martí's discursive mechanisms. In the next
chapter, I review some of the prior discourses on Cubanness from which
Radio Martí draws its construction of "the separated Cuban community."
IV. An Island People and Their National Hero
In the previous chapters, I outlined a theoretical framework for understanding
the discursive and interpretive strategies by which mediated communities
are constructed. In particular, I noted that for such communities to come
into being as part of the way people "live" their communal identities,
media discourses must attempt to articulate their representations of belonging
to some aspects of people's already held senses of belonging. To analyze
this relationship, however, we have to know something about how people
already think of themselves. But how exactly does one study what goes on
in people's heads? In Chapter II, I argued that thinking about always
involves speaking about since both processes require the use of
words and images which acquire meaning through the particular discourses
of which they are moments. Therefore, one way of approaching the study
of how Radio Martí works to link its representations of belonging
to the senses of belonging extant among Cubans is to consider some of the
prior discourses which have probably informed the Cuban people's sense
of their collective identity. This is the subject of the present chapter.
I begin, in the first section, by outlining popular conceptions of Cuban
national identity as these emerged in the nineteenth-century literature
of Cuban writers, like José Martí. These early constructions
of Cubanness (re)presented Cubans as distinct island people. As will become
evident in Chapter V, this understanding of Cubanness has been taken up
by Radio Martí. I then proceed, in the second section, to consider
how the figure of Martí has been incorporated into the official
discourse of the Cuban government. I will suggest that Martí's significance
as a Cuban national hero has been incorporated into the socialist revolutionary
discourse in a way which foregrounds or accents Martí's revolutionary
and anti-imperialist significance. It is this latter significance, this
revolutionary accent, which Radio Martí attempts to disarticulate
from the meaning of Martí as Cuban national hero. My point in considering
these popular and official discourses on Cubanness, therefore, is to survey
the discursive matrix--that is, the overlapping networks of meaning--from
which Radio Martí draws the several aspects of Cubanness it (re)articulates.
The Vision from Afar
National identity is generally thought of as something which emerges
from within the spatially-bound construct of the nation. In the case of
Cuban national identity, however, the earliest writers to meditate on Cubanness
were exiles, and hence, Cubans writing about Cubanness from the outside.
This point is made in Cintio Vitier's Lo cubano en la poesía(22)
and reiterated in Adriana Méndez Rodenas' (1986) study of Cuban
literature by women. These literary scholars turn to nineteenth-century
poetry to identify some of what they consider to be the formative aspects
of Cubanness. In this respect, their work bears a certain resemblance to
Benedict Anderson's work (1983), especially to the relationship he posits
between print media and the imagining of the national community. The difference
here is that poetry conveys more through symbolism than through storytelling--that
is, poetry seldom involves a before-and-after and a meanwhile. With respect
to the particular construct of the nation, therefore, it may be argued
that poetry is largely parasitic on prose: it symbolizes what has been
constructed elsewhere.
At the same time, however, there is a sense in which poetry conveys
aspects of something which prose somehow fails to grasp. What I am aiming
for here is a sense of the different cultural significances which we attach
to poetry and to prose. We tend, I think, to approach prose as something
which will give us a quasi-descriptive account of a happening or a situation;
we tend to approach poetry, by contrast, as something which yields a symbolic
representation of a sentiment. For this reason, poetry (more so than prose)
invites a deep hermeneutics: an interpretive strategy which aims at exposing
the emotional content which underlies the surface. Let me be clear on this
point--I am not suggesting that poetry actually does convey something deeper;
I am saying that, at least in my experience, most people tend to treat
it as if it did. It should be clear from this that, inasmuch as they are
constituted as discrete objects of knowledge (viz., as poetry and
as prose), literary texts, too, are embedded in a network of meaning
(a discourse about literature) which invites readers to approach these
kinds of texts differently.
This desire to read poetry as something which conveys a deep emotional
understanding is evident in Vitier's comments on the early Cuban poetry
he analyzes. As Méndez Rodenas explains, Vitier turns to poetry
as a "model for identifying the strata that compose insular foundations"
(1986, 72). In the following, note the archaeological understanding of
identity presupposed by the notion of "strata," the sense that an understanding
of Cuban identity entails a digging into or excavation of literature in
order to uncover or bring to light the various layers that form more recent
sedimentations of Cubanness:
Poetry goes about illuminating country. . . . First comes the
peculiarity of the nature of the island. . . . Very quickly . .
. the character appears: the flavor of the vernacular, the customs,
the typical. . . . Further inside the feelings start to flow, one can begin
to hear the voices of the soul. Finally, in certain exceptional moments,
one arrives at glimpses of the reign of the spirit: of the spirit
as sacrifice and creation. (Vitier, quoted in Méndez Rodenas, 1986,
72; my translation; italics in original).
The stratification--of nature layered over character layered over feeling
layered over spirit--which Vitier finds in the poetic construction of national
identity implies a particular pattern to the way in which national communities
are imagined. That imagining begins with what is most apparent: a physical
account of the bounded space which situates the nation ("the nature of
the island"). This general survey of the area is followed by a quasi-anthropological
account of the people who inhabit it ("the vernacular, the customs, the
typical"). This, in turn, is followed by a quasi-psychological expression--one
which poetry is, apparently, especially adept at conveying--of the national
sentiments which underlie a people ("the feeling"). The final moment in
the formation of national identity--the moment at which one can say it
exists--is the moment at which one can identity a people who
are willing to die for the sake of establishing the nation: this,
I think, is what Vitier means by his reference to the moment at which "one
arrives at glimpses of the reign of the spirit," a spirit which engenders
in a people a sense of "sacrifice and creation."
Following Vitier's tracing of these strata, Méndez Rodenas points
to the earliest attempts, by writers like Manuel Zequeira y Arango and
José María Heredia, to construct Cuba "as nature, origin
and source" by transforming "the shores of insular territory into a shared
yet intimate space" (72). Given the ways in which the nation is constructed
as a spatially-bound community whose borders mark the distinctions between
"us" and "them," it is perhaps not surprising that Cuban identity should
be linked, from the beginning, so explicitly to the natural features of
the island. What better conveys the "shared yet intimate space" which is
the imagined community than a sense of itself as an island separated from
all other nations by miles and miles of water?
The second strata which Vitier identifies is the character of a people.
In their analysis of early Cuban poetry, however, neither Vitier nor Méndez
Rodenas says very much about the vernacular, customs, and typical behavior
of the Cuban people which may be conveyed in these early works. At a minimum,
it is clear that most of this work was written in Spanish. But this does
not suffice to distinguish Cuban national identity from Spanish national
identity. Anderson's (1983) comments about the rise of the new American
nation-states in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are
applicable here. He remarks that because nationalism studies have been
couched almost exclusively in terms of the European context, such studies
have tended to emphasize the role of vernacular languages in demarcating
national identities. They have emphasized, as well, the populist tenor
of most nationalist movements. Anderson notes, however, that neither of
these factors are applicable to the American style of nation building:
In the first place, whether we think of Brazil, the USA, or
the former colonies of Spain, language was not an element that differentiated
them from their respective imperial metropoles. . . . [Secondly, at] least
in South and Central America, European-style "middle classes" were still
insignificant at the end of the eighteenth century. Nor was there much
in the way of an intelligentsia. . . . The evidence clearly suggests that
leadership was held by substantial landowners, allied with a much smaller
number of merchants, and various types of professionals . . . (Anderson
1983, 50-51).
In contrast to the European-style of popular-vernacular nationalism, Anderson
argues that the nationalist drive for independence in virtually all the
new American states was spurred by the creole communities within them (1983,
50). The term creole (in Spanish, criollo), as Anderson notes,
refers to someone "of (at least theoretically) pure European descent but
born in the Americas . . . " (1983, 50, footnote 1). These were, in effect,
people with a language and heritage which they shared with those in the
colonial metropole (or center), against whom they fought for independence.
The fact that nationalist sentiments emerged first among the creole communities,
on Anderson's view, can be partially explained from the shared creole experience
of discrimination by those in or from the metropole.
In the case of Creoles in the Spanish colonies, their relevant counterparts
were the peninsulares (i.e., Spaniards, born on the Iberian peninsula).
What this effectively meant was that, insofar as they shared the same language
and culture and moved within the same administrative circles as peninsulares,
Creoles embraced many of the same expectations for administrative advancement
but, through an accident of birth, had none of the same prospects as their
peninsular counterparts. And this, according to Anderson, contributed to
Creoles' sense of themselves as a distinct community with a shared concern
for autonomy from Spain.
In her study of the work of the French-creole writer María de
las Mercedes Santa Cruz y Montalvo (also known as, la Condesa de Merlín)
(1789-1852), Méndez Rodenas, too, notes the "presence of a criollo
identity" which is distinct from the peninsular identity of the Spaniards
in Cuba (1986, 76). The following brief passage from la Condesa's writings
tells something about the character of this early creole form of Cuban
identity:
Since my arrival, we have celebrated nightly with a brilliant
gathering at my uncle's house, during which time I have had the occasion
to observe all that grave Spanish nature and all the indolence of the Creoles
and natives. (La Condesa de Merlín, cited in Méndez Rodenas
1986, 92; my translation).
Méndez Rodenas is clearly citing a writer who harbored a good deal
of contempt for her fellow Creoles. Notwithstanding this, Méndez
Rodenas finds in la Condesa's work "the emergence of a national sentiment
in terms of insular cohesion" (1986, 92). Put somewhat differently, this
early work conveys an emerging sense of a distinct island people.
Perhaps the reason Méndez Rodenas does not labor over outlining
the character of that people is that her point has less to do with the
substance of that character as one writer (la Condesa) envisioned it, than
with an incipient sense of its distinctiveness. In addition to its distinctiveness
from the identity of the peninsulares, this early Cuban identity,
according to Méndez Rodenas, depended, as well, on a racial antagonism
between the creole sugar aristocrats and the black slaves who tended their
plantations:
On this antagonism . . . are the bases of criollo identity
set: the exclusion of the black from the insular community cohered by the
racial and economic interests of the white landowner class. (Méndez
Rodenas 1986, 91).
Hence, creole identity was the paradoxical product of exclusion from
the peninsular community and exclusion of the African slave community.
Whatever its substantive character, the creole community emerged out of
its sense of difference from these other two communities: a sense which
helped it to imagine itself as a distinct island people.
These, then, constitute the first two surface-most strata of national
identity formation which Vitier outlines: the early symbolic portrayal
of the nature of Cuba as island and the rudimentary character of its people
as (white) island people. The third strata Vitier identifies is the feeling
of a people. Vitier finds two distinctive sentimental features in the work
of the early exiled writers he studies. The first feature is the "incipient
sense of national belonging" (Méndez Rodenas 1986, 73). The second
is the experience of Cuba as a void or loss registered through the writer's
absence (his or her exile). Hence, belonging (pertenencia) and distance
(lejanía) help to mark the originary traces of Cuban national
sentiment:
The first lyrical illumination of Cuba fulfills itself in exile
[or uprootedness: el destierro]. What the exhaustive enumeration
of flora and fauna cannot configure (the image of the motherland [patria]),
is given by a sigh and a vision which are nostalgic in character. Heredia
makes the island mutate into motherland, not simply as native land, but
rather as a motherland which shines in the distance, far away, perhaps
unreachable. (Vitier, in Méndez Rodenas 1986, 73; my translation).
For Méndez Rodenas, this sense of motherland as distant and unreachable
follows from the understanding that for national identity to be realized,
Cuba must have political autonomy. But because Cuba was still a Spanish
colony at the time these works were written, she argues that nineteenth-century
poets like Heredia and later Martí could only
imagine the "patria"; that is, conceive it in a double
dimension--as both the meeting place of nature and community ("pertenencia")
and as future aspiration, as an unreachable island that must be turned
into fulfillment ("patria") from a faraway mainland shore. (Méndez
Rodenas 1986, 73-4; her italics).
Of course, in this context, Méndez Rodenas uses the term imagine
in a more fictive sense than I, following Anderson, have meant this when
referring to the imagined community. From my standpoint, the national community
is no less imagined even after it has won its political autonomy from some
outside nation. Notwithstanding this difference, Méndez Rodenas'
point in speaking about the need to imagine patria in a fictive
sense is to emphasize the concrete, historical circumstances in which exiled
poets found themselves.
Still missing from this incipient sense of belonging and this sense
of distance is the final moment--the fourth and innermost strata--of national
identity: namely, the national spirit as sacrifice and creation. Méndez
Rodenas implies that this final moment is heralded in the exiled writers
particular "vision from afar" (1986, 75). This vision, as it manifests
itself in these early works, is comprised of both a sentimental and a critical
view of the Cuban isle: "Separation and return signal the sentimental dimension,
whereas the critical one is directed to political analysis and involvement
with the historical present" (75). Why does this mark the final moment--the
coming-into-being of the national community? Evidently, the answer lies
in our commonly held understanding of the nation as politically autonomous.
Anderson relates this understanding in his definition of the national community
as something which "is imagined as sovereign" (1983, 16; his emphasis).
This is implied, as well, in my earlier description (following Catherine
Hall [1992, 240]) of national identities as identities that jostle with
each other for dominance within the nation and co-existence without. The
drive for the political autonomy of a people signals the emergence of a
willingness on their part to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the nation.
So while a bounded-space (island), the distinctive character of a people
(white, island people), and their sentiments (of belonging and, perhaps
also, distance) are formative, the nation as such must be born in pain.
Vitier's archaeological metaphor--his image of the four strata that
compose the insular foundations of Cuban national identity--seems to imply
that Cubanness has a substance and fixity: that is, that relatively stable
formations of Cubanness build up from previous formations of Cubanness.
As Méndez Rodenas argues, however, "The definition of `lo cubano'
. . . remains ambiguous in Vitier's study, as it refers neither to a fixed
essence nor to an absolute notion of insular destiny" (1986, 72). Rather,
what emerges is a trace of a trace of a trace, the layering over of different
appreciable sedimentations of Cubanness:
There is not a mobile and preestablished essence, called Cubanness,
which we can define independently of its successive and generally problematic
manifestations. . . . Our enterprise consists in going about discovering
something which we suspect but do not know in its wholeness. Something
which, furthermore, does not have a fixed wholeness, but rather which .
. . is inseparable from its diverse historical manifestations.
That development and that history, nonetheless, leaves behind an appreciable
sedimentation which allows us to indicate some of the distinctive features
of our peculiar sensibility and our attitude toward the island and the
world. (Vitier, in Méndez Rodenas 1986, 93, footnote 1; my translation.)
The "strata" which Vitier identifies may be viewed as necessary components
of all national identities, and in my summary, I have treated them as such.
Given the theoretical framework I adopt here, however, the notion of identity
formation outlined by Vitier and Méndez Rodenas remains both too
evolutionary and too individualistic. First, the archaeological sense of
historical identities as strata belies Vitier's conviction that Cubanness
has no substance and fixity. What must be added to this notion is the understanding
that while the appreciable sedimentations of past notions of Cubanness
may be identified, what those sedimentations are comprised of (that is,
what they mean to contemporaries) is open to interpretation. The past,
therefore, is not merely uncovered; it is (re)constructed. This point is
crucial for understanding how "Martí" can mean "Cubanness" differently.
Furthermore, the step-by-step process which Vitier implies in his description
of nature as what comes first and spirit as the final moment need not evolve
in precisely this fashion. After all, most of the writers whose work Vitier
and Méndez Rodenas discuss already had either been exiled by Spanish
colonial authorities or else had themselves chosen to live in exile rather
than under Spanish rule. In this respect, they already exhibited something
of the national spirit of sacrifice and creation (a critical vision). And
it was, arguably, their experience of political exile which heightened
their romantic view of the nature of the island, their distinctively creole
character, and their sentimental sense of belonging.
Secondly, as it stands, Méndez Rodenas' focus on the work of
one nineteenth-century woman writer seems to imply that Cuban identity
is largely the product of one individual's formulation. At the same time,
it is evident that Méndez Rodenas wants to treat as unique la Condesa's
political defense of Spanish colonial rule and some of her remarks about
the creole character. What needs to be made more explicit, however, is
that literary constructs must be shared by a community in order for identities
to come into existence: it is in the joint articulations--in the communicating--of
senses of selves that both community and identity come into being.(23)
Notwithstanding these concerns, I find that some of the concepts outlined
in this study of early Cuban identity are broadly applicable to studies
of national identity. Given the emotional attachment which the national
community, as Anderson (1983) has noted, engenders in its members, it is
clear that its imagining involves an important
sentimental dimension.
In addition to this, national identities must compete for dominance within
the nation and defend the nation's existence from the threats posed by
other nations. Consequently, the imagining of the national community involves,
also, a
critical dimension--one generally concerned with establishing
who gets to count as "enemy" both inside and outside the nation's boundaries.
In addition to this, the concepts of belonging and distance
which Méndez Rodenas outlines are broadly applicable to those national
identities constructed in any exile discourse. In this case, the discursive
battle is waged from the outside, but the aim is the same: dominance,
within
the nation, of one particular version of national identity.
Two points should be noted about the import of distance (of a "vision
from afar") in exile discourses on Cuban national identity. First, a critical
sense of "the outside" from the outside is not necessarily at odds
with what gets to count as "Cuban," which is already a partially insular
view: hence from the inside. Furthermore, even voices from inside
Cuba have tended to draw from (or echo) voices from the outside. (I am
thinking about revolutionary appropriations of the exiled writings of José
Martí.(24)) Consequently, what gets
to count as "Cuban" from the inside is itself also marked by a certain
"vision from afar." The senses of "inside" and "outside" evinced in various
enactments of Cubanness are not, therefore, strictly speaking geographical.
That is, speaking from a position "inside" is not equivalent to being physically
"on the island." When I speak about the insular view of Cubanness, I am
referring to the sentimental strains of Cubanness which coalesce around
a sense of Cuba as island home. And this rudimentary sense of Cubanness
is what I argue is shared by most Cubans, both inside and outside Cuba.(25)
In contrast to this shared insular attachment, the critical strains of
Cubanness are dissonant. The Cubanness enacted by Fidel Castro and other
Cuban revolutionaries is enabled by a different "constitutive outside"
(Mouffe 1991, 78) than the one which enables the Cubanness enacted by,
for example, exiled Cubans. In this respect, Cubanness has a polymorphous
other. Or more precisely, multiple and differing senses of "the outside"
effect quite different substantive understandings and enactments of lo
cubano.
As I have tried to suggest, however, this distinction between the sentimental
and critical elements of Cubanness should not be read as marking the difference
between, say, a (sentimental) "national identity," on the one hand, and
a (critical) "political identity," on the other. By definition, national
identity implies a notion of sovereignty, and this, in turn, implies political
autonomy. Furthermore, it seems to me that one of the effects of the revolution
of 1959 was to explicitly politicize Cuban identity in a particular
way.(26) After 1959, it became virtually
impossible to be a Cuban and not take a stand on Castro and Communism.
"Castro" has become the locus around which coalesce the processes of inclusion
and exclusion of contemporary Cuban communities. To belong to the exiled
Cuban community, for example, one must be (at least, implicitly) "against
Castro" since that is the only form of being with/in that community.
Cuban membership is defined vis-à-vis that standard.
The discourses of Cuban national identity which surfaced after 1959,
therefore, articulated some elements which were new to that identity and
which have had radically different meanings in each of these discourses:
at a minimum, these have included "Castro" and "Communism." To these may
be added other shared elements which were not exactly new on the scene,
but which have clearly undergone changes in meaning in the respective discourses
of which they have become moments: the figure of Martí is a good
example. A third set of shared elements are those which have quite similar
meanings across these discourses (though, of course, there is no necessary
connection here between these elements and the meanings which they apparently
share across these discourses).
Among the latter set, as I suggested above, are those sentimental elements
which construct Cuba as island home. While this vision of Cuba may have
emerged out of early distinctions which elite Creoles made between themselves,
on the one hand, and
peninsulares and African slaves, on the other
hand, this vision has engendered a popular conception of Cubanness. That
is, the insular moments of this early Cuban discourse have been
articulated by contemporary discourses on Cubanness. In this respect, they
point to a common sense of Cubanness. These insular moments are evident
in articulations which emphasize the natural characteristics of the island
and the national character of its people as detached and hence distinct
island people, with sentimental ties to their patria ("motherland").
But Cubanness is not, on this account, an insulated or fixed
identity; rather as with all identities, it is permeable or invadable.
From the standpoint of imagining the community, its vulnerability means
that Cubanness (like all national identities) must be linked as well to
a critical view of its constitutive outside. This critical dimension is
what is most apparently different about competing versions of Cubanness,
and what has contributed to the different understandings of some of the
shared elements: such as the figure of Martí.
What's in a Name?
The ideological contest between the U.S. and Cuban governments over
the meaning of "Martí" is tantamount to a struggle over men and
women who consider themselves to be "as Cuban as Martí was." The
U.S. government's decision to call its Cuba-broadcasting program Radio
Martí was, in this respect, a fundamentally political move:
a moment in the international politics of naming. Drawing from the
work of Jean-François Lyotard, Van Den Abbeele (1991) has argued
that names have a special (though not unique) status in language use. Like
other indexical signifiers, names
appear to point to something
outside language--some extra-discursive presence. "Smoke," for example,
is commonly read as indicating the presence of "fire." Similarly, the name
"Martí" seems to point or refer to a concrete human presence:
an object of perception. But Van Den Abbeele wants to stress that for Lyotard,
names, too, are fundamentally discursive elements. They only apparently
designate some stable extra-discursive element, but what they mean (or
how they are described) can actually vary across different phrasings. That
is, the same name may be used in various utterances, but different meanings
may attach to it in each of these instances.(27)
As a consequence, names may be the locus of a highly contentious debate
over what they mean. Summarizing Lyotard's position, Van Den Abbeele notes,
In contradistinction to essentialist notions, which understand
"the referent of the name as if it were the referent of a definition" .
. . that is, as a shorthand for a bundle of preinscribed qualities--Lyotard
sees the number of possible senses ascribable to a named referent as bounded
only by the contingency of the future. . . . It cannot be determined in
advance how many or which meanings can be validated for a particular name.
The senses of a named referent refer us not to the field of perception
but to the world of history, and as such, to an agonistic locus
of debate, litigation, antagonism, and differend. . . . [T]he (historically
contingent) link between name and meaning ushers in the political . . .
" (Van Den Abbeele 1991, 31; his emphasis).
Van Den Abbeele's description of the politics of naming seems tailor-made
for discussions about the place of "José Martí" in both exile
and revolutionary discourses on Cubanness. That the name of "José
Martí" has become "an agonistic locus of debate" is evident in the
visceral reaction engendered by the United State's decision to name its
Cuba-broadcasting project Radio Martí. On May 19, 1985 (significantly,
the anniversary of Martí's death and the day before Radio Martí
began transmitting), the Cuban government sent a note to the United States
Interests Section in Havana denouncing the radio program and arguing that
"the gross insult of raising the glorious name of José Martí
for these broadcasts [was] deeply wounding [to] the feelings of the Cuban
people" (cited in Masud-Piloto 1988, 104). The Director of the Center for
Martí Studies (in Havana) remarked that "Only a government that
has demonstrated such repeated evidence of its ignorance can commit such
a stupidity of taking the very name of the greatest anti-imperialist we
have had."(28)
Notwithstanding these claims about the unfairness and inaccuracy of
the United State's appropriation of Martí's name, the Presidential
Commission on Broadcasting to Cuba defended this appropriation by arguing
that Martí,
was passionately dedicated to the truth, to democracy and freedom,
and to the independence of Cuba from foreign dominance from whatever
source. . . . He is perhaps the only such symbol to all Cubans. (cited
in Frederick 1986, 25; my emphasis).
Given this response, it can be argued that what is not at issue
in this debate about the meaning of Martí is his symbolic significance
as a devout Cuban nationalist and staunch anti-imperialist. Rather, the
debate surrounding the figure of Martí has concerned the meaning
of the very notions of "freedom" and "imperialism" (contestable terms!).
What gets constructed as "the imperialist threat" to Cuba's sovereignty
has varied across time and across standpoints.
Few Cubans would, I think, deny that for Martí and given the
time and standpoint from which he was writing, the United States represented
the greatest potential imperialist threat to Cuba.(29)
During the fourteen years he lived in the United States, Martí wrote
a number of articles about American society. In the beginning, he lauded
what he saw as "a country where everyone seems to be his own master . .
. [and] where the unprotected always find a friend."(30)
Later, however, Martí became increasingly more critical of what
he had come to perceive as the United State's corrupt, plutocratic political
system and its "monstrous" imperialist ambitions. In an often-quoted letter
written on the eve of his death (May 18, 1895) from his encampment at Dos
Rios, Martí wrote:
I am now each day in danger of losing my life for my motherland
and for my duty--as I understand it and can fulfill it--[which is] to prevent,
by the independence of Cuba, that in the fullness of time the United States
extend itself over the Antilles and descend, with that added force, on
our America. All I have done up to now, and will do, is for [the sake of
preventing that]. . . . I have lived in the monster, and have known its
entrails: and my slingshot is David's. (Martí 1953, 231; my translation).
The long history of U.S. interventions in Cuba suggests that Martí's
fears were not only warranted, but prophetic.(31)
In this context, it is not surprising that Cuban revolutionaries should
construct the revolution as the fulfillment of Martí's vision after
so many years of neo-colonialist dependence on the United States. At the
same time it should be noted that revolutionary interpretations of Martí
and of Cuban history also constitute a (re)construction of those phenomena.
While they may seem more authentic readings, they are not, on this account,
disinterested. The revolutionary Cuban community (like its exiled counterpart
in the United States) also brings "its past" into being through a particular(istic)
way of reading.
In order to appropriate the figure of Martí, revolutionary Cubans
have attempted to (re)construct him along revolutionary lines: i.e., as
a Marxist or at least a proto-Marxist. At the same time, revolutionary
writers have noted the difficulty of effecting this (re)construction:
Notwithstanding the fact that a man like Martí could
contemplate with such a sagacious vision the problems that his times posed
for Cuba, it does not follow that he would possess the best doctrine and
method for their treatment and solution. In Martí, one finds an
intermittent and vital tension between his points of view on the greatness
of liberal democracy and his amazing understanding of matters which, as
his posterity has proven, could not be settled via the measures he proposed.(32)
As this statement suggests, the revolutionary appropriation of Martí
has required a reading of his work which stresses his "sagacious vision"
of the problems posed for Cuba (e.g., his fear of U.S. imperialism) while
downplaying what he regarded as the solutions (e.g., his support of liberal
democracy). Both the stress on Martí's anti-U.S. sentiment and the
dismissal of his liberal-democratic vision have been accomplished in one
and the same argument: namely, in the argument that Martí's vision
(including his desire for a liberal democratic republic in Cuba) could
not be realized because his aims were "frustrated" by the United
States.(33) Within this network of meaning,
liberal democracy is linked both to bourgeois privilege and to the United
States as the imperial power which had, prior to the revolution, buffeted
the corrupt administrations of self-serving, bourgeois, Cuban politicians
in order to safeguard North American economic interests on the island.
Martí's diagnosis of the problem (viz., the United States) remains
correct. According to this understanding, however, Martí could not
have foretold that the solution he outlined (liberal democracy) would be
made untenable because of the United States imposing presence on the island.
This logic has served to articulate Martí's vision of a liberated
Cuba largely in terms of "freedom from U.S. imperialism." At the same time,
it has served to reinforce the sense that revolutionary measures have been
necessary for realizing that vision. In this way, Martí's vision
has been linked to revolutionary actions: "Martí is the ideal. Fidel
is the action. But the principles are the same."(34)
Through this link, Martí has been (re)constructed as "the direct
mentor" of the Cuban revolution. This (re)construction occurs in a 1960
speech by Ernesto Ché Guevara given on the anniversary of Martí's
birth:
Martí was the direct mentor of our Revolution, the man
whose word had to be resorted to always in order to give a correct interpretation
for the historical phenomena which we were living. . . . not all, nor many--nor
perhaps any--can be Martí, but all of us can embrace Martí's
example and try to pursue his course in our endeavors. We can try to understand
him and to relive him by our actions and our conduct today, because that
War of Independence, that long war of liberation, has been replicated today
and has many modest heroes, hidden heroes, outside the pages of history
and who, nonetheless, have achieved with absolute perfection the precepts
and mandates of the Apostle. (Guevara 1977, 4-5; my translation).(35)
Guevara's (re)construction of Martí goes a step further. Rather
than leaving him "in the pages of history" as a mere precursor of the Cuban
revolution, Guevara transforms Martí into a "living hero of the
revolution." In other words, he articulates Martí's (past) ideals
to the (present) revolutionary action by arguing that those ideals are
present(ed) in the revolutionary practices "of today":
I would like for all of you today to contemplate Martí.
That you think on him as you would a living being, and not as you would
a god nor something dead; as something that is present in every manifestation
of Cuban life, present in every manifestation of Cuban life as is the voice,
the air, the expressions of our great and never well bewailed Camilo Cienfuegos.
[Applause.] Because as regards heroes, Comrades, as regards heroes, one
cannot separate them from the nation, one cannot convert them into statues,
into something outside of the life of this nation for which they gave their
own life. The popular hero should be a living thing and present in every
moment of the history of the nation. Just as you remember Camilo, so should
you recall Martí, the Martí who talks and thinks today, with
today's idiom, because that is the greatness which makes thinkers and revolutionaries
great: their idiom does not age. Martí's words of today are not
of the museum, they are incorporated into our struggle and are our emblem,
they are our banner of combat. (Guevara 1977, 10-11; my translation).
The revolutionary (re)construction of Martí as "living hero of the
Socialist Revolution in Cuba" marks the revolution as the fulfillment of
Martí's vision. For this reason, Santí (1986) has characterized
the revolutionary (re)vision of Cuban history as teleological: one which
constitutes Martí as a "prefiguration" (147) of the Cuban revolution,
as the mark of a promise for the future revolution which realized that
promise. This teleological reading of Martí has resulted in a different
substantive interpretation of his work. Emphasizing Martí's concerns
with U.S. imperialism, revolutionary Cubans have rearticulated those concerns
to a socialist revolutionary discourse by redefining his "anti-imperialism"
as an inchoate form of Marxism:
Martí cannot be made, perforce, into a militant Communist,
applying a Marxist-Leninist framework to his life and doctrines, [a framework]
which would deform and betray them. Martí was not a Marxist. He
wrote a beautiful article on Marx concerning the death of the father of
Scientific Socialism, in which he clearly expresses his sympathies and
differences with him, but not a single letter authorizes us to believe
that he read either Marx or Engels, and even less that he subscribed to
their fundamental ideas. Martí, rather, was an idealistic thinker
and a political organizer so attached to the stubborn reality of facts--to
use a Leninist expression--that all of his revolutionary theory surpasses
the bourgeois democratic concept of the creators of Hispanic-American nations
who preceded him, from Bolívar to Juárez to Sarmiento, and
it situates him as an initiator of the great anti-imperialist struggle
which leads, inevitably, to the restoration [instauración]
of socialism. He is a true pre-Marxist . . . father and teacher,
together with Lenin who endows it with its definitive ideological instrument,
of the Socialist Revolution in Cuba. (Portuondo 1982, 278-9; my translation;
emphasis in original).
Given the import of Martí's anti-imperialism in revolutionary strategies
of articulation, these appropriations of Martí have relied more
on a (re)construction of the critical elements in his work rather than
the sentimental elements. In fact, Martí's romantic vision of Cuba--his
poetic reflections on the simple beauty of the island, its beaches and
palms, its people, and their collective sense of belonging there--is ignored
in much of the revolutionary literature on Martí. For this reason,
it is difficult to comment on the ideological significance of the sentimental/insular
view of Cubanness as a unifying principle for "revolutionary Cubans": or,
more precisely, as a unifying principle within the hegemonic discourse
of the socialist revolution in Cuba.
It would be wrong, however, to argue that identity in this discourse
is defined strictly in terms of a (transnationalist) revolutionary sentiment.
In the official discourse of the Cuban government, the revolutionary in
Cuba is still represented as a Cuban revolutionary with a sense
of attachment to Cuba as island home. Furthermore, this discourse can accommodate
non-revolutionary senses of Cuban belonging: that is, a more inclusive
Cuban identity in primarily insular terms (with the critical moment
seemingly attenuated). One can glimpse a discursive opening for articulating
this primarily insular Cuban identity in the "dialogue" which ensued, briefly,
between the Cuban government and Cuban-Americans in the late '70s. In one
of the speeches he delivered concerning the dialogue, Castro articulates
a notion of "community" which provides a new Cuban subject position
for non-revolutionaries:
[These] children of Cuban emigrés . . . have helped
us to understand to a certain degree the problems of what we call the community.
Some have been struck by the fact that we use this new expression: the
community. And yes, we're going to use a new expression. Because we have
always used expressions . . . that were unjustly generic references to
people who had emigrated, unjust generalizations. We generalized and used
terms such as traitors and gusanos [worms] and the like. . . . I
think these expressions resulted from the heat and the passion of the struggle.
And I have been the first to use the term "community," and I plan to continue
doing so . . . They also helped us become aware of the problems of the
community. Because there is something which we have started to realize,
the fact that, as I see it, the Cuban community, like all other communities
in another environment, in another country, tries to maintain its national
identity. . . . this arouses our solidarity and appreciation, even if they
don't support our revolution. (Castro 1981, 216-17).
Two significant features should be noted about this intriguing articulation
of a non-revolutionary sense of Cuban belonging. First, note that this
opening is reserved for "the children of Cuban emigrés" and others
who, in my terms, "are not necessarily against the revolution," though
they are clearly not, in Castro's terms, supporters of the revolution,
either. I want to argue that the subject position which Castro is making
available in this moment of "dialogue" is for ethnically identified
Cuban-Americans, rather than for the nationally identified Cuban
exiles who have challenged the revolutionary hegemony within Cuba. The
sense that the latter are still excluded from Castro's more amelioratory
term "community" is suggested by the fact that he rejects the older terms
of "traitors" and "gusanos" because they were "unjustly generic,"
and not because these terms do not still apply to some Cuban exiles.
Castro has to explain why he is adopting the term "community" because
the shift he identifies from gusano to community means accepting
the sympathy-invoking term with which exiles have commonly referred to
themselves. The Spanish-language circulars and broadcasts in Miami have
always used the term la comunidad ("the community") to talk about
Cuban exiles in South Florida. In the spirit of dialogue, Castro is adopting
this more amelioratory name for (some of) those Cubans, but my point
is that he is effectively changing its meaning (and thereby employing
a different logic of inclusion and exclusion). What he says about "the
Cuban community . . . in another country" suggests that Castro is imagining
this community as an ethnic community.
Secondly, I want to argue that three senses of "community" are
conveyed in this passage. The first is the explicit reference to the primarily
ethnically-defined "Cuban community . . . in another country." The second
community conveyed in this passage is implied in Castro's use of the terms
they and our in his statement, "even if they don't support
our revolution." This second community is the (nationally-defined) revolutionary
community in Cuba. In effect, then, Castro distinguishes between two Cuban
communities: the "emigré" and the revolutionary. Note, however,
that he implies a connection between the two when he states that the former's
efforts to maintain its "national identity" (really, its ethnic
identity) "arouses our solidarity and
appreciation." In my view, what is
shared between these two communities is an insular way of life: that is,
a common language and culture which is distinctively Cuban in character.
Consequently, the passage makes an oblique reference to a third, broader
Cuban community--the Cuban community writ large and defined in terms of
culture, absent the critical vision of the national/revolutionary community
(or the national/exile community which is the unnamed "other" of Castro's
speech) and absent the "out-of-context" aspect of the ethnic community.
On the other hand, within the revolutionary context, this (cultural) sense
of community is, of course, linked to a critical vision. Moreover, within
the context of another country, this (cultural) sense of community (as
Castro articulates it) is devoid of any particular critical vision,
but is linked, nonetheless, to a threat of extinction, given the overwhelming
presence of the host culture. The former is imagined as a national community;
the latter as an ethnic one. But in the process, Castro's "dialogue" makes
oblique references to a broader (and obviously separated) Cuban community
defined simply in terms of cultural character.
In contrast to the multiple Cuban communities articulated in Castro's
"dialogue" speech, Radio Martí articulates only one Cuban community,
and it mediates that community in terms of nation. This mediation is accomplished
via the figure of Martí, principally in the Radio Martí theme
song [12]. This appropriation attempts to disarticulate the figure of Martí
from its revolutionary image as "living hero" (of the Socialist Revolution
in Cuba) and to rearticulate an image of Martí as "martyred brother."
Note the temporal shift (from "living" to "martyr") and the relational
shift (from "hero" to "brother"). Clearly, the invocation of the name of
Martí as "martyred brother" is meant to appeal to a very different
sense of Cubanness. In particular, it enacts a Cuban identity in terms
of a sentimental attachment (pertenencia or belonging) to a broader
family comprised of islanders, exiles, and their shared national hero,
Martí. And this identity is enacted, as well, in terms of a loss
(lejanía or distance) registered in both temporal and spatial
dimensions: the passing away (martyrdom) of
our brother, and hence
the loss of a "family" which was once whole. The point, of course,
is to make this family whole again.
Radio Martí attempts to register this sense of attachment and
loss among listeners by inviting them to identify with the Cuban voices
which speak in terms of an "us" sentimentally linked to romantic memories
of a whole community and to future aspirations of a reunited community.
One of those "inviting" voices is constructed as the voice of Martí;
not, of course, in the sense of a human voice which pretends to be Martí,
but rather of a spiritual voice which conveys the tenor of Martí's
visions and hopes for Cuba--his romantic vision of Cuba as island home,
his national sentiment of Cuba as patria, and his political hope
that Cuba might become a liberal-democratic republic. The last of these
points to one of the several critical elements on Radio Martí. Added
to these are the representations of "Castro" and "Communism" as those actors
on the political stage which have divided the Cuban people. In this respect,
then, Radio Martí defines the Cuban community writ large in specifically
national terms: national insofar as this imagining is linked to a critical
vision of what has torn the Cuban community apart. Clearly, for Radio Martí's
discursive invitation to succeed (i.e., for listeners on the island to
incorporate this nationalistic sense of the "separated Cuban community"
and what has kept it apart), islanders must already share some of the understandings
which Radio Martí attempts to mediate (that is, to signify in a
particular way).
By naming its broadcast campaign Radio Martí, the U.S.
government is drawing on an ideological element which is clearly already
meaningful among islanders (in part, as a figure of Cubanness). To integrate
the figure of Martí, however, RMP must disarticulate it from its
(re)construction as "living hero of the Socialist Revolution in Cuba" and
rearticulate it within its own ideology. This rearticulation of an already
popular figure draws from sentimental elements in Martí's vision
of Cuba (as patria) and attempts to integrate these with other popular/traditional
elements (from early discourses on Cubanness) to transform Martí
into a unifying figure for the Cuban nation. My point in investigating
the insular discourse on Cubanness proffered by early Cuban writers and
the official revolutionary discourse articulated by contemporaries in Cuba
has been to identify some of the elements which Radio Martí links
to its discourse on Cubanness. Familiarizing ourselves with these elements
as moments of prior discourses helps us to understand how Radio Martí
attempts to capitalize on already held senses of Cubanness. In the process,
however, we will note, as well, that these elements are accented differently.
They come to mean slightly different things when linked to the other elements
that comprise the network of meaning through which Radio Martí vocalizes
its sense of Cubanness. In this respect, then, what gets (re)articulated
is a different substantive enactment of Cubanness. The invocation of the
name of Martí helps to summon that identity into existence.
V. (Pen)Insularity
From the beginning, I have argued that to understand how Radio Martí
tries to work on its listeners, we have to view it as a discourse which
articulates particular identities and related sets of interests, values,
and understandings about "the world." To get at this alternative view,
I suggested that the media are sometimes (perhaps often) involved in projecting
senses of a mediated community of one sort or another: e.g., when a media
text projects the image of a "we." To this I added that one's interpretation
(and possible acceptance) of the mediated communities "represented" by
the media is situated in a complex of prior mediated communities (both
"lived" and imagined) which make possible personally held senses of self.
One conclusion drawn from these theoretical considerations was that media
"representations of belonging" are not constructed in a vacuum. The common
inclination to read media presentations as representations (viz.,
of some phenomenon) implies that what we see or hear on the media resonates
with our understanding of that phenomenon. But to say this is to say only
that a media presentation must bear some family resemblance, some familiarity,
to what one already understands; it does not have to be a perfect reflection
of already held understandings. And, in point of fact, media presentations
usually are not mere representations. The media are innovative, as well
as parasitic. They re-articulate. To see what "new" meanings and identities
Radio Martí attempts to bring into being, it was necessary that
we familiarize ourselves with some of the prior discourses on Cubanness.
Having sojourned through these various theoretical considerations and prior
discourses, we can now turn our attention to Radio Martí.
In the following analysis, I borrow from Méndez Rodenas' (1986)
distinction between the sentimental view and the critical view in early
notions of Cubanness. I employ this distinction as a paradigm for analyzing
the elements which Radio Martí links together as specific kinds
of moments within that discourse. Some preliminary comments may help to
clarify why I adopt this approach. To begin with, let me make clear that
in characterizing some elements as sentimental moments in Radio Martí's
discourse and others as critical moments, I am not simply describing or
cataloguing the program content. The practice of describing implies that
the moments I discuss can be read only as sentimental, on the one hand,
or as critical, on the other. This implication would deny what I have been
at pains to argue elsewhere in this study: namely, that even what presents
itself as a neutral description of a certain set of phenomena has an important
interpretive component. Consequently, the sentimental/critical distinction
should be understood as an analytic distinction, rather than an empirical
one. It is one of a number of possible ways of classifying the content
I study.
I employ the notion of sentimental moments to get at those elements
in Radio Martí's discourse which, on my view, attempt to draw from
and modify (re-articulate) Cuban senses of belonging. I call these moments
sentimental precisely because I read them as trying to work on my
emotional attachment to the island of Cuba and to a Cuban community. In
short, sentimental moments are those most concerned with constructing a
sense of a "we." The notion of critical moments, on the other hand, is
intended to get at what constitutes the "other" of this community--the
"they." Processes of both inclusion and exclusion (or of sameness and difference)
are integral to the building of senses of community (and hence, of self).
By defining the sentimental/critical distinction in terms of the construction
of we/they distinctions, I am adopting an approach aimed at classifying
the moments of a discourse about identity.
I begin this discussion with an analysis of two identities constructed
in Radio Martí's discourse. The first is what I call a (pen)insular
Cuban identity: an "exile" sense of Cubans as belonging to a separated
Cuban community which encompasses both exiles and islanders. The second
constituted identity on which I focus is the identity of the United States.
The point of this consideration will be to show how that voice is coded
as "friendly," rather than "hostile," and how, therefore, it attempts to
articulate a different understanding of the role of the United States in
international and, specifically, Cuban affairs. In the next two sections,
I consider the critical moments in Radio Martí's discourse. These
include multiple constructions of the "Cuban realities" facing islanders:
bleak realities which are, in turn, linked to "Castro" and "Cuban Communism"
as the causes of these realities and, hence, the "real enemies" of the
Cuban people. I then note how in the process of drawing parallels between
Cuban realities and the realities that spurred changes in Eastern Europe,
Radio Martí attempts "to propose new destinies" for Cuba. The final
section concerns the metaphor of "bridging" as employed in one of Radio
Martí's regular programs ("Family Bridge," [39]) and in a specific
segment of the regularly scheduled commentary by Roberto Valero [90].(36)
I interpret "bridging" as a predominately sentimental metaphor--one which,
on Radio Martí, connotes the sense of linking together what was
once whole and has been torn apart. Because "bridging" is constituted as
Radio Martí's primary task in these two programs, I will note how
the metaphor, on my view, works to discursively link together a number
of the sentimental and critical elements on Radio Martí.
The Constitution of a "W/e"
Radio Martí presents itself as a program with diversity. Diversity
is claimed explicitly in the assertion that "Here [on Radio Martí]
there are no enemies; there are only diverse voices" [90]. It is also implied
in the identification of the apparently different voices which speak through
Radio Martí: the "voice [of] Martí" [12], "the Voice of the
United States of America" [9], "the voices of your loved ones, of your
friends, of those who you remember fondly" [39], and the "Voices of Liberty"
[77].
At the same time, however, all of these voices are coded as the "one
voice" of Martí [12]. The point of this construction is to suggest
that what is being transmitted on Radio Martí is consonant with
Martí's vision of a liberated Cuba. On one level, that message may
be read as contradictory--an instance in which Radio Martí's politics
of naming seems at odds with its discourse on diversity. That is, the effort
to articulate the popular image of Martí to other ideological elements
by unifying these elements under one voice seems to contradict the very
notion of "diverse voices" and of the value of diversity.
Alternatively, the construction of Martí as a unifying figure
may be read as an attempt to convey the notion of "Cuban diversity"--the
attempt to express a we which may be comprised of different opinions,
but a we which is nonetheless a "family" sharing in that sense of
Cubanness enacted by "our martyred brother," Martí [12]. And as
a "family," moreover, we can keep our differences "within
the family": i.e., reject "alien" solutions to our problems in favor
of "Cuban" solutions.(37) Clearly, then,
the expression of a "Cuban family" both unifies and distinguishes: it sets
the limits for what gets to count as "the familial" and opens up a space
for defining/constituting "the unfamilial" and even "the adversarial."
Furthermore, the expression of "Cuban diversity" in terms of "family" is,
in turn, extended to Radio Martí ("your other family here" [39]).
Given this chorus of diverse, familial voices, the voice of Radio Martí
cannot be characterized once and for all as "the voice of a hostile nation."
At a minimum, one should consider the voice of "the Cuban exile" constructed
on Radio Martí.
Many of the announcers on Radio Martí present themselves as "Cubans":
a construction which is evident in their fond remembrances of their island
home and in their explicit references to "our country" ("nuestro país")
([24], [27]). At the same time, they code themselves as "exiled" through
references to the distance between themselves and their island home [24].
These Cuban exile identities are enacted primarily during the popular music
shows on Radio Martí. Like pop-music commercial radio stations in
the United States, the music programs on Radio Martí are hosted
by announcers. Radio Martí program announcers introduce songs, comment
on a particular song's history or on some related aspect of Cuban history
and culture, and more generally reminisce about their own experiences of
Cuba.
As I argued in Chapter II, media address is often a form of invitation
to listeners to identify themselves in a particular way. Significantly,
many of the announcers on Radio Martí address each other and their
audiences with expressions of amity, endearment, and familiarity--using
terms like "friends" and "our dear listeners" [24], and on occasion employing
the familiar form of "you" (con tigo and tu, [15]). Spanish
grammar distinguishes between a familiar second-person pronoun (tu)
and a formal second-person pronoun (usted). Tu is considered
an appropriate form of address only for family members and close friends
(viz., our equals) or for those who are subordinate to us. Usted
is used to address those we do not know well or those who are in a position
of authority. Consequently, the use of tu usually connotes friendliness,
informality, and equality; whereas usted often connotes respect,
formality, and authority. Recalling Anderson's (1983) claim that the national
community is imagined as a horizontal comradeship, the argument that Radio
Martí imagines a particular Cuban community is supported by the
fact that some Radio Martí announcers address their listeners as
tu and hence, implicitly, as members of a shared, horizontal community.
A second feature which Anderson (1983) relates to the process of imagining
the national community is the reliance on two modes of temporal ordering:
a historical (or diachronic) ordering and a simultaneous (or synchronic)
ordering. These features also surface on Radio Martí. The historical
component is evident in the recuerdos (remembrances) which many
of the announcers share with their listeners: remembrances of Cuba as it
once was, with a unique natural beauty ([17], [27]) and a rich cultural
tradition ([24], [90]). The simultaneous ordering is suggested by the way
in which the voices on Radio Martí project themselves into their
listeners' space: the way they talk about being "here with you" [24], and
thereby construct a shared space in which they and their listeners can
simultaneously reminisce about Cuba. Clearly, these shared recollections
convey a sense of togetherness--of Cubans united with Cubans in Cuba. Set
against the "reality" of separation--of distance--between exiles and islanders,
these nostalgic visions from afar construct a view of a whole Cuban community
which has been lost. What emerges from this is a Cuban identity which desires
re-union, wholeness, "the reconciliation of Cubans" [94].
Those familiar with Jacque Lacan's (1977) work in structuralist psychoanalysis
may note a parallel between the Cuban identity constructed on Radio Martí
and the subject of desire related in Lacanian theory. Lacan's subject has
two distinguishing features which are apposite to the way I am describing
the identity of the Cuban exile. First, the subject is a marker
for an absence: a fragmentary substitution for a lack that can never be
fully satisfied. Second, the subject is constituted in language--or, more
precisely, through discursive intermediations. This understanding of the
subject follows from Lacan's account of the stages of development by which
the child comes to experience a sense of self.(38)
The Lacanian account of the subject begins with an assumption about
the perfect symbiosis--the perfect union--which the infant experiences
in the womb. In this early context, distinct phenomena do not exist. The
world is a perfectly ordered single entity. Consequently, the infant has
no experience of itself as a distinct self, no recognition of boundaries
between its "self" and some "other." Furthermore, since its needs are instantaneously
met in this perfect union, the infant experiences neither lack nor desire.
It wants for nothing in the womb.(39)
After its birth, however, the infant's needs are no longer instantaneously
met. The absence of nutrition (a lack) and the first experience of hunger
(a desire) is what first makes the infant aware of its separation. At this
moment, the infant's sense of the world as a single entity is disrupted,
and it comes to experience the world as alienation: "The infant becomes
conscious of itself as difference in the denial of its desire. The first
knowledge of the self is knowledge of alienation" (Norton 1988, 12).
As I understand Lacanian theory, the story of the subject is, in part,
the story of a self which attempts to recapture this early experience of
perfect union. This aspect of the self as sameness (to an other) is registered
in what Lacan calls the imaginary order, and is opposed to the experience
of the self as difference (from an other) registered in
the symbolic
order (Lacan 1977; Silverman 1983, 149-193). The imaginary order is
ushered in by the mirror stage (Lacan 1977, 1-7). The child's image
of its self in the mirror invites an imaginary identification with
the image. At this stage, according to Silverman,
the subject arrives at an apprehension of both its self and
the other--indeed, of its self as other. This discovery is assisted
by the child seeing, for the first time, its own reflection in a mirror.
That reflection enjoys a coherence which the subject itself lacks--it is
an ideal image. (Silverman 1983, 157; her emphasis).
This (albeit, fictive) coherence is again disrupted by the child's entrance
into the symbolic order. On one level, Lacan's notion of the symbolic order
is analogous to the Freudian notion of the Oedipus complex. The symbolic
is the realm in which the child becomes aware of sexual difference.
But by characterizing this as the symbolic order, Lacan underscores
that such differences rely on language. The incest taboo generated by the
Oedipal drama (and, indeed, all the other prohibitions by which a culture
defines itself), "can only be articulated through the differentiation of
certain cultural members from others by means of linguistic categories
like `father' and `mother' . . . " (Silverman 1983, 180). In this respect,
the symbolic establishes the conditions of
exclusion by which a
"self" is demarcated from an "other."
Because the symbolic names the child's introduction to language, it
may be concluded that the imaginary order (insofar as it precedes the symbolic)
is pre-linguistic. But it would be wrong, I think, to suggest that the
conditions of inclusion by which a self imagines itself related
to an other does not also involve linguistic categories. In this respect,
I may be moving away from Lacan. But even in Lacan's work--and despite
the unfortunate evolutionary connotation of stages of development--the
subject of desire is conceived as the product of an interplay between
the symbolic and the imaginary. Although the symbolic order disrupts the
imaginary order which precedes it, it does not displace the imaginary once
and for all. On the contrary, the imaginary order, as Silverman explains,
continues to coexist with [the symbolic] afterward. The two
registers complement each other, the symbolic establishing the differences
which are such an essential part of cultural existence, and the imaginary
making it possible to discover correspondences and homologies. (1983, 157).
In this respect, then, the process of imagining the national community
can be viewed as an interplay between the imaginary (which registers, and
indeed seeks, correspondence) and the symbolic (which registers, and indeed
demands, difference). The important point to note here is the extent to
which that imagining is, first, a discursive operation, and, second, an
attempt to recover a presumed lack: and one which can never be fully satisfied.
With respect to Radio Martí, these aspects of the subject of desire
are especially evident in those nostalgic moments in which the exile voices
evince a desire to recapture (that is, re-constitute) a bygone wholeness,
inviting their listeners to identify themselves as members of a separated
Cuban community.
The program Dos a las Dos ("Two at Two") is exemplary in this
respect. It airs twice every weekday "at two" (as the name implies) in
the morning and afternoon (with the exception of Monday mornings, when
RMP is off the air).(40) Dos a las Dos
is hosted (again, as the name implies) by "two" people, "Soñia and
Miqui," who present themselves as chummy, both with each other and with
their listeners. In one of the program segments I analyzed [24], Soñia
begins by greeting listeners and commenting on the distance between them:
Hello, hello, friends, a very good afternoon. Oh, how nice,
I'm so happy to be here with you: here, far, far, far, far. As always I
say far, far, far, and Miqui [the other announcer] tells me over there,
there, there, there, very far. [24]
Two features are remarkable about comments like this one on RMP. First,
note that in articulating a place "here with you," this comment conveys
a sense of simultaneity in the way I noted above. Despite the physical
distance between announcers and their listeners, the voices transmitted
via airwaves confound the distinction between "here" and "there" and articulate
a shared space (a "here) in which they and their listeners can "interact"
with each other: "We will spend two hours with you, so that you and we
can pass two hours a little better" [24]. However, while broadcast voices
can effectively obscure the distance between announcers and listeners,
the voices on Radio Martí sometimes foreground their distance: "here,
far, far, far, far . . . very far" [24]. This distancing is what helps
to code the voices as "exile" voices which evoke a sense of longing to
be "there."
In effect, expositions like the one just considered work to construct
a "separated We"--a W/e, if you will, whose "e" represents the place
of the exile. The voices on Radio Martí enact this W/e in their
references to Cuba as a "nation which has been deceived and divided" [90]
and in their use of a combination of possessive pronouns and place markers:
"yours over here for ours over there" [39]. The possessive pronouns ("yours"
and "ours") evince a sense of belonging, while the place markers ("here,"
"there") imply distance.(41) What emerges
from this is a "Cuba" characterized as a divided community: a division
between "us" and "ours."
At the same time, the exiled voice identifies its distant place as the
United States (especially South Florida and more specifically Miami). The
relative significance of Miami as the place of the Cuban exile is not surprising
given the proportion of Cubans who reside there. Castellanos (1990) notes
that about half of the U.S.'s Cuban population lives in the Miami metropolitan
area (Dade County): relative to Cuba, "One of every ten Cubans now lives
in the United States, and Miami is second only to Havana in number of Cuban
residents" (1990, 50). In several respects, then, "Miami" has been reconfigured
as "the place of the Cuban exile." A largely Cuban-populated and Spanish-speaking
section of Miami which includes Calle Ocho (Eighth Street) is commonly
know as "Little Havana." RMP transmissions draw from this sense of Miami
as the "here" of the Cuban exile: notably, in those segments in which announcers
claim to be speaking from "the Capital of the Sun" ([17], [24]), but also,
implicitly, in those segments in which "Miami" is favorably contrasted
with "Castro's Cuba."(42)
Taken together, the constructs of the "separated W/e, there and here"
and of the "here" as Miami, Florida, mark the voice of the Cuban exile
as (pen)insular. Its
insular origins are indicated in the
sentimental expressions of belonging to the Cuban isle, conveying a sense
of an insular union. However, the three-letter prefix pen- is both
necessary and significant. Denotatively, it marks the voice as one which
clearly emanates from outside the island: in particular, it evinces the
"Cuban" identity of those "exiles" living principally on the Florida peninsula.
Connotatively--and in contrast to the sense of "detachment from
an outside" suggested by insularity--peninsularity implies
a sense of "attachment to an outside." Hence, the prefix pen-
identifies this version of Cubanness as an appendage.
Let me take this point a bit further. In Chapter II, I suggested that
identity should be viewed as the feigned product of discursive articulations:
feigned insofar as identity is never fixed or fully present, but rather
"exists" only as the moment of a particular network of meaning. In this
respect, the meaning of a particular identity emerges out of a set of relations
or linkages. I use the term (pen)insular to convey a sense of the
specific kinds of linkages (the processes of inclusion and exclusion) which
constitute this version of Cubanness.
There is, as well, an almost unavoidable phallic connotation
to the notion of (pen)insularity as appendage. And, in this respect, it
may be worth mentioning Lacan's claims about the place of the phallus in
the symbolic order. According to Lacan's framework, the phallus operates
as the privileged signifier of the symbolic order. Silverman explains that
"the phallus is a signifier for those things which have been partitioned
off from the subject during the various stages of its constitution, and
which will never be restored to it . . . " (1983, 183). It is a phallic
signifier because it stands in for the "symbolic father" whose interdictions
(e.g., the incest taboo) are Law within the symbolic order. Of particular
note, here, is the way the phallic signifier establishes--through discourse--the
exclusionary markers (the differences) which mark the subject off from
the symbiotically whole self of the womb and the fictively whole self of
the imaginary.
It may seem odd that the (pen)insular identity I am describing is at
once concerned with recapturing the erstwhile wholeness of an imaginary
Cuban community (the insular component), but that it also lacks that wholeness
because of its pen-insularity (that is, because it is constituted
by a particular phallic order which marks it as different from "insularity").
But that fragmentation and contradiction is precisely the point of Lacan's
notion of the subject of desire. It desires to satisfy a lack which can
never be satisfied: in this case, because the Cuban community which "the
exile" desires to re-unite has never existed as perfect union.
What emerges, then, is an "exile" notion of Cubanness which is ideologically
and materially "attached to" the United States (the symbolic father?).
Radio Martí foregrounds this attachment to the United States each
time the Radio Martí theme song is aired. As the announcement portion
of the theme song relates, Radio Martí is "a service program for
Cuban, from the voice of the United States of America, transmitting from
Washington, capital of the United States" [12]. In this and other ways,
then, the Cuban identity constructed on Radio Martí is constituted
in relation to a particular U.S. identity. It follows from this
that any attempt to understand the former must take the latter into account
as well.
"The Voice of the United States of America"
Given that I have already characterized Radio Martí as a U.S.
government broadcast campaign, most readers will shrug at the relevance
of noting that Radio Martí constructs the United States in a non-adversarial
fashion. But showing how the United States is constructed on Radio Martí
is relevant for two reasons. The first reason relates to distinctions made
in propaganda studies between different types of broadcasts campaigns.
Some propaganda campaigns are clandestine operations which transmit illegally
and often supply misleading information about, among other things, the
very source of the broadcast. These have been termed black propaganda
campaigns, in contrast to white propaganda campaigns:
As first used, black propaganda described covert propaganda
that "has an ostensible source other than the real source and normally
involves utterances or acts which are unlawful under the domestic law of
the attacked area." Overt or white propaganda "is issued from an acknowledged
source, usually a government or an agency of the government, including
military commands at various levels."(43)
It should be clear from this distinction that a government involved in
a black propaganda campaign may construct itself as "the enemy" in order
to delude its listeners into thinking that the source of the broadcast
is that government's opposition. Consequently, noting that Radio Martí
acknowledges its source is necessary for understanding the type of propaganda
campaign involved here: namely, white propaganda.
But this distinction is only preliminary. Propaganda scholars may admit
that the identity of the communicator is decisive for how listeners will
interpret broadcasts, but they also assume that Cuban listeners already
identify the United States in a particular way--that is, "as a hostile
nation" (Nichols 1984, 37). Consequently, under the propaganda approach,
the fact that Radio Martí acknowledges its source as the United
States suffices to make claims about how listeners will respond to this
broadcast. All other considerations beyond this simple identification are
incidental to that analysis.
As I have argued, however, the (pen)insular Cuban identity which some
of the voices on Radio Martí enact--and which Radio Martí
attempts to transform into personally held senses of Cubanness among islanders--is
linked to the U.S.'s identity. So the second reason for studying the construction
of the United States on Radio Martí is to glean some understanding
of how the exile Cuban identity on Radio Martí speaks itself in
relation to the way in which the United States both speaks itself and is
spoken by the multiple voices on Radio Martí.
Within the forum for airing "diverse voices" which Radio Martí
establishes, the United States is permitted to speak (for) itself in certain
segments: principally, in VOA Editorials, described as "the Editorial of
the Voice of the United States of America, which reflects the points of
view of the North American government" [9].(44)
"The Voice of the United States of America" articulates what may be regarded
as the official discourse of the United States.
Outside the Radio Martí context, this official U.S. discourse
has surfaced, time and again, in the public statements made by U.S. officials
and can be seen working itself out (that is, re-constituting itself) in
the de-classified memoranda of policy makers and in the de-classified transcripts
concerning specific policy issues. Insofar as it is one of the prior discourses
from which Radio Martí articulates certain elements, I should have
perhaps included an analysis of it in the last chapter. But since that
analysis represents a large project unto itself(45)
(and since I assume most readers are familiar with that discourse, anyway),
I provide an abbreviated analysis of some of the moments of that discourse
as these get articulated within Radio Martí's discourse. I begin
by analyzing how the United States speaks itself in the VOA Editorials
on Radio Martí and how "exiled" voices, elsewhere on Radio Martí
speak the United States. I then proceed to outline how Radio Martí
draws from "expert" understandings of the role of the United States in
promoting democracy around the world. A fair portion of this discussion
concerns what is meant by "democracy" both within the U.S. official discourse
and within Radio Martí's articulation of this phenomenon. I conclude
this section by considering how "exiles" construct themselves in relation
to the United States conceived as "the first and most powerful democracy
in the world" [13].
The three VOA Editorials I recorded for this analysis concerned, respectively,
the "liberation" of Kuwait by North American troops [9]; U.S. Congressional
debates over maintaining Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status for China following
the June, 1989, repression of pro-democracy movements in Tianenmen Square
and elsewhere in China; and, lastly, coverage of a recent gathering of
officials from the seven most advanced-industrial, democratic countries
(including, of course, the United States) [116]. Significant aspects of
the U.S. self-image are constructed in these editorials. The United States
emerges as a country which supports "peace," "human rights," "democracy,"
and "open economies," and which opposes "tyranny," "terrorism," and the
"anti-democratic" practices of other countries. On the international scene,
then, the United States presents itself as a "liberator" (most explicitly,
in segment [9]).
A sort of quid-pro-quo logic seems to underpin the inclusion of "the
Voice of the United States" among the diverse voices allowed to speak on
Radio Martí. Since Radio Martí is concerned with safeguarding
"Cuban diversity" against what it regards as Castroism's "monolithic culture"
[90], it shows itself willing to listen to (in effect, to air) non-Cuban
voices which respect diversity. Respect for diversity, then, is part of
what qualifies regarding the United States as a friendly voice. As the
following excerpt from Roberto Valero's commentary indicates, respect for
diversity is an important aspect of how U.S. identity is constructed by
some of the "exile" voices on Radio Martí:
In the United States, as in any other democracy which is respected,
there are differences of public opinions which are quite stark, but a tradition
exists of respecting contrary ideas, of listening to diverse points of
view. [90]
Both the VOA Editorials and Valero's commentary emphasize another significant
feature of U.S. identity: namely, the characterization of the United States
as a "democracy." In fact, the term democracy surfaces a number
of times on Radio Martí--in connection with the role of the United
States in international affairs, with the political concerns which led
to changes in Eastern Europe, with the specific changes sought for Cuba
by recently exiled dissident intellectuals and, of course, in connection
with what "the Cuban exile" wants for Cuba. It would seem, therefore, that
democracy constitutes the normative/political aim underscoring the whole
of Radio Martí's project. But this raises more issues than it settles.
Numerous political theorists have observed that democracy, in the twentieth
century, is a term which has almost universal moral appeal. However, because
democracy can be linked to so many distinct and often contradictory political
practices, its substantive meaning is considerably harder to pin down.(46)
In a manner of speaking, then, democracy is to Western political
discourse what Martí, more specifically, is to Cuban political
discourse. Because these terms invoke such heart-felt responses among so
many, it becomes that much more crucial to discern the substantive linkages
made in concrete invocations of these terms. With respect to the concept
of democracy, Cambridge political theorist John Dunn has warned:
Democratic theory is the moral Esperanto of the present nation-state
system, the language in which all Nations are truly United, the public
cant of the modern world, a dubious currency indeed--and one which only
a complete imbecile would be likely to take quite at its face value, quite
literally. (1979, 2).
How, then, to tease out the concrete form of democracy behind the cant
on Radio Martí?
One of the segments of the regularly scheduled program Enfoque
(Focus) was especially useful in this respect. Enfoque presents
itself as "a segment dedicated to setting forth and analyzing Cuban and
international reality by way of the most pressing events" [13]. The segment
I recorded dealt with two issues. The first was a commentary on dissident
intellectuals from Cuba. The interesting thing to note about this first
section is the way in which the "exiled" voices characterize both themselves
and Cuban intellectuals as subjects desiring democracy for Cuba:
Now that the declaration of Cuban intellectuals has enlivened
the panorama, that we know for certain how they think and how some of them
express themselves, we feel that we are in the presence of people who,
like us in exile, feel a real concern for the Cuban problem. It was surely
not easy to express, as they have done, that concern which has led them
to take a stance in favor of the democratization of the country . . . [13].
The section following this one on Enfoque launched into a discussion
of the future role of democracy in the world. An interesting aspect of
this discussion of democracy is that the voices aired are coded as "expert"
North American voices. One is the voice of Joshua Muravchik, a "member
of the Center of Investigations of the American Enterprise Institute in
Washington, D.C., and author of a book entitled
Exporting Democracy"
[13] (see Muravchik 1991). Another of the expert voices in this segment
is Samuel Huntington's, a professor of political science and director of
the International Studies Institute of Harvard University.(47)
Ceding to these expert voices arguably allows Radio Martí to
offer an authoritative understanding of what gets to count as "democracy"
and what role the United States should play in promoting this form of democracy
around the world. Within that expert framework, a "multi-party system"
and "popular elections" emerge as the most obvious institutional features
of democracy. Less obvious but perhaps more significant are the pertinent
normative features which, also, are articulated to democracy. Via Muravchik's
expert voice, Radio Martí links democracy to nature:
A people's desire for liberty, for freedom from the arbitrary
domination by a dictator or a tyrant, is universal. Democracy is the way
of life which, at a minimum, best satisfies the natural impulse of a people.
[13].
In addition to this, Muravchik/Radio Martí associates democracy
with diversity. A telling aspect of this second relation is the way in
which it is constructed in contrast to Communism:
[C]ommunism tries to conform the entire citizenry in a mode
preordained in the name of socialism. Democracy doesn't try to mode a people
in a preordained fashion. On the contrary, democracy declares: Don't
change; maintain your individual personalities. Democracy is simply
a way of trying to reconcile all the different objectives and desires which
human beings possess in all their diversity. [13].
The conclusion to be drawn from these procedural and normative features
is that democracy (defined in terms of multi-partisanship and popular elections)
is universally preferred to Communism insofar as it remains true to the
diversity of a people and to their natural impulse to be free.
In addition to Muravchik's comments, this segment of Enfoque
draws from Huntington's expert voice to articulate a relationship between
democracy and economic development. The specific point of Huntington's
comments is to argue--specifically against Weber's The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958)--that "economic progress" is possible
in Catholic countries.(48) Two features
are remarkable about this discussion. First, the conditions that best satisfy
economic development (and in turn democracy) are never explicitly defined
in this segment. There is, nonetheless, a tacit understanding that economic
progress is best satisfied via capitalism. That understanding is implied
by the fact that Huntington's comments are set against Weber's classic
study. But what is remarkable about this is that the term capitalism
is never used in this segment (or, to my recollection, anywhere else in
the transmissions I recorded). Instead, the announcers on Enfogue
refer to Weber's assumptions about the relationship between the Protestant
ethic and "economic progress." For this reason, I argue that the spirit
of capitalism is the unspoken logic underpinning Radio Martí's
promotion of "economic progress" in this segment (and of "open economies"
in one of the VOA Editorials [92] I discussed above).
The second feature worth noting about the association between democracy
and economic progress which Radio Martí articulates is that this
association seems to draw from assumptions made by modernization theorists.
Modernization theory developed in the post-war era. It held that
all societies go through the same basic stages of economic growth, developing
from traditional societies with agricultural and craft-oriented economies
to modern societies with advanced-industrial economies. As Klarén
(1986) notes in his introductory essay on Latin American "underdevelopment,"
the political implications of modernization theory were that "Westernization,
industrialization, and economic growth would generate the preconditions
for the evolution of greater social equality and hence, it was assumed,
the rise of stable, democratic institutions" (11). In effect, then, modernization
theorists proffered a unilinear progression from traditional economies
to modern economies, and, then, to democratic institutions. On my reading,
Radio Martí is offering a modernization theory perspective and appropriating
Huntington to show how the proffered link between democracy and economic
progress is possible in a Catholic country, like Cuba, as well.(49)
One final comment worth noting about this segment of Enfoque
is the way in which the expert voices characterize the role of the United
States in promoting (a specific form of) "democracy" throughout the world.
According to the Radio Martí commentator,
a debate has arisen concerning the role which would befall
the first and most powerful democracy in the world, the United States,
in the stimulation and dissemination of liberty around the world. [13].
But no "debate" is presented here. The commentator proceeds to note Muravchik's
argument that
the United States, having been the model for different forms
of popular government, should have as a principle objective of its foreign
policy, the bolstering of new democracies. . . . [13].
And later in the segment the commentator quotes Huntington as saying:
The United States should do all it can . . . to bolster democracy
wherever the economic prospects for it look hopeful . . . I would urge
that we concentrate our efforts on those countries which still have authoritarian
regimes, but where, at least, some of the social and economic conditions
favorable to democratization have already developed. . . . [13].
Given the role of the United States (as "the first and most powerful democracy
in the world" [13]) in promoting democracy, I want to suggest the following
conclusions. First, it is evident that the "democracy" supported with such
fanfare on Radio Martí is liberal (representative) democracy--in
contrast to other forms, like participatory democracy and socialist democracy:
alternatives which are simply never considered on Radio Martí. Second,
this form of democracy is tacitly linked with a specific kind of economic
system: the capitalist system. Third, by presenting "democracy" and "economic
progress" as natural human desires and contrasting them with Communism--significantly,
with no alternatives in between--Radio Martí's discourse arrays
its "family" and "friends," on the one hand, and its "real enemies," on
the other, according to a bi-polar logic, akin to the Cold-War logic underpinning
the official discourse of the United States.
The U.S. official discourse has, of course, undergone some modifications
recently. In particular, U.S. warnings about the "Communist threat" have
given way to swan songs about "the end of Communism." But on my view, these
modifications should not be read as a displacement of the earlier Cold-War
rhetoric. On the contrary, one of the interesting features of discourses
is that, as I have already noted, they draw from prior discourses: they
re-articulate. And hegemonic discourses, in particular, involve a continuous
process of re-constitution. Because no alternatives have been articulated
between "Communism," on the one hand, and "democracy," on the other hand,
what U.S. policy makers have labeled "the New World Order" is still, in
my view, very much trapped within the dichotomous logic which informed
the earlier Cold-War "rhetoric." The following table outlines the dichotomy
underpinning this "New" U.S. discourse.
Table 1. "The New World Order"
| [The Spirit of Capitalism] |
Communism |
| Democracy |
Dictatorship |
| Freedom |
Tyranny |
| Diversity |
Homogeneity |
| Nature |
Experimentation |
| Open Economy |
Centralized Economy |
| Free Information |
Information Monopoly |
| Progress |
Stagnation/Death |
In outlining this table, I have employed terms used on Radio Martí;
the only exception, of course, is capitalism, which, as I suggested
above, is the implicit, unspoken, natural other of Communism, constructed
as "experimentation." (The construction of Communism on Radio Martí
is the subject of the next section.) The disproportionately large size
of the first column is intended to highlight that an important aspect of
the U.S. official discourse is the commonsensical view that "democracy"
is squeezing out "Communism": metaphorically speaking, the Liberty Bell
has tolled the death of Communism.
The point of this table is to note the dichotomously arrayed moments
of the U.S. official discourse which Radio Martí articulates within
its discourse. Once again, however, I want to stress that these two discourses
are not the same. The official discourse of the United States (in both
its "Cold War" form and its "New World Order" form) is a discourse principally
concerned with ordering countries. That is, the phenomena which that discourse
arrays into two "camps" are sovereign states, with specific forms of government,
located in an international system. In contrast to this, Radio Martí's
discourse is, on my view, principally concerned with ordering a national
community. Granted that this ordering also depends on demarcating one "Cuban"
form of government from another, which explains why this discourse draws
so heavily from the "New World Order" discourse of the United States. But
Radio Martí's discourse is aimed at Cubans, not countries. Put another
way, Radio Martí's discourse is primarily a nationalist discourse;
not an internationalist one.
One important consequence of this is that the association posited between
"the Cuban exile" and the "United States," as these identities are constructed
on Radio Martí, does not really have the critical gloss normally
read into notions of political alliances. Rather, that relation
is couched in a moral language--a language in which shared views
on "democracy," "respect for diversity," "the natural and universal human
desire for liberty," and so forth, suffices to make "the Cuban exile" and
"the United States" friends. Consequently, this relation, on my view, has
a quasi-sentimental gloss. That is, alongside the narrower we of
the "separated Cuban community," a broader we is articulated on
Radio Martí: namely, a more inclusive normative community in which
"the United States" and "the Cuban exile" (and "the Cuban people" writ
large) are identified, above all else, as moral allies with the
same normative vision. Within this framework, the United States emerges
as a non-Cuban but nonetheless friendly voice which shares (and, indeed,
helps to define) the exile's concern with "democratizing" Cuba (albeit,
according to a particular, liberal-representative model). Given this understanding
of the United States, Radio Martí does not hide its peninsular link
to the United States. That link is expressed several times a day in the
RMP theme song's construction of the "one voice" of Martí as one
which emanates "from the Voice of the United States of America." In this
respect, then, "the Cuban exile" enacted on Radio Martí is doubly
bound to an outside/inside: it is a (pen)insular construct doubly
articulated (ironically, by its separation) to the United States and to
Cuba.
"Cuban Realities" and Their Sources
Because the United States is constituted more as a moral, than a political,
ally to "the Cuban people"--given any people's "natural impulse"
for liberty--the United States is not the primary voice which articulates
Cuba's problems. I do not mean to suggest that critical moments are completely
absent from the VOA Editorials and wherever else "North America" voices
speak. I mean only that Radio Martí relies on other discursive devices
for articulating "the Cuban problem" [13]. Bearing in mind that the critical
moments, as I have defined these, are those which attempt to (re)construct
the them which poses a threat for us (the them, in
this instance, which has separated the Cuban community), the point of this
section is to analyze how Radio Martí voices the "other" of the
Cuban community.
In order to present its critical view as valid, RMP couches its criticisms
in vocalizations of "Cuban reality" ([13], [95], [98]). As with the sentimental
moments, the voicing of these critical moments involves a temporal ordering.
In the case of the former, that ordering was nostalgic in its vision, engendering
an image of a past Cuba which had been lost. In the voicing of "Cuban realities,"
however, Radio Martí constructs a present Cuba whose conditions
of existence (its "realities") become the explicit object of criticism--a
"reality" in need of reform. What is remarkable about the voicing of "Cuban
realities," however, is that the validity of the critical vision presented
here depends on a reversal of perspective: instead of a sentimental "vision
from afar," the vocalizations construct the critical view as one which
emanates "from the inside." This apparently insular critique is
implied in the use of "testimonies" [95] and of the "real stories" of "dissatisfied
Cubans" [71]. To give a concrete example, the first part of the Enfoque
segment which I discussed in the previous section involves a commentary
on the problems faced by Cuban intellectuals in Cuba. Here, the detractors
of Cuban Communism are voices which have lived under that system: i.e.,
dissidents
rather than counterrevolutionary exiles.
In the process, a sense of simultaneity is conveyed. By explicitly establishing
a relation of equivalence between dissidents (inside Cuba) and exiles
(outside Cuba), this segment employs a temporal sense of in-the-meantime
to imagine the Cuban community in terms of a shared suffering: the implication
is that while exiles were experiencing the problems of separation
and loss created by the socialist revolution in Cuba, some islanders were
experiencing the more concrete, "difficult conditions" of living under
a Communist system. In this way, then, the commentators construct "exiles"
and "dissidents" as simultaneous members of the Cuban community who have
suffered (albeit, in different ways) from "the imposition" of Communism
in Cuba and who share a longing for "the democratization of the country"
[13].
The equivalence established between "exiles" and "dissidents" or "dissatisfied
Cubans," here and elsewhere in RMP transmissions, allows Radio Martí
to mark its critical vision as the vision of those who live (or, at least,
have lived until recently) under the Cuban system. The criticisms are thereby
guaranteed a certain validity: the validity of first-hand experience. And
in the bargain, the insular gloss given this critical vision helps
to efface its (pen)insular origins, obscuring the ways in which
the other voices on Radio Martí (exiled, expert, and North American)
also inform this critical vision.
Concretely, RMP constructs an image of a present-day Cuba which it argues
is at odds, explicitly, with the revolutionary promise and, implicitly,
with Martí's vision of liberty. "Testimonies" of this type serve
to set "Cuban reality" apart from the Communist rhetoric--the "contradictions
and lies" [7]--evident in Castro's speeches. Recall that "Martí,"
especially within the official discourse of Cuba, signifies a revolutionary
figure who warned against "imperialism." Cuban revolutionary discourse
has overwhelmingly defined this as anti-United States. This ideological
linkage between Martí and an anti-U.S. sentiment is what Radio Martí,
for its part, attempts to disarticulate: in part, through its characterization
of Castro as having "betrayed the revolution" by delivering it into the
hands of the Soviet Empire.(50)
This betrayal is implied in one of RMP's "testimonial" segments: the revolution
obtained for the Soviet Union "its first beachhead in American territory"
and "brought forth a profound ideological and economic dependence" presumably
on "the Russian empire" [94]. As Martí's "namesake," then, Radio
Martí implicitly accepts the significance of Martí as a staunch
anti-imperialist (from whatever source). The point here, however, is to
underscore that Martí's concern with Cuban sovereignty is contradicted
by "Cuban reality"--the "reality" of an imposed Communist order mired,
until recently, in dependent relationships with the Soviet Union.
As I suggested in the previous section, the dissolution of the Soviet
Union has been matched by a modification in the official discourse of the
United States. Aspects of this discourse of "the New World Order" have
been integrated into Radio Martí's discourse. As a consequence,
RMP's critical moments rely less on themes of an "outside enemy" than on
themes which construct Castro and Communism as the "real enemies" of the
Cuban people. To articulate that understanding, Radio Martí attempts
to outline the nature of the conditions under which the Cuban people have
had to live.
Insofar as the socialist revolutionary discourse of Cuba constitutes
the revolution as a "popular" one--that is, as something which the Cuban
people want--a number of the commentaries on Radio Martí attempt
to disarticulate this understanding by pointing out not only that the revolution
has had its detractors in Cuba (as I noted above), but also that the space
for dissenting in Cuba has been very limited. To that end, one commentary
mentioned the experience of a political prisoner who had been jailed for
over thirty years [10], while another commentary noted that Cubans who
had revolted against the revolution had been imprisoned and some even executed
[71].
The living conditions in Cuba are also suggested in the episodic program
Qué Pasa en Casa? ("What's Happening at Home?"). The program
follows the life of one fictive Cuban family and depicts, in each episode,
the extremes to which that family has to go to deal with some new problem.
One episode concerned a shortage of school uniforms (uniforms mandated
by the government) and the attempts by the mother and grandmother to "invent"
one out of well-made American bed-sheets which an exiled family member
had sent from Miami [107]. The tacit point of episodes like this one is
to suggest that the Cuban people experience periodic shortages, that the
supply of goods is rationed, and that what goods they do manage to get
are poor quality. The contrast with Miami implies that it (and the United
States by extension) is a place of plenty. This episode is one of the few
places in which the issue of market freedom surfaces, at all, on Radio
Martí. If the spirit of capitalism is what animates Radio Martí's
ideological linkages, that spirit, as I suggested earlier, is obscured
by a more vocal one demanding political freedom.
At the same time, Radio Martí constructs revolutionary Cuba as
a place which poses real constraints on the extent to which islanders themselves
can be vocal. For example, in addition to points about the scarcity of
resources in Cuba, one scene of this episode of Qué Pasa en Casa?
depicts the grandmother and a store clerk subduing their voices for a moment
to criticize the government. In this way, the program characterizes "home"
as a place in which Cubans have to be careful about voicing dissenting
opinions.
Similarly, segments like the Enfoque program on Cuban intellectuals
[13] and program announcements like the RMP greeting [15], which constructs
Radio Martí as a service program designed to meet the human right
to free information, implicitly refer to the existence of censorship in
Cuba. Censorship is also alluded to in those segments which argue that
Cuba was rich in culture before the revolution ([24], [90]). In fact, this
is the entire premise underpinning Roberto Valero's commentary about the
"cultural function" which Radio Martí attempts to serve. In that
commentary, Valero mentions a number of Cuban writers who have been excluded
from the "monolithic culture" which Communism has attempted to establish
in Cuba.
Many of the writers mentioned by Valero are among those Cuban intellectuals
which Carlos Ripoll(51) (1987) argues were
targeted by Cuban officials in the early '70s under the government's new
policy concerning freedom of expression in Cuba. Guillermo Cabrera Infante
is one of these writers. Ripoll cites an article by Cabrera Infante in
which the latter describes how censorship works in Cuba:
One week after returning [to Cuba] I knew that not only could
I not write in Cuba, I could not live there either. I only told this to
a friend, a type of revolutionary non-person. This is the cycle of the
non-person: request for exit from the country; automatic loss of job and
eventual search of house and goods; without work there is no work card,
without work card there is no ration card . . . (Cabrera Infante, cited
in Ripoll 1987, 464).
The experiences of writers like Cabrera Infante are no doubt the subject
of Valero's commentary.(52) This point
is important, for it would be wrong to suggest that Radio Martí's
constructions of "Cuban reality" are entirely fictive. I am not denying
the "lived" experiences of the Cuban people articulated on Radio Martí;
but as I explained in Chapter II, following Tomlinson (1991), these are
but one moment in the interplay between the "lived" and the "represented"
by which "culture," more broadly, is experienced.
Consequently, it would be equally wrong to suggest that the sources
of Cuban problems are obvious (viz., unmediated). But this is what Radio
Martí attempts to do. It presents as self-evident sources of Cuban
problems what are in fact constructs drawn from the U.S. discourse of "the
New World Order" (see Table 1, above). Drawing from this discourse, Radio
Martí characterizes Communism as an "experiment." This point is
suggested in one commentary concerned with the possibility of development
under a centralized economy [113]. In the process, the commentator notes
that other "experimenters" (a reference to Eastern European countries)
have moved away from centralized economies in favor of more open economies.
In contrast to this link between Communism and experimentation, Radio Martí
arrays "democracy," "economic progress," and "diversity" on the side of
"nature." The tacit suggestion is that left to themselves, a people will
naturally desire the latter set of conditions; but "in reality," the Cuban
people have not been left to themselves. Via the contrast between the natural
and the experimental, Radio Martí implies that Castro, as the leader
of the Cuban revolution, has imposed a Communist regime on the Cuban people.
And what is more, Castro remains "immovable" despite changes elsewhere
in the world [113]. This double sense of Cuban Communism as unnaturally
imposed and as impervious to change is conveyed succinctly in one of Valero's
statements:
Castroism, while it may seem to us long, is a passing accident.
As things are today, it is dead. Although the cadaver is not yet mindful
of its own lifelessness: People, it is a cadaver. [90].
In this way, "Castro" and "Communism" are cast as the self-evident sources
of Cuba's problems: "everyone in the country knows who the villain is"
[107].
At the same time, RMP attempts to bridge the gap between islanders and
exiles by arguing that Cuban exiles and the United States are only "invented
enemies" ([90], [96]). Insofar as Cuban revolutionaries like Castro have
characterized exiles as
gusanos ("worms"), the exiled voices on
Radio Martí mark "Castro" as what has divided the community (apropos
my earlier comment that one's position on Castro is what has constituted
membership in the exiled and revolutionary "Cuban communities" which emerged
after 1959). In short, "Castro" is constructed as the villain who has both
created the difficult conditions confronting islanders and who has also
driven a wedge between islanders and exiles, thereby making Cuba "a nation
which has been deceived and divided" [90]. In this way, too, Radio Martí
attempts to articulate the
insular critiques of Cuban conditions
to the (pen)insular diagnosis of the problem.
"Proposing New Destinies"
Taken together, the critical themes summarized above comprise the strategies
by which Radio Martí attempts to disarticulate Cubanness from Communism.
Alongside these negative themes about the "present" are those which attempt
to rearticulate Cubanness to a series of more positive, forward-looking
ideological elements significant in the (pen)insular discourse. In effect,
then, the retrospective sentimental moments which articulate a past Cuba
and the introspective critical moments which characterize a present Cuba
are linked, as well, to prospective moments (both sentimental and critical)
which articulate a future Cuba. "Proposing new destinies" for all Cubans
on the island is, therefore, an important aspect of what Radio Martí
aims to do. This sense is vocalized in the musical portion of the following
announcement for the regularly scheduled program Por Montes y Caminos
("Through Hills and Roads"):
For listeners in the hills and also those outside the hills,
from the path of the cane field to the main road [literally: the "royal
road"], from the plantation to the nearby town, from the sugar mill to
the big city, our appointment is at five in the morning, on Saturdays and
Sundays, through Radio Martí. [Song] To propose new destinies through
your hills and roads. Cuba wants liberty, Oh God. [103]
The desire for a Cuba Libre (a free Cuba) expressed in this song,
like the desire for "democracy," is an aspiration which has a fine moral
tenor but no necessary substantive meaning. After all, a Cuba Libre
was something which Cuban revolutionaries, themselves, also aspired to
have. Within the meaning-constitutive framework which Radio Martí
articulates, however, that aspiration is linked specifically to individual
rights, including the "possibility for a better future" than has been possible
under Communism [77]. Liberty on Radio Martí is defined often
in terms of free information, free thought and expression, free elections,
and, less often, in terms of free market choices. Furthermore, within this
framework, Radio Martí explicitly constructs itself as a medium
by which these rights are made available, by invitation, to Cubans
on the island (the you of the address in the following RMP greeting):
Good afternoon, Cuba. You are listening to Radio Martí.
Always with you: twenty-four hours in your company. Radio Martí:
by the right of every man to be free, to receive information and disseminate
it, to seek his own truth and unfurl it among other men who respect it
of him.(53)
In a series of complex discursive maneuvers, RMP articulates this sense
of liberty through relations of equivalence to democratic institutions
(the multi-partisanship and popular elections of the Enfoque segment
[13] discussed above) and to capitalist economies (obliquely implied in
positive comments about "economic progress" [13] and "open economies" [92]).
The meaning of liberty is constituted, as well, through relations
of difference. That is, what liberty is is also dependent on expressions
about what it is not. Significantly, liberty and its equivalences
are contrasted to tyranny and dictatorship (and the set of
equivalences which are, in turn, related to these "others" of liberty).
As I indicated in the previous sections, these "others" of liberty include
"experimental centralized economies," "information monopolies" or "censorship,"
and, more broadly, "Communism" as that type of regime which imposes itself
on a people, against their "natural impulse," and which "drowns out" Cuban
voices "by a monolithic bloc lacking in historical sensitivity" [90].
By now, these points should seem familiar. What I have not, as yet,
discussed in any detail is the specific discursive strategy by which Radio
Martí attempts to link islanders to change--or, more precisely,
how it attempts to re-constitute them as political actors who can bring
about the "liberation" of Cuba. That linkage is articulated through a relation
of equivalence between Cuba and Eastern Europe. By drawing a parallel between
islanders and Eastern European "Voices of Liberty," Radio Martí
invites Cubans to identify themselves as an active people who, notwithstanding
conditions of censorship and imprisonment, can in unison voice demands
for political freedom.
Against the backdrop of "Communism is dead" and "Castro is immovable"--a
backdrop implying a static reality imposed by Cuban revolutionaries who
ignore historical changes--Eastern Europeans are constructed as people
who faced similar conditions, but who took steps to change those conditions.
This understanding is conveyed in the program Voces de la Libertad
("Voices of Liberty") [77]. In the segment I analyzed, a marching theme
(conveying, on my view, the sense of time marching on) played in the background
while an announcer explicitly drew the parallel I am claiming between Cuba
and Eastern Europe:
[I]t was the daily routine. The Cuban government keeps depriving
its people of their rights and of the possibility of a better future. But
in Eastern Europe, what appeared impossible has become a reality. Today
can be heard the Voices of Liberty. [77].
Radio Martí admonishes its listeners that the struggle for freedom
(that is, for the liberal democratic and market freedoms implied on Radio
Martí) is a struggle which "demands the efforts of each citizen"
[77]. Positive changes are not given by the effortless effort of history;
they are made by concrete political actors. Elsewhere on Radio Martí,
listeners are reminded that "Losers let things happen; victors make things
happen" [100].(54) Hence, in the process
of articulating a particular Cuban identity for islanders to incorporate
and enact, Radio Martí attempts, as well, to transform its listeners
into agents of change: "When we are stuck in a situation that doesn't
permit us to grow like human beings . . . we have no choice but to take
the road to change" ([52], my emphasis).
This construct may seem ironic. "Agents of change" are generally conceived
of as political subjects articulated by leftist discourses. However,
having considered the ways in which "Communism" has been constructed as
a static condition within the meanings constituted by the discourse of
"the New World Order" and rearticulated here on Radio Martí, we
should not be surprised to find that "progressiveness" is a concept which
has been disarticulated from revolutionary discourses and rearticulated
to erstwhile counter-revolutionary discourses. What I am suggesting
is that commonsensical views which link "revolution" to "progress" are
views that emerge out of particular historical contexts: in this case,
out of the political-historical context of the early twentieth-century.
Beginning with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, the revolutions which
emerged in the early twentieth century were set against the then static
conditions engendered by classically rightist forms of government:
from absolutist regimes like Tsarism to the military regimes of Fascism.
Consequently, "progress" was linked to "revolutions" which were left-oriented.
My point, however, is that outside this context, no necessary connection
exists between "progress" and "leftist revolutions."
A different way to put it is that Radio Martí is here attempting
yet another strategy of disarticulation and rearticulation. By characterizing
"Communist regimes" as static and even "dead," it strives to uncouple a
"leftist revolution" from the sense of "progress" with which this is usually
associated. In the meantime, Radio Martí marks the "Voices of Liberty"
as change-oriented, and it constitutes liberty in terms of liberal-democratic
and, implicitly, capitalist freedoms, thereby attempting to rearticulate
change to a liberal orientation. Through a complex of articulations
of both sentimental and critical moments, then, Radio Martí attempts
to bring into being a particular kind of Cuban political actor. Table 2
summarizes these articulations.
Table 2. The Voice(s) of Radio Martí
|
Articulations
|
Sentimental Moments
|
Critical Moments
|
|
Themes
|
-
Sense of Belonging to and Distance from a Past Cuba
-
Natural Respect for Diversity, Democracy, and Liberty
-
Desire for Change
|
-
Sense of Betrayal and Hard Realities in a Present Cuba
-
Experimental Imposition of Homogeneity, Communism, and Censorship
-
Refusal to Change
|
Spoken
Identities
|
-
Exiles and ISLANDERS
-
The United States (North American Officials, Experts)
-
Eastern Europeans
|
-
Castro
-
The Cuban Communist Regime
|
Mediated
Communities
|
-
A Separated Cuban Community
-
A Broader Normative Community
|
[No Community of "Others"]
|
The table is meant to provide an at-a-glance understanding of the various
elements which Radio Martí links together in order to meaningfully
constitute this "new" Cuban political actor. The point is to grasp how
ISLANDERS (the subject position located at the center of these complex
linkages) are invited to identify themselves in relation to the set of
themes (or broad arguments), the multiple spoken identities
(that is, the constituted identities), and the two mediated communities
articulated on Radio Martí. The elements located within the columns
marked
Sentimental Moments and Critical Moments are made
meaningful, on the one hand, via
relations of equivalence among
the elements within each column and, on the other hand, via relations
of difference between elements across the two columns. Equivalence
and difference, therefore, underscore that the emergent mediated communities
articulated on Radio Martí are constituted via processes of, respectively,
inclusion and exclusion.
Within this framework, the spoken identities of Exiles and Islanders
are constituted as belonging to and distant from a past Cuba and, hence,
as members of a
Separated Cuban Community. Furthermore, these identities,
along with the United States and Eastern Europeans, are spoken as identities
which respect diversity, democracy, and liberty, and, hence, as identities
sharing a moral vision which marks all of them as members of a Broader
Normative Community (the "Free World"). These identities and their
respective communities emerge, as well, in contrast to the "others" ("Castro"
and "the Cuban Communist Regime") spoken in relation to the critical themes
voiced on Radio Martí.
One additional point is worth noting. Since "Communism" is constituted
as an imposition, this concept is understood in hierarchical terms: specifically,
as a regime imposed on a people by a dictator ("Castro")
who, in turn, is (or, at least, has been) constituted as a minor player
dependent on an imperial power (formerly, "the Soviet Empire").
Recalling that community conveys the sense of a deep, horizontal
comradeship (a relation of equality), it is not surprisingly to find that
Radio Martí does not articulate its "others" as a community.
Even while the Soviet bloc had existed, the members of that political alliance
were understood in hierarchical terms as dependents or subordinates of
the Soviet Empire. In contrast to this, the sovereign states comprising
"the Free World," have been understood as equal members (obscuring whatever
de facto, asymmetric, military and political-economic power relations may
have existed among members of the so-called "Free World" and may still
exist among members of "the New World Order"). It is clear, therefore,
that the use of the term
community has certain normative implications,
conveying the sense that its members freely choose to identify themselves
as belonging to this community: hence, the contrast between "the Free
World" and "the Soviet Bloc." Within this framework,
community
has never been a term extended to the latter, and it is less apposite now
that "the Soviet bloc" (which was, at a minimum, conceived as a collectivity)
no longer exists. Since this collectivity was understood in hierarchical
terms (as one imposed), there has been no space within this network of
meaning for understanding "Communism" as a freely chosen, popular form
of government. Furthermore, the
absence of this hierarchy helps
to explain why "Castro" is constructed as "the last communist"--a phrase
connoting an isolated identity, rather than a communal one.(55)
Given this implicit us-and-them framework within which islanders are
situated, it is evident, I think, that Radio Martí attempts to re-constitute
Cubans on the island as political actors who can bring a future Cuba
Libre into being. I fully grant, however, that Radio Martí's
efforts may be unsuccessful. One aspect of these articulations which may
mitigate against RMP's being able to effect this agency is that the sentimental
elements (which yield the sense of "us") can be disarticulated from the
critical elements (the sense of "them") by listeners themselves.
That is, a listener may agree with Radio Martí's construction of
"us" while disagreeing with its construction of "them."(56)
The point to bear in mind is that none of the elements are necessarily
linked; rather, each of these links are discursive constructs made in Radio
Martí's vocalizations.
What may help to foster islanders' acceptance of these articulations
(and their concomitant self-identification as a particular kind of Cuban
political actor) is the very normative appeal of concepts like community,
especially when that concept is given the sentimental gloss of a family.
Above all else, Radio Martí works on Cuban identity by playing with
islanders' sense of attachment both to the concrete families and to the
broader, imagined Cuban national family which Radio Martí argues
were separated by the revolution. The desire to reunite both of these families
is conveyed via the all-important metaphor of bridging.
"Bridging"
Family Bridge. [Music] Family Bridge, a program from all those
who are here to all those who are there. The voices of your loved ones,
of your friends, of those who you remember fondly and who want to erect,
with the Radio Martí family, a bridge of love and hope. [39]
I am interested in meditating for a bit on the work of Radio Martí:
or if you like, on one of the functions of Radio Martí. For me,
the most important assignment for this radio program is its cultural function.
I am not talking about culture in a strict, professional sense . . . I
am talking about all the disciplines of knowledge. The most important task
is bridging. Radio Martí has served and continues serving to unite
Cuba and the Cubans. [90]
"To erect a bridge of love and hope," "to unite Cuba and the Cubans": these
are the self-described efforts of Radio Martí. Taken together, the
segments just cited convey the sense of concrete Cuban families which have
been divided by the revolution and of an imagined Cuban national family,
also divided by the revolution. The first segment is from an announcement
for the regularly scheduled program Family Bridge [39]: a program
which airs messages from "loved ones" in North America to "loved ones"
in Cuba ("yours over here for ours over there" [39]), thereby allowing
voices marked as members of separated families to communicate with one
another via Radio Martí. The second segment is from Valero's commentary
[90]. While the sense of a
national family being bridged by Radio
Martí is not explicitly expressed by Valero, the metaphor of bridging
does, at a minimum, convey a sense of distance and loss. And insofar as
a familial connotation to bridging is articulated in the Family Bridge
program, there is, in my view, a carry-over, if you will, of this familial
connotation of the metaphor of bridging in its articulation elsewhere on
Radio Martí. Furthermore, references to the figure of Martí
as "our brother" in the RMP theme song [12] articulates the Cuban national
community in explicitly familial terms.
Bridging is an apt metaphor for what is attempted by Radio Martí.
In its various vocalizations of a separated we, bridging symbolically
expresses Radio Martí's effort to articulate the insular to the
peninsular, to erect a discursive bridge across an ideological gap which
can be measured in miles (the 90 miles across the Straits of Florida which
separate the isle from the peninsula) and in moments (the persistent and
problematic present which separates Martí's past vision of a liberated
Cuba from the Cuban exile's future vision of a liberated Cuba).
Radio Martí attempts to bridge the spatial gap through the conflation
between the "here" and the "there" which broadcasting makes possible. The
voices travel across the 90 miles separating islanders from exiles and
present themselves "here with you," inviting islanders to share with them
a few precious moments of communal interaction. The temporal gap is bridged
especially through the construction of the "there" to which the Cuban exile
longs to return. The Cuba "over there" which still belongs to the Cuban
exile ("our things" [24]) is a largely imagined place: an imagined Cuba
Libre which is brought into existence only as "past memory" and as
"future promise."
We should recall, in this respect, the role which nostalgia plays on
Radio Martí. As I mentioned in an earlier section, the backward-looking
expression of a "past Cuba" rich in culture and natural beauty is one of
the most important discursive devices by which Radio Martí articulates
the identity of the Cuban exile and invites islanders to share the sense
of loss and of belonging to a separated community. Recuerdos (recollections)
are Proustean moments on Radio Martí: moments in which the voices
attempt to recreate the "Cuba of the past." In his Remembrance of Things
Past (1981), Proust noted that the past never dies; rather, it imposes
itself through art, through culture. The voices on Radio Martí express
a similar conviction; the Cuba of their memories cannot slip out of existence
because the art and literature of Cuba (including the writings of Martí,
himself) re-calls this past Cuba. Read this way, Radio Martí's "cultural
function" [90] can be seen as an attempt to let the past recreate itself
through remembrances of the nature and culture of a temporally distant
Cuba. What emerges is a nostalgic vision of Cuba as a loss--"When I left
Cuba, I left buried my heart" [104]. This construct, however, depends as
much on forgetting as it does on remembering: forgotten (insofar as they
are ignored) are any of the political and economic features of Cuba which
may have existed prior to the revolution. For this reason, Radio Martí's
remembrances must be seen to create more than they recreate.
They construct a parallax view of a Cuba Libre which passes for
"memory" and "aspiration."
The bridge erected by Radio Martí, then, is constructed according
to a very specific blueprint: what I have referred to as a network of meaning
or a discourse. In the preceding analysis, I have insisted on distinguishing
this from the official discourse by which the United States formerly constituted
"the Free World" and currently constitutes "the New World Order." By now,
the reason for this distinction should be clear. Radio Martí has
a more specific political aim than is suggested by the notion that it functions
simply as a mouthpiece for the United States. While the United States is
a member of Radio Martí's chorus of voices--and one which undoubtedly
has its solos--it is but one of the several voices on Radio Martí.
And for all that, it is not the principal voice on Radio Martí.
In capsular form, that voice is one which addresses its listeners in the
following way:
You and I are members of a national family. We may have
minor differences of opinion, but we are both Cubans who want to live in
our island home, enjoying the freedoms which every human being naturally
desires. Unfortunately, we have been separated, and we remain apart because
one man relentlessly ignores that people will inevitably cry out for liberty.
Thankfully, Radio Martí has erected this bridge for us. The vistas
from this bridge are incredible. Let's spend some time together here, on
this bridge, and I'll show you a Cuba our brother Martí saw and
a Cuba we may yet someday see and live in together.
This is the principal voice on Radio Martí: the voice of the Cuban
exile.
VI. Conclusion: Other Bridges
As scholars, we may regard ourselves, at best, as colleagues within
an academic community: a self-understanding which is different from senses
of self as compatriots of a national family. Whatever interactions you
(as reader) and I (as author) have had here, those interactions are professional,
scholarly, and theoretical in scope. Consequently, we may not understand
the sentimental appeal of nationalist "rhetorics" like the Cuban exile's.
But we do, on some level, understand the appeal of community, don't we?
If you have accepted my invitation to see yourself as an academic
because, at least in part, of the way I have addressed you--namely, as
a fellow colleague within an academic community--than you understand the
normative appeal of community. Perhaps academia and patria
are, in this respect, not all that different.
Within the respective communities to which we belong, we "build bridges"
all the time, and at times we are admonished not to "burn bridges." Whether
our ties are professional or patriotic, the need for connections is central
to the communities to which we have a sense of belonging. It is this need
which Radio Martí presents itself as filling. Unfortunately, my
analysis does not lend itself to pat conclusions about Radio Martí's
success at closing the gap between exiles and islanders. Given its discursive
strategies, however, questions about the program's effectiveness must,
I think, remain open.
These discursive strategies have included a politics of naming--an attempt
to cash in on the symbolic appeal of José Martí among Cubans.
What Martí actually believed will have less to do with the relative
success of this appropriation than whether or not islanders, on some level,
share RMP's interpretation/construction of him. As Santí (1986)
notes, Martí functions as little more than an "empty rhetorical
emblem" in Cuban politics (143). But the import of that otherwise empty
emblem for Cubans is, I think, implied in the following anecdote about
one incident in the history of U.S.-Cuban relations:
Havana developed a reputation as a good liberty port for the
U.S. Navy. . . . Most of the time Cuban authorities treated North American
excesses, drinking sprees, brawls, and minor disturbances with a mixture
of indulgence and indifference. In one incident, however, on the evening
of March 12, 1949, three drunken North American sailors climbed atop the
statue of José Martí in the Parque Central and urinated over
the monument. The incident provoked rioting and angry anti-U.S. demonstrations,
requiring in the end a formal U.S. apology. What made the event of lasting
effect was that it was well photographed by Cubans, and for years thereafter
the publication of photos of the North American sailors swinging from the
extended arm of José Martí aroused indignation and anti-U.S.
sentiment in Cuba. (Pérez, Jr. 1990, 222).
As this anecdote relates, the United States has "messed with" Cuba's national
hero before. Obviously, its current appropriation of Martí has not
been taken lightly by the Cuban government. But this does not tell us how
the Cuban people will respond to Radio Martí's missive. In the effort
to link islanders to their vision, the voices on Radio Martí enact
a concrete "Cuban" identity--the identity of the "Cuban exile." The features
of that identity are evident in the complex of sentimental and critical
themes, the spoken identities, and the mediated communities articulated
on Radio Martí. Ultimately, the success of its mission will, I think,
depend on whether or not islanders share in the exile's sentimental view
of a separated Cuban community and then translate that sentiment into the
critical vision expounded on Radio Martí.
Two features may facilitate the translation of Radio Martí's
representation of belonging to personally held senses of belonging among
islanders. First, in the process of re-articulating the insular identity
of islanders into a (pen)insular one, Radio Martí draws from commonsensical
understandings of Cubanness: the moments of prior discourses of Cuban identity.
Consequently, some aspects of the Cubanness voiced on Radio Martí
may ring true to islanders. Second, by inviting islanders to see themselves
as belonging to a separated Cuban community, the voices on Radio Martí
draw from the normative appeal of community: the need for a certain
connectedness which Radio Martí's bridging is designed to meet.
I grant that this bridge has been constructed according to a very specific
blueprint. In fact, the point of my analysis has been to consider Radio
Martí in terms of that blueprint: to show, in effect, the bridgings
(articulations) that this blueprint has erected, the other bridgings (rearticulations)
which remain possible, and the still other kinds of bridgings (disarticulations)
which are impossible to construct according to that blueprint. Of the last
of these, I considered the impossibility, within Radio Martí's network
of meaning, of imagining Communist others in terms of community. Both within
this network, and within the broader discourse of "the New World Order"
from which Radio Martí draws, it has been impossible to conceive
Communism as a freely chosen, popular form of government.
That construction of Communism is, however, available via other discourses:
for example, the official discourse of the Socialist Revolution in Cuba.
What this means, in effect, is that representations of belonging to a revolutionary
Cuba are available to islanders, and a fair number of the latter may have
accepted this understanding of themselves: viz., as revolutionary Cubans.
Radio Martí (and the United States more broadly) denies the possibility
that this identity may have been freely chosen by islanders because within
its (liberal) democratic framework, choice is measured against the
presence or absence of a multi-party system and popular elections. Unrecognized
here is that other blueprints for bridging--for satisfying a sense of connectedness--exist
in Cuba, and that according to those alternative blueprints, different
understandings of choice may be possible. This study was written
with these alternatives in mind.
As a Cuban-American--living on the "borderlands," as it were, between
two cultures and experiencing each, at times, as appealing and, at other
times, as imposing--I have staked out a position of ambivalence with respect
to the Cuban revolution. On my view, this ambivalence has allowed me to
accept the possibility that Communism is popular among a number
of islanders. This is not to say that I reject the "exile" desire to close
the gap between exiles and islanders. On the contrary, what this means
is that my impulse is towards accommodation: in effect, towards erecting
a bridge between exiles and islanders according to a different blueprint
than has been available. Unfortunately, many Cuban exiles disbelieve that
Communism can be popular: consequently, they have tended to reject the
possibility of accommodation. Furthermore, international "realities" have,
on their view, proven that Communism is unpopular.
The problem with seeing Cuban "realities" as analogous, specifically,
to Eastern European ones is that the socialist revolution in Cuba was
a popular revolution. Of course, a number of islanders are beginning to
voice anti-revolutionary views, but a number of others still support the
revolution. (Islanders of both types were cited in "Focus--Numbered Days?"
[1992].) Consequently, whether the Cuban revolution remains popular today
is a question which, I think, must remain open. As regards the exile's
skepticism about its popularity, I would encourage, at a minimum, a suspension
of disbelief so that other (perhaps stronger) bridges between exiles and
islanders may become possible.
Appendix
Radio Martí Recordings:
Radio Martí is not allowed to broadcast (or send transcripts
of its programming) within the United States. According to Frederick, "This
is intended to prevent an American presidential administration from using
governmental radio channels to propagandize itself within the United States"
(1986, 19). Despite these restrictions, transmissions can be picked up
here. For this analysis, I recorded Radio Martí Programming (RMP)
transmissions via shortwave in South Florida.
Working from recordings presented two specific problems. First, on occasion
the transmission either weakened or faded out completely. Consequently,
I was not always able to hear entire segments. Secondly, although Spanish
is my first language, I have never had formal training in it; consequently,
I sometimes found the task of translation a challenge. Since I had no written
transcript from which to work, I often had to guess what words were being
spoken, check to see if such a word was listed in the Spanish/English dictionary
I used, and then decide if the word in question fit with the content of
the rest of the segment as I understood it. Given this process-of-elimination
method of translation, I would consider the following a reasonable paraphrase
(rather than a faithful quotation and translation) of RMP transmissions.
For the recordings, I used six 90-minute cassette tapes and recorded
about nine-hours worth of transmissions. The recordings are neither successive
nor systematic. They include selections from transmissions made from June
28, 1991 to July 17, 1991. Actual dates and (approximate) times for each
transmission are noted below. I provide only a brief summary for most of
the segments. For others, I include a translation, and for a select few
I also include a transcript in the original Spanish (no doubt, with a number
of misspellings and omitted accents).
[PLEASE NOTE: U.S. policy regarding the extensive reproduction on
the Internet of Radio Martí programming (or transcripts of the same)
is unclear. For this reason, I have decided not to post the Appendix here.
Those interested in reviewing its content for research purposes may obtain
a copy of the Appendix by e-mailing me at diana@saco.name
.
Thank you, and sorry for the inconvenience. --D. Saco, 4/28/97 (email updated March 8, 2007)]
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Notes
1. Bracketed numbers throughout the text refer to
segments of Radio Martí transmissions which I recorded for this
study and have listed in the Appendix at the end. Details about these recordings
accompany the listings in the Appendix.
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2. For detailed discussions of the Reagan administration's
objectives in launching Radio Martí and of the role of Cuban exiles
(especially members of the Cuban American National Foundation) in lobbying
for its legislation, see Masud-Piloto (1988, 104-108) and Frederick (1986,
24-31). An official statement of Radio Martí objectives is available
in the U.S. government publication entitled Report by the Advisory Board
for Cuba Broadcasting (1989)--hereafter, US/Report (1989).
3. See, especially, Lowery and DeFleur's section
on "Small Groups and Meaning Theory" (1983, 183-184) in their chapter on
the two-step flow of communication.
4. This correspondence is quoted in US/Report
(1989), and also on the Radio Martí Program (RMP) in its regular
segment "Letters to Radio Martí."
5. The link between Nation and Narration has
been taken up by several recent scholars in Bhabha (1990). See especially
Timothy Brennan's essay, "The National Longing for Form" (in Bhabha 1990,
44-70).
6. In my view, one of the best elaborations of the
sense in which lived experience is discursively mediated is provided by
Joan Scott (1991).
7. Gramsci's concern was with state-society relations.
For this reason, I have considered it appropriate to describe his notion
of hegemony in terms of its nationalistic construction of a people.
The concept of hegemony, however, is broadly applicable to any study of
the relationships between a structure or institution and the quasi-social
practices that support and are supported by it. I am thinking here, in
particular, of studies of "the world order" in international relations
theory by "neo-Gramscians," like Robert Cox (1987). In his recent assessment
of the neo-Gramscian perspective in international relations, Mark Laffey
(1992) argues (in my view, correctly) that neo-Gramscians have not sufficiently
addressed the role of ideology (so central to Gramsci's notion of hegemony)
in winning popular consent. My summary of Gramsian theory, in this section,
has benefitted from discussions I have had with Mark about his work.
8. For an analysis of Thatcherism in terms of its
discursive articulations, see Hall (1988).
9. In her dissertation (currently in progress), Jennifer
Milliken has drawn on Schutz's work to outline a notion of pragmatic
contexts. I owe my introduction to Schutz and his relevance for understanding
the discursive mediation of experience to conversations I have had with
her about her work.
10. See the chapter on "Revolution and Response,"
in Pérez, Jr. (1990). For a former insider's view of the Cuban revolution
and its relationship with the Soviet Union, see Carlos Franqui's auto-biographical
account (1985).
11. Speaking before MacArthur Graduate Fellowship
recipients at the University of Minnesota on January 25, 1991, Rafael Dausá,
Third Secretary of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, D.C., noted
that 80% of Cuba's foreign trade had been conducted with "socialist Europe."
In addition to this, he pointed out that whereas Cuba consumes 13 million
tons of oil annually, in 1990, the Soviet Union had exported only 10 million
tons of oil to Cuba.
12. The letter was published in the April 11, 1965,
issue of the Havana journal Verde Olivo ("Olive Green": an explicit
reference to the revolutionary figure's customary garb). A translation
of this is cited in Bonachea and Valdés (1969).
13. This is from a filming of one of Castro's recent
speeches shown on the January 21, 1992, episode of The MacNeil/Lehrer
Newshour, in a segment on Cuba entitled "Focus--Numbered Days?" I have
drawn this quote from a transcript of the episode ("Focus--Numbered Days?"
1992, 9).
14. One perhaps decisive concern which I ignore
is the issue of racial difference. In his study of Ideology and U.S.
Foreign Policy, Michael H. Hunt (1987) has shown how a hierarchy of
race has helped to structure the United State's ideological position vis-à-vis
other nations, including Cuba, serving to justify U.S. intervention in
nations conceived, at least tacitly, as "racially inferior." In addition
to this, Cubans of African descent have overwhelmingly supported the Cuban
revolution, in contrast to the droves of white Cubans which comprised especially
the first waves of exiles emigrating from Cuba. In this respect, sentiments
about the revolution may cut across racial (as well as, class) differences.
But racial issues were not in evidence in the transmissions of Radio Martí
which I analyzed for this study. Consequently, I cannot really comment
on the role it might play in RMP's effectiveness.
15. This sense of residing in the interstices between
two cultures has been beautifully conveyed in the poem "To Live in the
Borderlands . . . " by the mestiza (half-breed) writer, Gloria Anzaldúa
(1987). The work of "women of color," like Anzaldúa, reflects the
new ways in which writing has recently been employed to imagine more fragmented
identities and the complex and contradictory communities to which they
belong.
16. In addition to this, not all exiled Cuban communities
are as explicitly anti-Castro as the Cuban community in Miami. As Eric
Selbin has pointed out to me in conversation, studies of the exile Cuban
community in New Orleans, for example, suggest that this community is less
anti-Castro and anti-socialist in character. Since I have not engaged in
a comparative analysis of these two exile Cuban communities, I can only
point to this difference here.
17. I capitalize Communism to denote that
sense of the term linked to actual political structures in the Soviet Union
and revolutionary Cuba. I regard this as distinct from the (lower-case)
communism of which Marx wrote, thereby leaving open the question
whether the Communist systems established in these countries are actualizations
of the communism which Marx envisioned. This distinction is the subject
of Van Den Abbeele's (1991) essay, "Communism, the Proper Name."
18. It is virtually impossible to describe oneself
in this fashion without sounding irritatingly pompous, for this claim no
doubt implies that some academics and virtually all non-academics are naive
in their uncritical acceptance of, respectively, particular theoretical
positions and particular political/ideological understandings about the
validity of certain truths. On my view, however, the academic skepticism
I describe here is neither necessarily "healthy" nor necessarily appropriate
in all contexts. Recently, some feminist and/or "third world" writers have
offered scathing criticisms of the skeptical turn occasioned by post-structuralist
thinking among some academics. Implicit in their criticisms is the conviction
that political concerns, in practice, require moments in which one's skepticism
must be put aside: this, at least, is the way I have understood Gayatri
Spivak's claim that "the essentializing moment . . . is irreducible" (1987,
205).
19. For the moment, I should note that by peninsular
I mean literally a Floridian and hence "exiled Cuban" view of Cubanness,
and by insular I mean the "island" view of Cubanness. I have borrowed
these terms from Méndez-Rodenas (1986), but in her analysis of nineteenth-century
Cuban identity, peninsularity refers to the Iberian peninsula and the national
identity of Spaniards on the island, while insularity refers to the nascent
sense of Cubanness among members of the Creole class. In contrast to this,
peninsularity and insularity are used in this study to denote twentieth-century
referents, and they have a connotative significance which I explain fully
in Chapter V.
20. Identities are more like subject positions
than social roles. For a discussion of this distinction, see Davies
and Harré (1990).
21. As I have already suggested, however, interactions
need not be face-to-face interpersonal encounters; tele-communicating is
a form of human interaction. This is why I have insisted on speaking about
communities as "imagined" and even "mediated."
22. Vitier's "Cubanness in Poetry," published in
1958, is cited in Méndez Rodenas (1986).
23. What I am proposing here is a shift from an
individualist ontology to a "communitary ontology" as outlined by Jean-Luc
Nancy (1991) in his essay "Of Being-in-Common." As I understand Nancy,
his point is not that we are all alike, but rather that our "being" (existence)
is something we have "in common" with others. Read this way, both similarity
and difference (taken together) are what yield senses of self, and to
be requires a sense of our people whom we are like and
of other people whom we are unlike. Being, therefore, has
no concrete essence since what it is cannot be identified absent
the relationships through which it emerges; but, for this very reason,
being does involve a concrete mode: namely, community. I have implied
this different ontological understanding throughout this study in my insistence
on linking identity (senses of self) to community (senses of belonging
which situate the self). See, also, other discussions of the concept of
the "community of being" in Miami Theory Collective (1991).
24. I briefly analyze this appropriation in the
next section. For a more elaborate discussion of how Fidel Castro and other
Cuban revolutionary figures have appropriated the image of José
Martí, see Santí (1986).
25. This is so even for many second-generation Cubans
(Cuban-Americans), born and raised in the United States. That is, despite
our investments in the United States as "home," many of us who have never
even seen Cuba still, paradoxically, register a subtle sense of loss and
nostalgia for the Cuba which our parents left. Arguably, this is a Cuba
which is as distant and unreachable as the Cuba "imagined" by nineteenth-century
exiled writers because ours is a Cuba refracted through our parents' vision
of a Cuba which doesn't exist anymore, and perhaps never existed. For us,
it exists only as a construct which passes for "memory." As I will argue
below, this (re)construction of "the past" is one of the most important
ways in which Radio Martí attempts to bring a "liberated Cuba" into
existence.
26. I am not suggesting that pre-1959 notions of
Cubanness were apolitical; my point is that they were politicized
in a different and perhaps more implicit fashion.
27. Some readers may balk at this claim, arguing
that when we utter a name, we know exactly who we are referring
to by that name. But I want to suggest that the sense that a name may refer
differently in various situations is not altogether alien in scholarly
circles. We need only consider the conventional practice of distinguishing
between "the early Marx" and "the later Marx" to note the way in which
names may have multiple significations.
28. This is cited in Frederick (1986, 25). Frederick
also notes that the Washington Post, in an editorial entitled "Cuban
Liberty, American License," published (significantly) on July 4, 1982,
also registered its disapproval of the United State's appropriation of
Martí's name.
29. Frederick (1986) suggests that the Cuban exiles
involved in the Radio Martí project were aware of Martí's
criticisms of the United States; they apparently reconciled this contradiction
by arguing that "Martí's support of democratic principles puts him
at odds with the present regime in Cuba" (cited in Frederick 1986, 25).
As I will note below, RMP constructs Castro's regime and Soviet Communism
(until recently) as the immediate obstacles to Cuba's realizing its dream
of national sovereignty. Implicitly, at least, these are constructed as
worse evils than Martí could have imagined, given the historical
period in which he wrote, and far worse than the U.S. "monster" which he
did envision and warn against.
30. Martí's comment is cited in Foner (1975,
31). In the introduction, Foner provides a brief, biographical summary
of Martí and his different perspectives on the United States. The
balance of the book includes translations of some of Martí's essays
on the United States, covering topics as diverse as North American personalities,
North American scenes, the political structure, minority issues, labor
issues, and the threat of U.S. imperialism to Latin American countries.
31. That history has included a complex of political,
economic, and cultural ties between the United States and Cuba. In his
excellent summary of these complex "ties of singular intimacy," Louis A.
Pérez, Jr. (1990) notes the myriad ways in which Cuba's independence
from Spain in fact ushered in a period of dependence on the United State.
32. From Juan Marinello's 1962 essay El pensamiento
de José Martí y nuestra revolución socialista
("The Thought of José Martí and Our Socialist Revolution"),
cited in Santí (1986, 142); my translation.
33. In an article entitled "All Our Own Work: The
Facts of Cuba's History Debunk Claims of an `Imported' Revolution," Tabarés
del Real (1990) argues that the United States "frustrated the aims" of
Martí and other revolutionaries by establishing a Cuban "pseudo-republic":
"Remote-controlled from Washington, it functioned in fact as a neo-colony
for the benefit of its new de facto masters" (4).
34. Edmundo Desnoes, in an early 1960s newspaper
article entitled Martí y Fidel (cited in Santí 1986,
147; my translation).
35. Santí (1986, 144) argues that the "cult
of Martí" began during the nationalist revival of the 1930s which
followed the overthrow of Gerardo Machado. It was in this post-Machado
and pre-revolutionary period that references to Martí as "the Apostle"
were first articulated. Guevara is clearly drawing from the pre-revolutionary
appeal of Martí as a national cult figure.
36. As noted in Chapter I, bracketed numbers refer
to segments of Radio Martí transmissions listed in the Appendix.
37. I am anticipating points I will make in the
subsequent sections which deal with the critical moments in Radio Martí's
discourse. In those sections, I will explain what gets constructed as "alien"
or "other."
38. The following account draws, in part, from the
summaries of Lacanian theory in Norton (1988) and Silverman (1983). In
contrast to the positivist framework which still informs a large portion
of the research in modern political science, Norton (1988) synthesizes
a number of structuralist and post-structuralist theorists to offer an
alternative approach to the study of political identity. In this respect,
her work is driven by the same impulse which informs my study: namely,
by the desire to proffer a framework for understanding identity formation
as a process of discursive intermediations.
39. This account is a little different from the
one Silverman provides. In particular, Silverman finds in Lacan's work
"the notion of an original androgynous whole" (1983, 152)--that is, a sense
that in some unknown beginning, human beings were a union of both a masculine
and a feminine part. She emphasizes that this primordial self was unified
because it had no gender difference. Consequently, the lack which
constitutes the subject of desire is the absence of its other gender--an
understanding which underscores the heterosexism of Lacanian theory. But
the bottom line in either Silverman's summary or the one I provide here
is similar: "The subject is defined as lacking because it is believed to
be a fragment of something larger and more primordial" (Silverman 1983,
153).
40. My source for information about the scheduling
of programs on Radio Martí is the May, 1991, "Radio Martí
Schedule" sent to me by the VOA's Radio Martí Program division at
the United States Information Agency (USIA). Subsequent in-text references
to the schedule are noted as US/RMS 1991.
41. It strikes me that belongingness and
distance help to mark an identity as "exiled" in a way that a mere
sense of origin would not. Note the difference between the voice
which remarks "I am here, but I belong there" as opposed to the voice which
remarks "I am here, but I come from there." The former is, arguably, the
voice of the "exile," while the latter may be characterized as the voice
of the "immigrant." Furthermore, this national sense of "belonging there"
can be transformed into a sense of "longing to be there" which registers
"Cuba" as "loss" even for those who do not have Cuban origins. Something
akin to this transformation is suggested in one of the segments I recorded
in which the announcers characterize singer Luís Aguile as "a Cuban
born in Argentina" [104]. This identification of Aguile is apparently warranted
by the sentiments of the "exile" which he expresses in his popular song
Cuando Salí de Cuba ("When I Left Cuba"). In at least this
unique construct, Cuba as "loss" becomes more significant than Cuba as
"origin" for marking this person as "Cuban."
42. See especially abstracts for episodes of Que
Pasa en Casa? ("What's Happening at Home?"), [107] and [117]: RMP's
episodic situation-comedy about the trials of a family in revolutionary
Cuba.
43. The internal quotations are from Paul M. Linebarger's
1948 study, Psychological Warfare, cited in Soley and Nichols (1987,
11).
44. According to the RMP schedule (US/RMS 1991),
VOA Editorials are transmitted twice daily on weekdays and Sundays and
once on Saturdays.
45. Those interested in a more detailed analysis
of this should refer to Weldes's (forthcoming, 1992) dissertation, entitled
Constructing National Interests: The Logic of U.S. National Security
in the Post-War Era. Taking the Cuban Missile Crisis as her case study,
Weldes analyzes Executive Committee transcripts and public statements by
policy makers (including the Kennedy's) in order to discern the common
senses underpinning the U.S.'s construction of "the national interest"
vis-à-vis Cuba. Consequently, her study is particularly relevant
to my analysis of the U.S.'s Cuba-broadcasting project. Arguably, it is
this early framing of the U.S. relation to Cuba which set the stage, as
it were, for the subsequent Radio Martí project.
46. This multiplicity of meanings is suggested by
the surfeit of political theory texts outlining distinct models of democracy.
See, for example, Dahl (1956, 1985), Barber (1984), and Cunningham (1987);
and, arguably, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) could be included here, as well.
For a summary of several different models of democracy, see Held (1987).
47. Huntington's works are a part of the canon in
the political science discipline. Chief among these are his classic study
Political Order in Changing Societies (1968).
48. On one level, this argument is relevant to Cuba
given that, as a former Spanish colony, its people have been raised predominantly
as Roman Catholics. On another level, this argument simply ignores the
influence of African religions on the Cuban people (both white and black)
and the popularity of Santería ("saint worship"): a hybrid
of Catholicism and Voodoo which is popular among islanders.
49. In point of fact, Huntington's classic work
Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) criticizes the simple
linear progression proffered by modernization theory. Briefly, Huntington
argues that modernizing economies often experience an increase in political
demands from various social groups; but in societies which lack the political
institutions through which to channel these growing political demands,
rapid modernization can in fact lead to authoritarianism. The subtleties
of Huntington's work--such as they are--seem to be glossed over by Radio
Martí in this segment. That said, Huntington is nonetheless commonly
understood (within the political science discipline, at least) as proffering
a liberal image which locates democracy at the end stage of political development
and links this with the strengthening of political institutions, on the
one hand, and economic development, on the other.
50. The quotation is actually from the State Department
"white paper" of April, 1961 (cited in Pérez, Jr. 1990, 248), and
not from Radio Martí. According to Pérez, the "revolution
betrayed" argument became "the linchpin of the North American propaganda
campaign against Cuba" (249). Not surprisingly, the argument resurfaces,
at least implicitly, in some of the constructions of the Cuban government
depicted in Radio Martí transmissions. However, due to the changes
that had taken place in the erstwhile Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe
(up to July, 1991, when I made these recordings), this "revolution betrayed"
argument had begun to give way to a "Communism is dead" argument. I suspect
the latter argument has taken on gargantuan proportions on RMP transmissions
now that the Soviet Union has been dissolved.
51. Ripoll is a Cuban exile and professor of Romance
Languages at Queens College, New York. He has written a number of articles
on Cuba.
52. For a more detailed account of the censorship
policy in Cuba and its effects on Cuban intellectuals, see Ripoll (1987).
53. This greeting [15] is repeated several times
throughout the broadcast day (like the RMP theme song [12]): furthermore,
in each of my recordings, this standard RMP greeting was transmitted immediately
prior to one of the several news broadcasts given throughout the day. In
this way, RMP's self-construction as a medium for the dissemination of
"information" is linked to its "objective news" coverage.
54. Segments [77] and [100] are program announcements
for, respectively, "The Voices of Liberty" and "The Art of Living." As
such, they are repeated often throughout a given week's broadcast.
55. While this characterization is implied in Radio
Martí's constructions of "Castro," the quote is actually from a
recent episode of the PBS series Frontline, entitled "Castro: The
Last Communist" (1992). Furthermore, one of the ways in which Castro and
Cuban Communism is linked to authoritarianism is through associations made
between Castro and fascism. The term for this is Red Fascism. (I
am grateful to Jutta Weldes for introducing me to this phrase.) The Frontline
episode articulated this understanding in one segment which argued that
Castro learned his speech-making techniques by studying Mussolini: and,
to drive the point home, this segment intercut images of Castro and Mussolini
employing similar mannerisms while making speeches. On Radio Martí,
the "Red Fascism" of "Castroism" is suggested in Valero's statement that,
"Castroism--like all movements which are retrograde, rightist and conservative--desires
to eliminate the differences . . . " ([90]; my emphasis). Given this association,
egalitarian understandings of "Communism" (viz., in terms of community)
are impossible within this framework.
56. For the most part, I found that this was my
response. At the same time, however, I must admit to moments in which I
was agitated out of my habitual "Cuban-American" ambivalence and found
myself feeling decidedly "anti-Castro." These moments, moreover, were largely
a response to RMP's sentimental appeal, and not to its "incisive critical
analysis of Cuban realities." Of course, I am not suggesting that other
listeners (especially islanders) have or will have the same responses.
Let me reiterate that my position is "Cuban-American": furthermore, even
other Cuban-Americans will likely register different responses.
URL: http://diana.saco.name/Radio_Marti_MA.html
© 1997-2007 by Diana Saco. Created April 28, 1997. Last updated March 8, 2007.
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